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Abstrdct 
The Financing of Small Firms in Saudi Arabia: 
A study of Informal Investors Characteristics and Investment Decision- 
Making 
This thesis is submitted as fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Mohammad Abalkhail, Business School, Loughborough University 
Recently, informal venture capital investors have been recognised as an 
important source of financing small & medium sized enterprises(SMEs). 
Unfortunately, very little research (if any) has been devoted to understanding 
how these investors fund particular investments in developing countries. 
This research study conducts the first-ever, detailed investigation in Saudi 
Arabia of the informal investor's characteristics, and decision-making 
behaviour across the full investment process. A theoretical framework, based 
on the asymmetric information that characterises this market, was used. 
Five hypotheses were developed to see how informal investors behave to 
reduce the inefficiencies and risks associated with the asymmetric 
information problem. 
Data from 156 Saudi informal investors were compiled. To analyze the data, 
three statistical methods, Factor Analysis, Cluster Analysis and Two-Way 
ANOVA, were applied. 
A descriptive picture of the profile and the investment activities of informal 
investors is presented in Chapter Seven. Research hypotheses related to 
investors' decision-making were then tested in Chapter Eight. First, the 
study shows that informal investors in Saudi Arabia depend on personal 
searches for investment opportunities. This is clearly supports the view that 
the flow of information between entrepreneurs and informal investors is 
inefficient. Secondly, in order to select a high quality entrepreneur and 
venture, investors use specific criteria though clearly the entrepreneur's 
reputation is the most important criterion. Third, informal investors use 
staging of finance and involvement in the venture to have access to 
information and gain better control over the venture. Fourth, informal 
investors apply the above methods to reduce the risks of the agency problem. 
However, informal investors in Saudi Arabia prefer to monitor the behaviour 
of entrepreneurs through outcome-based incentives with moderate use of 
involvement and behaviour monitoring. 
In concluding the thesis, recommendations and the possible implications of 
these findings are discussed. Finally, future research is suggested that may 
improve the understanding of informal investors but which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis or which depends on its findings. 
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Introduction 
, It is generally recognised that small firms have a very important 
influence on the future growth of today's - economies. Emphasis on the 
economic contribution of small businesses is now a familiar characteristic of 
both developing and developed economies. Research has shown that five 
main types of economic benefits are produced by small businesses : 
innovation, employment, a 'shock absorber' role in declining sectors, 
increased competition, and flexible specialisation. 
In Saudi Arabia small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent 
81% and 7% of businesses respectively. However, until recently this very 
important sector of the Saudi economy received very little attention from 
public and private organisations. 
According to many studies, the most important constraint that is facing 
SMEs in Saudi Arabia is the difficulty of obtaining external funds. About 
68% of SMEs in Saudi Arabia depend on their own savings to provide funds 
for their ventures, and 17% obtained funds from informal sources. 
Informal investors are recognized as an important source of financing 
SMEs. Informal investors are private individuals who provide money to a 
private business through non-institutional channels. 
This study notes the lack of research that explores the behaviour and 
practices of informal venture capital investors in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, 
research has shown that informal markets in developing countries are 
expected to be considerable. 
A full understanding of informal investors is very important to provide 
information to policyrnakers; and small firms in order to expand and increase 
efficiency in this market. Also, such a study will fill a gap in the literature 
concerning the behaviour of informal investors in a developing country. As a 
xv 
pioneer study about risk capital investors in Saudi Arabia, the study will 
attempt to answer the following question: 
Research Question 
What are the characteristics, investment activities 
and the decision-making behaviour of informal investors 
in Saudi Arabia? 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This research begins with the operational definition of the focal point 
of the study: the informal risk capital investors, whose activities meet the 
specific criteria to be considered as informal investors for the purpose of this 
study. These criteria are: 
1. That they should provide equity financing to a new or growing business; 
2. That the financing should have occurred during the last five years; 
3. That the investor has no close family connection with the entrepreneur. 
The informal investors are private individuals who provide money to a 
private business through non-institutional channels. The business must 
produce a product or service and must have been founded by someone other 
than the investor or his close family members, such as father, son, brother or 
uncle. The investment must be in the form of equity. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study aims to: 
I- Specify the characteristics and investment activities of informal investors 
in Saudi Arabia; 
2- Formulate and test hypotheses related to how informal investors make 
their investment decision during: 
- Deal origination, 
- Evaluation, 
- Post-investment. 
xvi 
It is important that the research study should be based on a theoretical 
framework. Therefore, as Chapter 5 will show, agency theory will be used to 
explain informal investors' decision behaviour throughout the complete 
investment process to reduce the possibility of agency risks (i. e. the risk that 
the entrepreneur will not use the investors' money in the responsible manner 
agreed upon). 
Structure of the study 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter One. The Financial System In Saudi Arabia 
An overview of the financial system in Saudi Arabia is undertaken in this 
chapter. Particular attention is placed on the financial institutions that are 
operating in the system. 
Chapter Two. Financing SmaIl & Medium Sized Businesses 
This chapter provides insights into the importance of SMEs. It then discusses 
the financing problem that face these firms in developed and developing 
countries. The role of Saudi commercial banks and government institutions 
in helping SMEs to grow, is considered. Emerging sources of finance to 
SMEs, such as venture capital, are briefly reviewed. 
Chapter Three. Venture Capital Firms (Formal) 
This chapter deals with the concept of venture capital. The chapter looks at 
the all-important issues that appear in the literature in developed countries. A 
review of a general survey that was carried out by the researcher, in an 
earlier stage of this study, in order to investigate the availability of this 
source in Saudi Arabian economy is presented. Because the Saudi's 
economy lacks venture capital firms that provide finance to SMEs, the 
xvii 
availability of the second'source of venture capital, which is known as 
informal venture capital, is discussed in the next chapter. 
-- Chapter Four. Informal Venture Capital Investors (literature review) 
In this overview of the informal investors' literature, an outline is given to 
identify research gaps which need further attention. However, a 
comprehensive analysis of past research findings is incorporated into the 
presentation of the results in Chapters 7 and 8. The availability of informal 
investors as a'source of finance to SMEs in Saudi Arabia is supported 
through the review of the general survey The survey concludes that informal 
investors play an important role in providing finance for SMEs. The chapter 
then develops the research question which this study is supposed to answer. 
Chapter Five. The Analytical Framework 
This chapter provides an analytical framework for the research variables. 
First the study's scope and the research objectives are reviewed. Asymetric 
information and the agency problem were used to construct the study 
framework. The research hypotheses are developed throughout the chapter. 
.. 
Chapter Six. The Research Methodology 
In order to meet the research objectives, this chapter will describe the 
research method, the selection of population samples and the data collection 
processes utilised. In addition, the generalisation of the results is undertaken. 
Chapter Seven. Informal Investors' Profile and Investment Activities 
A descriptive analysis is given in this chapter to provide more knowledge 
about the characteristics and investment activities of Saudi informal 
investors. In addition, a comparison analysis of international past research 
findings is incorporated into the presentation. 
xviii 
Chapter eight. Decision-Making Behaviour 
The analysis in this chapter is divided into three sections: 
- Deal Origination, 
- Evaluation, 
- Post-investment 
The hypotheses related to each section are statically tested. Informal 
investors' behaviour is explained within a theoretical framework. The 
statistical methods utilised in this chapter range from Frequency distribution 
to Factor and Cluster Analysis. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion provides a summary of the results, discussion, 
recommendations and future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN SAUDI ARABIA 
1.1 FRAMEWORK 
1.1.1 Introduction 
There are very important relationships between the financial system 
of a nation (and, indeed, the world) and the enormously varied and 
complex activities'of people working, buying and selling as part of the 
ordinary course of human affairs. The financial system includes both 
markets for financial instruments and those institutions concerned with 
financial transactions, just as the 'real' component of the economic system 
includes both markets for goods and services and those institutions that 
bring together people and resources to produce goods and services. The 
financial system is a vital component of the total economic system, 
greatly increasing its capacity to satisfy the needs and wants of people for 
such goods (Cooper, 1986). 
A developed financial system is recognised as one of the most 
important inputs to economic development in the development 
hypothesis. Over the last two decades a growing number of economists - 
Adams, Chandavarker, Fry, Shaw and McKinnon, among others - have 
agreed that a well-developed financial system does matter in economic 
development, ranking pari passu with other necessary 'inputs' such as 
natural resources, labour markets, management, technology and 
entrepreneurial ability(Al-Dukiel, 1995) 
Jao and Fry have made empirical tests of the Shaw-McKinnon 
hypothesis. Jao uses data from a large number of countries, both 
developed and developing, during 1967-73, while Fry employs time- 
series data from seven to ten less developed Asian countries during 1962- 
72. Both studies support the hypothesis that 'financial conditions 
positively influence saving and economic growth (Lee-, 1982). 
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However, the debate about which is going to lead in the 
development process: the financial system development or the real 
economy is still an unanswered issue. In general, most economists agree 
on the issue that financial system development is vital in the route to 
growth. 
The functions and roles for a financial system in an economy can 
be summarised as follows: 
(1) managing the payment system; 
(2) providing aý mechanism of savings and borrowing with different 
portfolio preferences, and direct funds towards more productive 
projects; 
(3) promoting general efficiency in the economic system, e. g. risk, 
information; and 
(4) promoting economic stability. 
The efficiency of channelling funds between savers and investors is 
said to be at the heart of the role of the financial system. Financial 
intermediaries and financial markets act between the two players in the 
markets (savers and investors) in order to match their preferences. 
Theoretically, it is assumed that with efficient financial institutions, funds 
will be invested in the more productive projects. 
The way of transaction between these two units used to take the 
direct contact (financial markets) route. However, due to several 
problems that restricted the efficiency of the market (like asymmetric 
information), an indirect (Bank) way of channelling funds between savers 
and borrowers has emerged. In the last few years financial markets have 
taken a large part of the Banks' market due to improvement in the 
efficiency of information technology. With either one (Bank or financial 
markets), channelling funds by using financial instruments that 
3 
differ in type and complexity 
efficiency and society preferences. 
reflects - the system development, 
I 
With a fast growing country like Saudi Arabia, the emphasis on 
developing the financial system becomes more important. In the Sixth 
Development Plan 1996, the private sector was given a large role in the 
provision of financial requirements. Of the total investment financing 
requirement of SR 472 billion over the five years, SR 213 billion is 
expected to come from the private, sector. The question which should be 
raised here, is how the Government is going to encourage the private 
sector to play this role, especially if the financial system is left 
unimproved with a small and unstable stock market, very limited money 
market and the reluctance of banks to take the risk of financing new 
projects. These new projects represent a high percentage of the demand 
in the Saudi market. 
However, in a country like Saudi Arabia, developing the country's 
financial system is not an easy task. History suggests that the specific 
structure of the banking and financial set-up adopted by a country is not 
only a product of its stage of economic development but is guided by its 
culture, beliefs, tradition, ethos and political orientation. As Al-Dukeil 
explained: "The specific structure of Saudi society and its religious 
orientation and beliefs have often brought it into conflict with the needs 
of the free-market economy [Western Model] that the country adopted for 
the country's economic structure" (Al-Dukeil, 1995: 19). The Government 
is facing a challenge to integrate the financial system into the country 
culture. It seems that the Government has not been concerned about what 
motivates the supply and the demand for funds. This is apparent from 
government policies and plans for the reforming of the Saudi economy. 
There are many issues (one of them being the legal identity of the interest 
rate) in the financial system which have to be debated for a healthy 
growth to its financial system to take place. 
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In the country's Sixth Development Plan, the Government faces the 
challenge of encouraging the private sector to take the important role that 
was given in the Plan. Looking at the last two Development Plans, it is 
apparent that the Government has failed to reach the target of growth 
rates in the private sector. I, 
Table 1.1 
Actual and Target Growth Rates 1985-95: * 
4th 5-Year Plan 5th 5-Year Plan 6th 5-Year Plan 
1985-95 1990-95 1995-2000 
Target Actual Target Actual Target 
Total non-oil 
sector: 
Govemment 1.7 0.8 2.8 2.7 
Private 3.5 - -1.8 4.15 1.5 4.3 
* Annual compound growth rates (in constant 1970 prices). 
Source: Sixth Development Plan 1996 (Review): Professor J. R. Presley, 
The Saudi British Bank (1996) 
With the previous represented data in mind, for a steady 
development, the Saudi Government has to review its policies and the 
structure of its financial system, bearing in mind that society's preferences 
is one of the major issues in its development. 
On the other hand, the Saudi investor, with limited developed 
investment instruments, is experiencing difficulty finding good 
investment opportunities to meet his or her preferences. This has 
transferred a high percentage of the country's savings towards high risk 
and non-productive investments like real estate speculation. These days, 
in the Saudi market, a large number of businessmen who are using their 
5 
money, friends' or relatives' money, to speculate in real estate prices or to 
finance export trading. 
1.1.2 The Saudi Financial System 
Seventy years ago the area that now comprises the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia had no universal currency, rather, a number of foreign 
currencies, notably the Maria Theresa Thaler, were used for transactions 
(Johany, 1986: 150). However, the Saudi Arabian Government, in 1927, 
introduced a silver riyal to standardise the country's monetary units and to 
replace all the coins which were then in circulation. The British gold 
sovereign was used as the standard base. The two were circulated side- 
by-side and the ratio was riyal/sovereign 10: 1. As the market prices of 
gold or silver were changing such a ratio was not stable. This system 
served the financial transactions needs for most of the Kingdom prior to 
oil production. In the Hijaz, where pilgrims come from all over the world 
to Mecca and Medinah, transactions were extensively monetarised. In 
that region the business of money changers was active. 
"New found oil (30's, 40's) wealth in the Kingdom attracted the 
attention of foreign banks and bankers... Banking firms were also 
created by the local money-changers. Like their predecessors, they 
refrained from calling themselves banks. However, they accepted 
deposits on demand accounts and occasionally granted loans either 
free of charge or with a 'service' charge. In recognition of their role 
in the development of the country, they were allowed to expand... 
The vast majority of people in the Kingdom preferred to hold their 
funds in bullion either at home or with the money-changers. 
However, the idea of banking started catching on. " 
(Al-Dukeil, 1995: . 27) 
As the system got more complex, the need for an institution 
responsible for ensuring the stability of the Kingdom's currency and 
handling the Government's exchange and payments needs was becoming 
more obvious. The "Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency [SAMAI was 
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founded in conjunction with plans drawn up by US Federal Reserve 
Board experts who, under point four program auspices, -visited the 
Kingdom in 1951"(Adnan, 1984, P 34 ). SAMA was created in October 
1952. The period between the 1950s and the 1970s saw a rapid growth 
in the expansion of the financial institutions and the power of SAMA as a 
Central Bank. A few points can be stressed in this period: 
- the number of banks through the further establishment of both local 
banks and branches of foreign banks rose dramatically to meet the 
developments in financial transactions; 
- the currency transfer from a Coin Riyal to Notele Riyal was officially 
pegged at the US dollar at the rate of 3.75 riyals; (Al-Dukiel, 1995: 29 
- the power of SAMA was gradually increased to supervise banks, 
stabilise currency and reduce inflation; 
- an important banking development from the point of view of SAMA's 
effectiveness in regulating the banking system was the enactment of 
the Banking Control Law of 1966 (EI Mallaka, 1982: 301); 
- money changers played an important role, and in many cases they 
were closer to individuals than commercial banks even in view of the 
fact that they were not under the control of SAMA. One of the 
reasons behind this was the religious view towards the charging of 
interest (riba). 
1.1.3 The Structure Of The Financial System after 1973 
The sharp rise in oil prices in 1973 was the turning point in the 
Saudi Arabian economy. On the financial structure, SAMA found it 
inefficient to leave only two national banks dominating most of the 
system where the other 14 foreign banks competed in a small percentage 
of the market (about 20%)(Wilson, 1982: 285 ). The decision was 
therefore taken in 1977 to Saudiise the foreign banks already operating in 
the Kingdom. 
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As revenue from oil was the main element of GDP, the 
Government thought this situation needed to be changed gradually by 
diversifying production. The Government introduced its first Five-Year 
Plan. Commercial banks were reluctant to take the lead in financing the 
development due to problems in the structure of the economy and the 
experience of these banks. However, the Government established 
specialised banks to channel the oil income to the more productive 
companies, industrial, agricultural, etc. The system gradually developed 
until it reached the 1990s with the structure that appeare in Figure (1.1). 
For a better understanding of the challenge and the future growth of 
the Saudi financial system, a few issues should be raised before we 
proceed to analyse individual institutions. 
0 Saudi Arabia is a Muslim country with regard to both the religious 
practices of the people and the law of the country. The majority of 
Islamic scholars agreed that the interest rate is the riba which is 
prohibited in the Holy-Qu'ran. So when the Government could not 
justify the interest rate under the legal system of the country, it 
established Courts outside the Ministry of Justice to solve interest rate 
based disputes. This conflict has affected the development of the 
financial system and will affect its future. 
0 One of the obvious characteristics of the Saudi economy is its 
openness to trade and financial flows. This emphasises the need for a 
sound and strong financial system. 
0 The Government had taken the lead in financing the private sector 
during the 1970s and 1980s. As planned, the Government provided a 
back-up which would open the market for private financial institutions 
and slow the heavy outflow of capital. 
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Figure 1.1 Saudi Arabia 
Structure of the Financial System 
I. Included in Monetary Survey: 
MONETARY AUTHORITY -10. Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) 
1 Albank al Saudi Al Faransl 
2 Albank A[ Saudi Alhollandi 
3 Arab national Bank 
4 Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation 
COMMERCIAL BANKS', 5 National Commercial BAnk 
6 Bank AI-Jazira 
7 Rlydh Bank 
8 Saudi American Bank 
9 Saudi British Bank 
10 Saudi Investment Bank 
11 Saudi Cairo Bank 
12 United Saudi Commercial Bank 
If. Excluded from Monetary Survey: 
1 Real Estate Development Fund 
2 Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
S SPECIALIZED CREDIT INSTITUTION 3 Public Investment Fund ý 
4 Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank 
5 Saudi Credit Bank 
11 Investment Companies 
OTHER NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 Insurance Companies 
33 Money Exchange Companies 
4 4 Other 
C Pension Fund AUTONOMOUS GOVERMENT INSTITUTIONS F- 
-2 General Organization of Social Insurance (GOSI) 
Source: SAMA 
1.2 THE SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY AGENCY (SAMA) 
1.2.1 SAMA was established by the Royal Decree of April 1952. Its 
power has gradually increased and, with the co-operation of the 
Government, all the challenges and the limitations on the available 
monetary policy tools have been overcome. Latterly, SAMA is 
recognised as "one of the most powerful and unique monetary authorities 
in the world" (Adnan, 1984: 333). With a developing country like Saudi 
Arabia, a Central Bank is a very important institution to carry out long- 
term goals. 
Despite the fact that the Royal Decree establishing SAMA did not 
specify the extent of the Agency's powers, its primary monetary activity 
responsibilities can be broken down into the following: 
(1) Regulation of the money supply. 
(2) Stabilisation of the external value of the riyal. 
(3) Supervision of banking activities and the financial system. 
(4) Serving as government banker. 
(5) Management of foreign reserves. 
(6) Promotion of economic development. 
(7) Undertaking financial and economic research. (El Mallaka, 1982 ). 
1.2.2 Managing the internal and external Saudi currency with limited 
market tools was one of the successes of SAMA. One of the things that 
SAMA opposed strongly was the internalisation of the riyal. After the 
mid-1950s crises, where the riyal depreciated, SAMA pledged the riyal to 
the US dollar at SR 4.5. After some amendments, the riyal was fixed at 
SR 3.75. 
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1.2.3 Regulation of banking institutions has been the primary role for 
SAMA. A sound banking system was a vital issue for economic 
development. With only one national bank and a few foreign banks 
which do not serve the local people, SAMA had a long way to go to 
establish banking habits with Saudi citizens. 
The first major move that SAMA made was the Banking Control 
Law in 1966, which was a result of a few crises in the financial system. 
This regulation improved the effectiveness of SAMA in controlling the 
banking practices, in Saudi Arabia. The major issue here was a sound 
banking system which was SAMA's primary concern from its 
establishment, until the 1990s. SAMA also used its power to encourage 
the participation of banks in lending, for more development-oriented 
purposes. 
Secondly, in the 1960s, SAMA encouraged foreign banks to open 
new branches in the country. , As a result, ten international banks were 
represented in the country. Since then, SAMA has promoted a policy of 
'Saudiization' of banks to encourage greater participation by Saudi 
'nationals'. "The decision was therefore taken in 1977 to Saudiise the 
foreign banks already operating in the Kingdom, and then permit them to 
expand their activities" (Wilson, 1982: 386). "As a result, by the end of 
the Second Plan, 1979, 'of the twelve banks in operation only three were 
non-Saudi. The total number of bank branches rose from 79 at the end of 
the First Plan, 1974, to 140 by the end of 1979" (Al-Dukeil, 1995:. 37). 
Finally, money-changers were the traditional controllers of personal 
banking services in the Kingdom, the major reason behind this being that 
most money-changers do not deal with interest rates, which are viewed by 
the Saudi people as a sin in an Islamic perspective. "In 1979, the four 
major money-changing companies in Saudi Arabia were 
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operating 250 branches, while the total number of branches of the 
commercial banks amounted to 140" (Al-Asaat, 1986: . 23). This 
expansion of money-changers reduced the power to control the financial 
sectore because they were not under SAMA control. Thus on December 
12-1981 new regulations were issued to bring the money changers 
activities under SAMA control, limiting their acceptance of deposits, 
making loans or engaging in any investment activities. This encouraged 
the Al-Rajhi Investment Company, which is the biggest money changer, 
to be converted to a commercial bank, becoming the only commercial 
bank that practices Islamic banking procedures. 
1.2.4 Monetary Policy 
As the country entered the 1970s with a rising oil revenue, the 
presence of government spending was the major determinant of money 
supply. This left SAMA with little power to affect the money supply. 
Also, banks were considerably in excess of the minimum legal reserve 
requirement which was the only tool in the hands of SAMA. 
As production capacity in the economy has grown and government 
spending levels have moderated, so the problem of inflation has 
significantly diminished. Between 1979 and 1996 the annual rise in the 
cost of living has always been less than 5%. This was as a result of 
greater control by SAMA of the factors that increase money supply 
(Presley, 1996: 27). (1.2). 
SAMA, as a "semi-autonomous government agency" under the 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, was prevented from dealing 
in interest rate according to Islamic Law, which is the country's 
constitution. However, SAMA did not exert much effort in researching 
for new tools to manage the monetary policy according to Islamic 
teaching. So SAMA, under market pressure, found itself unable to work 
without dealing with interest and that was associated with secular trends 
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in SAMA and the Ministry of Finance. However, the interest rate 
remains one of the biggest issues that the Saudi society has to deal with. 
SAMA's position has gradually improved in controlling monetary 
policy. In the 1980s, SAMA introduced the Banker Security Deposit 
Account (BSDA) to discourage the excessive build-up of foreign assets 
by banks. This has been followed by other short-term instruments. 
Later, SAMA announced its introduction of a Treasury Bond in the Royal 
Decree. NOM/12 dated 15.5.1408 (Presley, 1989: 129). However, the 
power of these instruments in a country like Saudi Arabia is under 
question. Their market is, very limited and concentrated in banks. The 
important issue here is that the introduction of these instruments has 
driven SAMA away from the teaching of Islam to a more overt secularist 
model. 
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le ( 1.2 ) 
Money Supply and cost of living 
Money Supply Cost of Living (All Cities) 
YEAR m1* IVI2* M3* General All Housing 
Index Food 
1398 Aprox 197 46,590 50,723 ý 
--4 
56,156 N/A N/At- N/A 
1399 (1979) 53,036 59,428 66,801 100.40 93.20 151.40 
1400 (1980) 58,833 71,164 80,179 104.80 99.70 1 151.80 
1401 (1981) 67,828 90,627 103,509 107.70 1 104.50 151.90 
1402 (1982) 82,374 111,219 129,396 108.80] 106.30 148 
- . 
70 
1403 (1983) 86,382 117,028 134,474 109.00 1 106.50 151.00 
1404 (1984) 83,289 119,451 144,736 107.30 10580 146.60 
1405 (1985) 82,395 120,016 145,399 104.00 102-90 142.20 
1406 (1986) 81,483 121,639 151,737 100.70 
- 
101.40 124.90 
T- 
1407 (1987) 87,799 128,043 1160,901 99.1 99.90 107.50 
1408 (1988) 93,664 134,143 178,418 100-00ý 100.00 100.00 
1409 (1989) 91,752 136,414 180,181 101.00 102.30 97.70 
1410 (1990) 102,265 141,546 188,438 103.10 97.60 
1411 (1991) 120,471 165,094 215,843 107.80 111.90 102.10 
1412 (1992) 127,930 174,255 221,178 107.40 
j 116.00 103.40 
1413 (1993) 124,891 172,783 225,973 
_1 
08.30 117.50 108.50 
T- 
1414 (1994) 129485 180902 232630 109.00 1 
ý15.80 
114.90 
1415 (1995) 127753 188975 239455 114.50 116.20 123.20 
Source: SAMA Anual Report, 1992, P & SAMA 0 ReportAth 0,1995, P 
* Rounded Numbers, (SR) Milion. 
1.3 COMMERCIAL BANKS 
1.3.1 The RoIe of Banks 
It has been mentioned that matching surplus units in the economy 
with deficit units , is at the heart of functions of the financial system. In 
modem economics, there are two major players which perform this role: 
capital markets and financial institutions. Commercial banks are 
believed to be the major player on the financial institution side. They 
perform critical roles in establishing the basis for effective national 
economic growth. Economic theory argues, that economic growth is 
stimulated by capital formation which is, in other words, sacrificing 
some of theýnational current income to build capital. Individual savers 
cannot reach individual borrowers in modem economies because of the 
cost of transactions and the asymmetric information. * Thus funds which 
should be invested are not efficiently utilised and those who do not wish 
to invest by themselves have no incentive to save. Financial 
intermediaries - banks at the top of the list - bridge this gap by matching 
the preferences of savers and entrepreneurs. ' However, history suggests 
that these institutions are'affected by the environment around them: the 
state of the economy, the culture and beliefs, and the political history. 
* This relationship can be obtained by capital markets if the financial 
system manages to improve the information and cost problems and that is 
why capital markets play a major role in developed economies. 
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1.3.2 Banking History in Saudi Arabia 
The need for efficient financial intermediaries in Saudi Arabia was 
vital. " The role'that they were supposed to play was complicated in a 
young economy with a high flow of revenue, very low entrepreneurial 
skills and a different culture, from the one that the'banks; developed in. 
This section will provide an overview of the Saudi banks, the challenges 
they have faced and it analyses their roleý in the development of the 
economy. 
The period between 1950 and the sharp rise in oil revenue saw only 
a couple of Saudi national banks and a few foreign banks which were 
concentrated in one region. After 1973, the country experienced rapid 
progress in the various sectors of the economy. The Government 
initiated many development projects and the First Five-Year Plan targeted 
restructuring the new Saudi economy. The need for-a viable banking 
sector was to provide an efficient payment system and to promote growth. 
The First Development Plan stated,, the banking sector was to "promote 
the development of a strong, diversified and viable banking sector that 
would encourage a high rate of economic growth without adverse 
inflationary effects ... " (First Plan, 1970). In general, the banking system 
at that time was not large enough to meet the financial requirements of 
the Development Plan. During the 1970s, SAMA raised the issue that 
the Kingdom was underbanked (Adnan, 1984: 55) and this led SAMA to 
introduce the idea of Saudiisation. As a result, by 1979, of the twelve 
banks, only three were non-Saudi, with about 140 branches; this rose to 
"1331 branches and 12 Saudi banks in 1992"(Al-dukiel, 1995: 191). 
Deposits rose about seventeen-fold in money terms from 1393 to 1401 
(approximately 1973-1981) and total assets from SR 5,856 in 1393 to SR 
10,6376 in 1401 (Presley, 1989: 13). Other important issues'in the 
16 
banking ý sector, such as regulations and the control - of money changers, 
have already been discussed in the SAMA section. 
1.3.3 The Banking Environment 
The ability of the commercial banks to play their expected role in 
the Development Plans was challenged by structural problems in Saudi 
society and the economy. These issues have affected the framework that 
banks operate in. - On the one hand,, competition with government 
specialised banks was not possible; on the other, Saudi society has been 
concerned about co-operation with banks because of the interest rate 
prohibition by the Holy-Qu'ran. Finally, banks were left with a young 
market which consisted of a small number of big businesses and a large 
number of high-risk small businesses, with limited demand for bank 
financing. These issues, and others, have prevented banks from being 
active in financing development. However, the Government, in its last 
two Development Plans, emphasised a greater demand on commercial 
banks to become more involved with private sector needs. 
The presence of government specialised banks, with their free 
financing, was very strong. With a good liquidity position, the absence 
of banks in financing the private sector, and a lack of a significant 
entrepreneurial class, the Government found it important to speed up the 
development process by participating in the financing of projects. Banks 
found it difficult to compete with the specialised institutions [by 1982 
their credit disbursements reached SR 26,479 million](SAMA, 1992: table 
9/k) in a small market with an apparent lack of domestic investment 
opportunities, so banks channelled funds into the national market. 
However, for many reasons, including the decline in oil revenue, the 
specialised funds have reduced their credit in the market. This has given 
commercial banks space to improve their operations. 
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One of the other obstacles in the development of Saudi banks has 
been the conflict between Islamic Law and the interest rate. Al- 
Shudukni concluded that consumers show reluctance and strong negative 
attitudes to dealing with banks due to the religious factor(Al- 
Shudukni, 1989 ). Other studies searched for businesses' acceptance of 
conventional banks financing. Al-Hajjar, referring to small businesses 
in Saudi Arabia and their sources of finance, stated that conventional 
bank borrowing was not popular because banks were seen to be charging 
interest and therefore for religious reasons should be 
avoided(Alhajjar, 1989: 110 ). However, banks have not been inactive in 
the Saudi market: if they have failed in the consumer and small business 
markets, they have been active with large corporations, which are usually 
managed by persons who are not interested in religious issues. In 
general, the concept of the interest rate remains a sensitive area in Saudi 
society and, as Al-Dukeil remarks, "a grey area in the country's legal 
framework"(Al-Dukiel, 1995: 50). 
During the infancy of the Saudi economy (prior to 1970) there were 
major limitations on banking sector development: banks had very little 
experience in the Saudi market; regulations Were very basic; 
information was difficult to obtain; business records were established in 
an unprofessional manner; this was as expected in, an economy where 
small businesses represent more than 70 per cent of businesses. 
However, the Saudi economy, under the directions of the Development 
Plans, stepped into higher stages and complexity. 
The type of deposits has affected the nature of commercial bank 
business. The high proportion of demand deposits (Table 1.3) has 
provided a cheap fund to the banks but, on the other hand, prevented 
banks from long-term objectives: 
"SAMA has attempted to encourage a more stable banking system 
by building longer-term bank deposits and in 1979-80 decreased 
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to less than 70 per cent of the deposit total while time deposits 
increased to 1.34 percent" (Adnan, 1984: 56). 
1.3.4 The Balance Sheet at a Glance 
Many forces were behind the enormous change in the consolidated 
balance sheet of Saudi banks: mainly the change of individual's 
behaviour towards banking services and the rapid expansion in the 
country's economy due to the rise in oil revenue. 
According to Table (13), liquid assets used to be in excess of the 
required reserve by SAMA (15%), which indicates that banks had 
difficulty finding opportunities to benefit from their liabilities. However, 
since then liquid assets have been very stable and closer to the reserve 
requirement. At the same time deposits have been rising rapidly and "the 
reserve requirement was reduced to 7% for demand deposits and to 2% 
for time deposits"(Banafih, 1993: 77). This reflects the improvement in 
the efficiency of commercial banks in using their liabilities. 
The unsecuritisation of the Saudi financial system and the size of 
the Saudi economy have affected the nature of banks' assets. A high 
percentage (80% in 1988) of total deposits is in foreign assets. In 1988, 
only 48.5% of total deposits were held in claims on the private sector and 
usually concentrated on short-term advances. These assets are very 
liquid to meet the high portion of deposits which are in demand. 
However, the situation has improved in the late ninties as table 1.3 
shows, claims on private sector are SR 133,684 milions that is 25% more 
than foreign assets. 
Unclassified assets have become very important items in the 
balance sheet after the rise in government lending, where banks are the 
most important customers. This item rose by 68% in 1990 to reach SR 
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53,085 million in 1991 and then soared to SR 136,034 million in 1997 
(Table 1.3). 
The gap between demand and time deposits as a percentage of total 
deposits was very high in the early 1980s where demand deposits took the 
lead. But the pace slowed down considerably for a few years then rose 
again. However, in recent years (after 1993) the weight of time deposits 
rose again. According to Wilson (1982: 290), "the sheer magnitude of 
demand deposits, and their growth ... indicates that they are well in 
excess of what depositors require for transactions or even precautionary 
purposes". The interest rate, as an unislamic concept, is considered to be 
the most important reason behind all this. 
The ownership, represented by capital, of these banks is an 
important issue on the liabilities side. Theoretically, from a socio- 
economic point of view, ownership of organisations should be spread in 
society to overcome the concentration of power and income in a small 
group in the economy. "The concentration of holding of bank shares is 
one fundamental malaise that continues to jeopardize the spirit of the 
formation of joint-stock banks. "(Al-Dukiel, 1995: 53) 
The decrease in the number of owners (table 1.4) shows how a 
social identity like banks in the Saudi economy is driven. On the other 
hand, if zero interest deposits continue to be large, income distribution of 
these banks will not be to the benefit of Saudi society. 
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Table (1.4) 
Banks ownership 
Number of Shareholders 
1981 1986 
Arab National Bank 28,689 8,900 
Saudi Cairo Bank 6,190 4,000 
Saudi British Bank 102,593 45,000 
Source: Al-Dukeil, 1995, p. 54 
In conclusion, the assets and liabilities of Saudi banks have risen rapidly 
from SR 2,929 million in 1970 to SR 73,918 milllion in 1980 and then to 
SR 381,787 million in 1997. Foreign assets and claims on private 
sectors' are the most important items on the'assets side. Unclassified 
assets are becoming increasingly large following the rise in government 
borrowing. On the liabilities side, business and individuals' demand 
deposits and time deposits are considered the major liabilities of Saudi 
commercial banks. 
1.3.5 Banks- and Development Plans 
A sound banking system has been refeffed to and emphasised in all 
Development Plans for a stable economy and to promote growth. ' The 
First Development Plan stated that one of its objectives was to promote 
the development of a strong, diversified and viable banking sector that 
would encourage a high rate of economic growth(First Development 
Plan, 1970). The role of promoting growth by banks has become a major 
issue in the last ten years. Presley(1989: 133) highlighted this point: 
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"The Fourth Development calls for a switch from public to private 
sector financing: it marks a major turning point in the 
development of the financial and banking sector. The changing 
economic and business environment will place new demands on 
the financial sector; falling oil revenues have identified more 
clearly the need to harness private sector capital in the 
development process. " 
The Government expected a reduction of 20-30% in its average annual 
expenditure in its Fourth Plan. That set the financial sector a major 
challenge to take the lead in mobilising funds in a domestic market. 
"It was also indicated that private-sector banks would be encouraged 
to extend long-term funding facilities to productive projects rather 
than concentrating on the provision of working capital, and more 
specifically shifting the focus from financing the import trade to 
production projects. "(Al-Dukiel, 1995: 39). 
The expected role that banks should take in the economy increased in the 
Fifth (pre-1995) and Sixth Plans (1995-2000). The country is moving 
towards a larger private sector economy away from the public sector. To 
achieve this, the Sixth Development Plan has continued the call for active 
financial institutions: the contribution of the private sector is essential for 
the achievement of the. objectives of the Sixth Development Plan. The 
mobilisation of private capital requires a regulatory framework to enable 
financial intermediaries to perform their allocative functions effectively. 
These functions are the collecting of funds from private households and 
enterprises with financial surpluses. This is done by offering attractive 
returns and transferring these funds to sectors offering profitable 
investment opportunities. The financial sector in the Kingdom will 
assume its vital function in mobilising financial resources for private 
investment in various production and services projects, and also in the 
effective implementation of the proposed privatisation programmes so as 
to ensure the desired results. Appropriate measures to 
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support, improve and expand the financial institutions and markets will 
be adopted during the Sixth Plan period(Sixth Dev. Plan, 1995: 133,163). 
1.4 SPECIALISM BANKS 
1.4.1 Background 
In the early 1970s the Saudi Government realised that the rational 
way to reach its rapid development objectives and to attain the 
Government's overall objective of diversification of the economy, was by 
providing long-term loans to businesses in the country. Commercial 
banks were reluctant to enter this market-for reasons that have already 
been discussed in previous sections. 
By 1974, there were five government agencies (only two of these 
were established before the oil boom of 1973): 
(1) The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (SAAB), 1962; 
(2) The Public Investment Fund (PEF), 197 1; 
(3) The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), 1974; 
(4) The Real Estate Development Fund (REDF), 1974; and 
(5) The Saudi Credit Bank (SCB), 1974). - 
Each one of these funds provides credit to a specific sector of the 
economy, except for the SCB which has provided financial assistance to 
small businesses, usually in manufacturing, but used to be the least 
important of the funds in terms of credit disbursed. However, the 
importance of this fund is increasing (Presley, 1996: 64-65). 
The role of these semi-government institutions has been the driving 
force in the financing of the private sector and government projects in the 
early years of the Development Plans. However, in the late 1980s, the 
situation changed. The presence of these funds in the capital market has 
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noticeably reduced. Presley has emphasised the reason behind this fall to 
be the down-turn in demand for loans, largely reflecting the new stage of 
the development process (Presley, 1996: 65), after the infrastructure 
requirements had been completed. However, the fall in oil prices and 
government policy to diminish its participation in the financial market, in 
order to improve the role of the private sector, can be counted as other 
explanations of what happened. The last two reasons are very clear in 
the case of the Real Estate Development Fund, where demand was not the 
driving force for the decline. 
The balance sheet loan total of the funding agencies has increased 
from SR 11.8 billion in 1396 to SR 166.9 billion in 1406, approximately 
1976 -1986, exceeding the commercial banks total by over SR 60 billion 
in 1413(SAMA, 1992: 161), then this figuere decreased to SR 149.8 in 
1417(SAMa, 1998). According to Table (1.5), these agencies disbursed 
over SR 25 billion in 1402, nearly 50% of the outstanding claims on the 
private sector by the entire commercial banking system in that year. 
"The result is that the specialized credit agencies effectively became the 
conduit for government fiscal policy while also complementing the short- 
term credit activities of the commercial banks through their term 
financing activities (Adnan, 1984: 139). However, the credit 
disbursements by the specialised credit institutions has decreased to SR 
5.6 billion in 1417, nearly 4% of the outstanding claims on the private 
sector by the commercial banking system in that year. This indicates the 
rapid increase in bank loans to the private sector and a decrease in credit 
disbursements to the economy by the specialised institutions. 
The specialised institutions have been the major force in the 
development process during the previous Development Plans. They are 
also supposed to provide part of the public sector investment financing 
requirements during the Sixth Development Plan. But they are by no 
means a substitute for the long-term investment which is expected to 
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come through the private sector. Approximately SR 259 billion is 
planned to be provided by the public sector during the Sixth Plan. 
Without strong and active public institutions the Government may fail to 
achieve this goal. 
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1.4.2 The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) 
The SIDF was established in 1974 to grant medium- and long-term 
loans of up to 50% of total requirements for new industrial projects or for 
renovation, expansion and modernisation of existing industrial projects. 
This has encouraged the private sector to undertake industrial projects 
with low cost financing. 
During the 1970s and 1980s the Fund concentrated on electricity, 
gas and water projects. The funds to these projects rose from SR 30 
million in 1394/95, aprox. 1974n5, to SR 5,489 million in 
1400/01, aprox. 1980/81, while funds to manufacturing projects rose from 
SR 5 million in 1394/95 to SR 1,172 million in 1400/01. After 
unification of the electricity companies under the General Electricity 
Corporation, this organisation assumed responsibility for the funding of 
electricity projects. Therefore, since 1405, the SADEF has concentrated 
on manufacturing, cold stores and date packing projects, where 
manufacturing has received the majority of funds. Table (1.6) shows 
how the decline in the total of credit disbursements after 1405 can be 
explained by the removal of the electricity projects. 
The manufacturing sector has always received more than 90% of 
credit disbursements after excluding funds to electricity projects. 
However, manufacturing loans slowed down between 1404-09, 
aprox. 1984/89, which 
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Table ( 1.6 
Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
Credit Disbursements By Purpose 
Milion (SR) 
YEAR Manufacturing Electricity Cold DATES PACKINGS Total 
Gas &Water Storage Projects 
1398 Aprox (1978) 1,265 4,724 5,989 
1399 (1979) 1,155 5,661 6,816 
6,573 1400 (1980) 1,141 5,432 
1401 (1981) 1,112 4,982 63 6,157 
1402 (1982) 658___ 4,342 43 5,043 
1403 (1983) 983 3,636 22 4,641 
1404 (1984) 1,073 4179 8 5,260 
1405 (1985) 736_ 
-- 
716 1 1,453 
1406 (1986) 621 129 - 750 
1407 (1987) 541.13 554 
1408 (1988) 326 333 
1409 (1989) 633 8 642 
1410 (1990) 788 9-- 7 804 
1411 (1991) 694 4 698 
1412 (1992) N/A N/A N/A N/A 4--Aý 
1413 (1993) 979 2 981 
1414 (1994) 959 4 963 
1415 (1995) 1,741 0 1,741 
Source: SAMA 0 Report, 4th 0,1990 & 3th Q, 1991 &4th Q, 1995. 
indicate the completion of infrastructure requirements. ý At this stage, 
building materials and cement projects decreased. However, the credit to 
this sector increased again after 1409, aprox. 1989, to reach the highest 
total credit since its establishment in this sector - SR 1,740 million in 
1415, aprox 1995, instead of SR 326 million in 1408. This reflects the 
expansion of the Saudi economy and the rise in the demand of consumer, 
chemical and engineering projects. 
- The role of the SIDF has become very important. It is ranked 
second after the REDF in planned loans during the Sixth Development 
Plan. This Fund, as a government agency, can help planners to implement 
the objectives of the Plan through the screening process during the 
funding decision. One of the leading objectives of the Plan is that future 
spending should indicate more interest in private investment in the 
import-competing and export-oriented industries which will provide the 
investment for future development of private sector finance., 
I 
1.4.3 Public Investment Fund (PIF) 
The PEF was established in 1971 to support government 
participation in the major industrial projects in the country, forming 
Petromin and SAPIC. The role of this fund has been important during 
the early stages of development. It encouraged the establishment of 
many crucial, basic projects, such as petrochemical, iron, steel and 
aluminium, which are prerequisites for a diversified industry. 
According to Table(I. 5), the Fund's credit disbursements, totalled 
SR 39.8 billion between 1399 and 1405, aprox 1979-1985, which 
reflects the major role that the Fund played. However, after completing 
the country's basic industry requirements and the move to privatisation of 
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the major projects, the important of the PEF diminished. This conclusion 
can also be drawn from Table(l. 5), where between 1407 and 1415, 
aprox. 1987-1995, total credit disbursements only reached SR 4.5 billion. 
1.4.4 The Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) 
The growth of housing construction had been very slow prior to 
1974. But the situation changed after the fon-nation of the REDF in that 
year. It has provided free loans to the personal sector and investors in 
the building of residential compounds. The period 1399-1406, aprox. 
1979-1986, can be recognised as the Golden Age of the REDF - 
approximately SR 61.5 billion were disbursed by the Fund. 
Recently, the Fund has reduced its credit. The average waiting 
period now is about 4-8 years to get credit, which had been less than 3 
years during the 1970s and early-1980s. The decline in government 
revenue can be cited as an explanation for this but also the government 
philosophy towards reducing competition with commercial banks, in a 
profitable market, can also be used to explain the situation. 
1.4.5 The Saudi Agricultural Bank (SAB) 
The SAB, established to aid in the development of the agricultural 
sector, was founded in 1962. Until the end of the 1970s, the growth of 
bank loans had been very slow. Due to expansion in the aggregate 
demand for agricultural products, the movement towards imported 
substitutes, and the Government's policies to increase agricultural 
production, the loans by the Bank have risen rapidly. During the period 
1400-06, aprox 1980-86 approximately SR 14.5 billion was disbursed. 
The Bank's impact on agricultural development in the Kingdom is well 
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recognised: its assistance has been sought in most major agricultural 
projects. 
However, after 1407, aprox. 1987, as agricultural development 
slowed down, reflecting the fulfilment of the small Saudi market and the 
decrease in government incentives to certain agriculture products, Bank 
credit fell to low credit disbursements. The amount of credit for the 
seven years between 1409-15, aprox. 1989-95, reached approximately 
SR 4.3 billion. 
1.4.6 The Saudi Credit Bank (SCB) 
Easing the pressure of the economic transformation on low-income 
citizens is the main objective of this Bank by providing interest-free 
loans. The SCR was created in 1974 to grant loans for specified social 
and economic purposes. The importance of the Bank on the 
development of the country has been the lowest among the government 
funding agencies. 
The provision of long-term credit on easy terms has been one of 
the major forces in the process of a rapid development and a diversified 
economy. This support was given by the five specialised institutions: 
the SIDF, PIF, REDF, SAAB and SCB. Total net lending by the five 
institutions from their date of establishment until the end of 1413/14, 
aprox. 1993/94, exceeded SR 245 billion. Their role will continue to be 
important in the Sixth Development Plan. During the Sixth Plan more 
than SR 24.1 billion will be disbursed by the five funds. This is 
approximately 10% and 5% of the public sector and a total of estimates of 
Sixth Plan investment financing requirements respectively. Their future 
role is expected to implement the government policies among different 
projects and sectors rather than being the only major funding focus. This 
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will open* the market in front of the commercial banks and private 
financial instruments, which has been the Government philosophy in the 
recent Development Plans. 
1.5 MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
Primary money and capital markets are very important mechanisms 
for mobilising national resources and savings. On the other hand, 
secondary markets for instruments that are raised in the primary market 
are, essential to provide' liquidity and fair prices for investors. 
Historically,, debt instruments have been very limited in the Saudi 
economy. 
1.5.1 Money Market 
The internal money market, ' which consists of securities with less 
than one year, was non-existent prior to 1985. In order to reduce the 
importance of foreign assets in banks' balance sheets and to improve 
banks' local liquidity, SAMA introduced the 180-day Bankers Security 
Deposit Account (BSDA). Later on, SAMA added a 90-day BSDA, and 
a 30-day BSDA. The BSDA was in operation until November 1991, 
when SAMA announced the creation of Treasury Bills and the BSDA 
scheme was discontinued. The duration of this instrument ranges from 
one to twelve months and is issued every week. The Treasury Bills are 
mainly owned by commercial banks, AGIs or banks' largest clients due to 
the size of the local market and the elimination of foreign investors from 
the domestic market. The secondary market for Treasury Bills is not 
very active (Al-Dukeil, 1995: 55). . 
Treasury Bills are treated by the 
banks as a short-term investment instrument and are used to increase the 
ability of banks for raising liquidity from SAMA through repurchase 
agreements (Banafih, 1993: 129). 
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1.5.2 Capital Market 
1.5.2. (a) Debt Securities 
Until 1408 (approximately, 1988), the Saudi Government was reluctant 
to issue Development Bonds. But since that time the situation has 
changed. The Government has issued Treasury Bonds with maturity 
ranging from 2-8 years. -"This is the first time such a method of financing 
has been used and was an interesting feature of the 1408/9 budget. The 
Bond is not only a new instrument to help regulate liquidity in the 
economy but also provides an additional- source of revenue to the 
Kingdom's treasury. " (Presley, 1989: 129). These instruments are mainly 
held by specialised institutions and commercial banks, although some are 
managed by banks (off-balance-sheet) on behalf of private clients 
(foreigners or citizens) and through mutual funds. The On-Balance- 
Sheet Bond and Treasury Bill holdings of commercial banks in 1990 
amounted to approximately SR 12.5 billion and rose to SR 34 billion in 
1992(SAMA, 1992: P43). This number was only 14.5% of the total 
government domestic debt of SR 338 billion in 1994 which increased to 
SR477 billion as of the end- 1997 (SAMA. 1998). There is effectively no 
trading and secondary trading is minimal. But they can be used in 
repurchase agreements with SAMA. On the other hand, private debt 
instruments are not yet known in the market so such corporate bonds do 
not exist. The limitation of the debt securities market can be understood 
if a general picture of Saudi society is taken. To a large extent, the 
involvement of interest rate in these instruments may explain the non- 
participation of the public in this market. 
1.5.2. (b) Stock Market - Equity Securities 
The stock market in Saudi Arabia is relativ"ely thin by international 
standards. The number of companies that are traded is no more than 70 
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companies. That reflects the demarcation of small business and family- 
owned companies in the Saudi economy. The transactions are placed 
through - banks so there is no physical exchange, with the Electronic 
Securities Information System (ESIS) providing a centralised trading and 
information-sharing system connecting the commercial banks. 
, Fluctuation in the market index'is, high(SAMA, 1998). The size of the 
market and the narrow investor base may explain this to a large extent. 
According to Table (1.7), the market was appreciating rapidly between 
1988-92 -, the index showed a rise of 157% during that period. However, 
in 1990 the market fell by almost 10% during the Gulf War, but soared 
again by 50% in 1992. Then in 1993-94 the worst happened when the 
market dropped by 30%. However, the market is recovering again and 
has shown a modest fluctuation in the last few years but relatively high 
compared with international standards. 
Activity in the primary market is very low. A year may pass without 
an entry of a new company to the secondary market. However, the last 
two Development Plans emphasised the importance of the Stock Market 
in providing for future investment requirements. Its suitability to Saudi 
society's preferences made the restructuring of the market urgent. The 
local market is starved of share subscription, and, historically, all new 
announcements are over-subscribed. 
Two important. factors are considered to be the driving forces for stock 
market developments:. the movement towards privatisation for the 
Government; and the call for private funds to play a major role in 
financing their development. 
The Sixth Development Plan provided a framework for improving the 
Stock Market through the following main policies: 
" developments for regulation; 
" transaction procedures will be simplified; 
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e improving the ability of investors in the assessment of companies' 
performance; and 
4, the possibility of permitting foreign capital to deal in the market. 
(Sixth Development Plan, 1995-2000: 165) 
1.6 RISK: FORMAL AND INFORMAL CAPITAL 
Historically, the Saudi economy consists of a small percentage of 
large corporations and small businesses make up the remainder. Large 
companies have received funds from different sources: specialised 
institutions, commercial banks, through international markets, or retained 
earnings. On the other hand, small businesses have been left without 
help from formal institutions. A study by Bandar Al-HaJar concerning 
Saudi small businesses revealed that they have financed their projects 
without a noticeable recourse to formal financial institutions (Al-HaJar, 
1989: 225). Relatives and friends are ranked at the top of the list of 
funding sources. The Islamic nature of Saudi society and the demand by 
small businesses for less formal capital with minimum intervention has 
expanded and will continue to expand this market. 
Small companies have been formed to seek out new or operating 
projects which are looking for funds to be injected into the project. Also, 
the number of individual investors who are looking for such projects is 
rising after decades in the real estate market. The exact size and value of 
this market is unknown. Broadly, the characteristics of both forms of 
financing are more or less in line with venture capital companies; and 
business angels. personal contact and through friends, are the major 
driving forces for this market's activities. 
This market has emerged and expanded naturally without any 
attempt from the Government to ease or understand its functions. 
However, with the encouragement of the Government, approximately 12 
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joint-stock companies are operating in the Saudi market as risk capital 
financing companies. Such companies are suggested in the Sixth 
Development Plan to promote a growth in the economy. 
As the economy is preparing to take off, the understanding of this 
market can help the government institutions to influence the direction and 
future of this market. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Financing SmaU Businesses 
2.1 Entrepreneurship and Small Businesses Background 
Since the 1980s, the economic importance of small businesses has 
grown dramatically in developed countries ( Deakins, 1996; Wetzel et al, 
1994). Since then, greater attention has been paid to small firms due to their 
potential for generating jobs and economic growth, for example the UK now 
has one million more'small businesses than it had in 1979 (Eglin, 1994). As a 
result, it is now accepted government policy that the small firm sector will 
provide the main vehicle for recovery from recession and " will be the main 
provider of jobs during the rest of the 1990s" (Deakins, I 996, p44). Similarly 
in the US, the economy passed'a milestone of great importance in 1979, the 
shift from industrial/manufacturing economy composed of large firms to an 
entrepreneurial economy driven by information and innovative technology 
( Wetzel, 1996; Freear et al., 1996; Wetzel et al., ' 1994). In fact, whilst the 
Fortune 500 companies lost over four million jobs between 1979 and 1995, 
over 24 million jobs were created by the entrepreneurial economy as the 
number of new businesses skyrocketed almost 200% ( Freear et al., 1996; 
Conlin, 1989). 
Since the 1960s many of the International Development Organizations 
have given the unemployment problem great attention. The World 
Employment Program has called for more support to small businesses due to 
their effects on jobs creation (I. M. D, 1987). China is an outstanding example 
in using small firms for developing regional areas. Recently many of 
developing countries' development plans have given an important emphasis 
to the creation and support of small businesses, this was aimed to decrease 
unemployment, achieve a better income distribution, and increase the growth 
rate for these economies ( Kamashki, 1995). 
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2.1.1 Importance of Small Businesses 
ý Due to their high degree of influence, emphasis on'the economic 
contribution of small business is now a familiar characteristic of both 
developing and developed economies ( Binks et aL, 1997). ' Research has 
shown five main types of economic benefits produced by small businesses : 
innovation, employment, the 'shock absorber' role in declining sectors, 
increased competition, and flexible specialisation. 
First, small firms produce many important innovations vital to 
economies. In fact, out of 61 important US inventions and innovations this 
century, overýhalf came from smA firms-and , independent investors ( Wetzel, 
1982). Small firms ( with less than 1000 employees) also produce 24 times as 
many innovations per dollar of research and development spending as large 
firms(over 10,000 employees) and four times more than medium-sized firms 
(Wetzel, 1982). 
Second, in the US, whilst large and medium-sized firms were decreasing 
their payrolls by over 25% and 5% respectively between 1979 and 1993, 
small firms created 20 million new jobs (Huey, 1994; Freear et al., 1995). 
Similarly, in the UK, in the early 1980s and early 1990s, small firms were 
seen as effective means of reducing unemployment and fostering job 
creation(Deakins, 1996). In fact, Acs et al., (1997) conclude that " it is highly 
likely that small firms and entrepreneurs probably employ a larger share of 
the US labour force than is commonly believed"(p. 9). 
Third, small firms play the ' shock absorber' role of small firm job 
creation, since they create jobs in declining industries whilst most of those 
are terminated by large firms( Acs et al., 1997) 
Fourth, small firms often complement large firms in an industry and so 
increase competition which may also make the economy more competitive 
( Mitchell, 1980). 
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Fifth, small firms are of increasing importance due to their ability to 
quickly respond to change and so the structure of the economy may have 
changed in favour of these small and flexible firms (Deakins, 1996). 
Clearly, the economic benefit of small businesses is well documented, 
especially, when compared to large firms. In the US, Wetzel(1982) even 
concluded that: 
" Relative to their larger, established counterparts, small technology 
based firms are more effective contributors to the generation of new jobs, 
innovative technology, productivity, price stability and favourable 
international trade balance'(p. 336). 
2.1.2 Difficulties in Securing Finance for Small Firms(Developed Countries) 
To finance small entrepreneurial firms, most entrepreneurs will 
initially utilise personal savings and bootstrapping (i. e. the use of credit 
cards, second mortgages, etc) to fund growth, relying also on internally- 
generated retained earnings when produced ( Wetzel et al., 1994; Winborg et 
al., 1997). But for many of these fast growth firms, personal funds and 
internally-generated funds are just not enough to finance growth, and so they 
may seek external financing. 
Unfortunately, many of those entrepreneurial firms which want 
external funding have difficulty locating it ( Wetzel et al., 1985; Harrison et 
al., 1996; Wetzel, 1993)., particularly from more conventional sources like 
banks. In particular, this is because these firms usually have: short 
performance histories, small scale operations, weak access to supply and 
distribution markets, illiquidity, long development times, uncertain growth 
rates, no collateral, relatively high transaction costs for the size of the 
investment, potentially high information asymmetries between entrepreneurs 
and potential investors, low survival rates, and some times involve an 
innovation which increases its already high risks ( Tyebjee et al., 1981; 
Poindexter, 1976; Storey, 1980; Landstrom, 1993; McInerny, 1994; Bank of 
England, 1996; Mason et al., 1996). Not surprisingly, Stevenson (1997) found 
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that in a survey of the 100 fastest growing unquoted finns in the UK, 
financing was the most frequently self-reported obstacle to growth. 
2.2 Small and Medium-sized firms in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) represent 
81% and 7% of businesses respectively ( Chamber C. C, 1997). However, 
until recently this very important sector of the Saudi Economy received very 
little attention from public and private organisations. 
According to many studies, the most important constraint that is facing 
SMEs in Saudi Arabia is the difficulty of obtaining external funds. ( 
Chamber C. C., 1997; Sajini, 1997; Al-Hajjar, 1989; Chamber C., 1994). The 
Al-Hajjar study concluded that 68% of SMEs in Saudi Arabia depend on 
their own savings to provide fund to their ventures, and 17% obtained funds 
from informal sources. But only 5% and 3% received funding from 
commercial banks and specialized funds respectively., In the next sections a 
more detailed analysis will be provided of the sources of finance available in 
the Saudi Economy. 
2.2.1 Role of Saudi Arabia Specialised Funds 
The assistance to small businesses by specialised funds is very 
extremely low. Collateral as a prerequisite in the funding decision by these 
institutions has proved a stumbling block for small businesses to get loans. 
Also, the equity capital that the borrower is required to put into the project 
has excluded most small projects from specialised banks financing(Al- 
Hajjar, 1989: 225). It was reported that small businesses in Saudi Arabia are 
reckoned to cover about 81% of total enterprises in the country. Thismeans 
that the majority of businesses are deprived from gaining access to the cheap 
financial funds provided by these institutions. For example, the SIDF has 
only financed 200 small ventures since its establishment in 1974 
(Sajini, 1997). 
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The Sixth Development Plan has emphasised this problem and has 
provided various programmes to overcome the unhealthy situation. The Plan 
stated the importance of expanding the activities of the Saudi Credit Bank to 
finance small enterprises to expand the existing incentives system to include 
small businesses. 
2.2.2 Banks and Development Financing 
It has, been said that at the heart of the financial system is the 
channelling of funds between investors and entrepreneurs. This represents 
the growth injection to the economy. The Saudi banks participation in 
national development, by providing loans to the private sector, represented 
the highest percentage of assets in the period pre/post- 1978 (Table 2.1). At 
that time the assets base was very small and only a few banks dominated the 
market. But when total assets started to grow rapidly, banks faced the 
limitations discussed in a previous section. The Saudi economy is small; 
interest-based loans are not welcomed by Saudi society; but also the banks' 
experience was inadequate. The low cost of funds has encouraged Saudi 
banks to expand their foreign assets without taking high risks that are 
involved in project financing. At the end of 1987 the claims on the private 
sector reached SR 59,465 million (Table 2.1), which represented only 31% of 
total assets where foreign assets represented 53.5% of total assets. "Most of 
this was in the form of deposits with other banks in the principal world 
financial centres, particularly London. "(Loony, 1987: 180). This was the case 
throughout the 1980s, but in 1991 the claims on the private sector started to 
catch up with foreign assets where the former represented 28% of total assets 
and the second 45% of total assets. The situation in 1997 was much better, 
with SR 133,684 claims on the private sector and SR 99.515 Millions foreign 
assets ( Table 2.1) and figure (2.1). Those changes reflected structural 
changes in the Saudi economy. The Government, through the 1980s (and 
particularly throughout the late-1980s and early-1990s) tried to rationalise its 
spending after the oil price decline. It is also believed that the private sector 
should take the lead in the development process after the completion of 
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infrastructure requirements. As the liquidity shortage in the economy started 
to appear, banks found a place to participate in the national economy. 
Demand for private funds has risen rapidly because of the expansion in 
petro-chemical projects, commerce and building sectors. 
Banks have been performing a 'gap-filling' role with government 
funding agencies. As soon as an opportunity opened and was not funded by 
government, banks would consider that option (Presley, 1989: 13 1). This has 
been obvious in trade financing and working capital. The nature of the 
Saudi economy was behind the importance of the trade sector. The 
Kingdom imports nearly all of its daily needs from the rest of the world and 
most of this is financed through commercial banks, as shown in Table (2.2). 
That presents SR 1,000-1,500 million in the balance sheet. Working capital 
is also not covered by government financing; so banks have been active in 
this area. These examples strengthen the idea that banks will expand their 
market in the national economy so long as the Government is not competing 
with them. But the question is, are banks willing to take the risk that the 
Government has taken with seed financing, and, in addition, will private 
projects now demand bank financing? One would expect that the demand 
for finance in the economy will not be seed financing, as was the case 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but instead will be a mix of seed and 
expansion financing. Many of the projects that were financed through 
government funds are already looking for funds to finance their expansion. 
The limitation of available data concerning the sources of financing the 
expansion of these projects will reduce the ability to predict the growth of 
private local markets fore commercial banks. 
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Claims on the private sector have risen steadily. Banks are finding 
good opportunities in the local economy. Unfortunately, the nature of banks 
is short-term oriented. Saudi banks are believed to be "more short-term 
oriented than their international counterparts "(Johany, 1986: 156). This is not 
surprising when the Saudi banks' liabilities are examined in more detail. A 
high portion of the deposits are held in demand deposits that limit, to a 
considerable extent, the ability of banks to consider long-term projects. The 
nature of deposits is unlikely to change in the near future, even if the increase 
in time deposits is taken into account. This increase is believed to come 
from individual and business foreign assets. Under this perspective, the 
orientation of the short term will not change unless new products are 
available to meet the preferences of depositors. However, the other argument 
believes that the rise in time deposits is due to changes in the attitudes 
towards interest, and the rise in time deposits will continue. 
"The provision of medium- to long-term financing is becoming a more 
important activity of Saudi banks, but this still lags far behind the provision 
of short-term credit. In part, this reflects bankers' preferences ... To a 
considerable extent, the limited size of long-term credit reflects the activity 
of government agencies which provide conditions with which banks cannot 
compete. "(Johany, 1986: 157) 
This point of view was expressed in 1986 and since that time the government 
agencies have reduced their presence in the market but banks have not 
greatly improved their long-term loans. To a large extent, big companies in 
Saudi did not go to banks to finance their long-term expansion. Companies 
depend on government funds or their reserves. In fact, many large 
companies in Saudi are net lenders to the banking sector, where they hold 
large balances of saving accounts or investment securities. 
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Looking at Table (2.3) can help to see banks' claims on the private 
sector in more detail. These claims increased from SR 65,295,000 million in 
1990 to SR 121,621,500 million in 1995, of that overdrafts (which represent 
short-term) accounted for 42% of banks' credit. Bills, discounted and others, 
counted for 5% of bankscredit (which is also short term). By assuming that 
50% of loans and advances are short-term provisions (which is an acceptable 
assumption taking into account the nature of Saudi banks), the short term has 
covered about 72.9% of banks' credit to the private sector between 1990- 
1995. 
Banks' participation in investment activities is considered to be'very 
small. The local capital markets still have a long way to go. Debt private 
securities are not available and the only capital securities available are 
stocks. Banks are limited by "banking law to only 10% of a company's 
capital "(Johany, 1986: P157). Banks' claims on private securities represent 
only an average of 5.5% of total claims on the private sector between 1990- 
95 (Table 2-3). 
Off-balance-sheet activities have been an important area of growth for 
the Saudi banks. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, banks introduced many 
investment funds which were thought to be a good innovation to finance 
development and to provide new products which should meet the unique 
preferences for the individual Saudi investors. This market has been led by 
the National Commercial Bank and Riyadh Bank. A list of examples of 
these funds is shown in table (2.4). The majority of these funds are 
international investments so do not provide funds for the local economy 
capital formation. In fact, they have driven funds outside of the country, 
where only about 25% of them are held in the Saudi market. Syndicates for 
project financing is another area of growth in the domestic economy, which 
is mainly concentrated in large petro-chemical projects. 
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Selected Commercial Banks' Investment Funds 
z 
0 
0', 
co 
2) 
:3 
X 
X 
l< 
a) 
CL 
=r 
03 
1) Short Term Dollar Fund 
2) Short Term Pound Fund 
3) European Stocks Fund 
4) Japanese Stocks Fund 
5) International Stocks Trading Fund 1 
6) International Stocks Fund 
7) Saudi Stocks Fund 
8) American Stocks Fund 
9) International Stocks Fund 11 
10) Southeast Asia Stocks Fund 
11) Bonds Fund In Dollar 
12) Curancies Portfolio Invest. Fund 
13) Balance Investment Fund 
Intern. Bonds & Stocks 
14) International Trading Fund 
15) Trading Fund In Riyal 
16) National investment Fund 
1) Dollar Fund 
2) Stocks Fund In Riyal 
3) Trading Fund In Riyal 
4) American Fund (Stocks) 
5) European Fund (Stocks) 
5) Japanese Fund (Stocks) 
7) Asian Fund ( Southeast Asian Stocks) 
8) British Fund (stocks) 
9) Bonds Fund In Dollar 
10) Bonds Fund In Pound 
11) Bonds Fund In Yen 
12) European Bonds Fund 
13) International Bonds fund 
1A\ Pktneih MmA /Qfniliel 
15) Investment Fund For Trading In Riyal 
Source: Riyadh NewsPaper, 9 /9/1996, P 24. 
Bank claims on the private sector are spread over all sectors of the 
economy. However, the commerce and building sectors dominate the 
claims, with 34.7% to commerce and 22.5% for building of claims on the 
private sector in 1982, and only 9.5% for industrial projects, as shown in 
Table (2.5), (2.6) and figure (2.2). The domination of the trade sector has 
continued through the years, with a decline in the 1980s and then rising in 
the 1990s to reach 25.4% of claims in 1995. The decline is attributed to 
some extent to the decrease in imports due to the fall in the country's income 
and also to the completion of infrastructure requirements. The importance 
of building and construction has declined and its portion of claims fell to 
10.4% in 1995. Traditionally, the Saudi Government had not been a 
customer for the private funds, but after experiences with budget deficits, the 
Government had to turn to banks to borrow funds. In 1995, the claims on 
the Government soared to 17.7% of total claims. The manufacturing sector, 
which is always emphasised by Development Plans, as the means to a 
diversified economy, was placed in the range 8-10% between 1982-1995. 
The interesting thing in this sector is that many young Saudi firms have 
already looked for second, third and fourth stages of financing yet total 
claims are less than 10%. They may have financed themselves, which is a 
common practice with Saudi firms, or found their needs through government 
agencies, and did not approach the banks. 
The challenge for the Saudi financial system lies in the fact that there 
is no diversified financial system., In developed financial markets, long-term 
financing can be provided by many different institutions: investment banks, 
pension funds, insurance companies, debt market and stock market. So the 
commercial banks are not the main players in long-term financing. The 
Saudi economy will face a shortage in growth financing when the 
Government leaves this field unless there is a rapid development towards 
diversified financial markets. 
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It was believed that an advance in the new phase of development in the 
1990s would be realised through private sector investment. "The main 
challenge during the Fifth Plan was identified as the initiation of institutional 
and policy initiatives, to induce structural shifts. "(Al-Dukiel, 1995:, 45) This 
was speeded up by the Gulf Crisis, when the Government turned to 
commercial banks to finance the deficit and allowed the quasi-government 
agencies to borrow to finance - the Third Expansion Plan. The Sixth 
Development Plan has encouraged the private sector banks to improve their 
participation in long-term financing to productive projects rather than 
focusing on working capital and the import trade. The Plan assumes SR 
212.7b., which is about 45% of the estimates of the investment financing 
requirements as put forward in the Sixth Plan would come from the private 
sector. About 41% of that will go to productive sectors: manufacturing, etc 
see table(2.7). The question is asked as to what mechanism the Saudi 
economy will use to channel that private fund to the different sectors. The 
economy experienced a shortage in reaching its objective [total non-oil 
private sector target growth rate was 9.6% and the actual was 1.5% - see 
Table 8] for the private sector development in the Fifth Plan and it may, 
without the appropriate action, undergo a similar shortage in the Sixth Plan. 
The industrial survey, which was carried out by the Ministry of 
Industry and Electricity in 1990, revealed that over 80% of the Kingdom's 
industrial production was accounted for by small- and medium-sized 
industrial enterprises producing less than SR 25 million worth of output 
annually. Conversely, commercial banks are not interested in financing 
small firms and they concentrate on the large firms, mainly those in the 
public sector. According to the Census which was conducted by the 
Ministry of Industry and Electricity-in 1989, covering about 1,600 licensed 
factories, a large percentage of factories had only a limited access to 
financial assistance from financial institutions(Al-Dukiel, 1995: 318). figure 
(2.3)ýshows that the availability of finance for small-scale firms from 
commercial banks and Saudi industrial funds is limited. About 10% of the 
country's biggest factories get 64% of loans. By expanding this percentage 
to 20% of the largest factories, they receive approximately 74% of loans, and 
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the remaining 80% get only 26% of loans. These numbers should signal a 
warning to the financial community and official authorities who are 
concerned about the growth of the domestic economy. There is much 
evidence to support the belief in the importance of small firms to the national 
economy. 
In the USA, the risk capital industry ( mainly venture capital, formal 
and informal) was the answer to the problem of the financing of small 
businesses. It was in the early 1960s that it started to have a major 
involvement in small business after the coming into force of the Small 
Business Act in 1958. This market was started by direct and indirect ways 
of injecting risk capital to small firms. The US entrepreneurs were assisted 
by a wide range of investment funds (Gransberg, 19881: 106), Mainly the 
informal and formal venture capital. 
The difficulty of financing small business due to the associated high 
risk is internationally recognised, and if banks charged the appropriate 
interest rate, it would be hard for new ventures to cover the high cost of 
funds. Also, AI-Dukeil raised another problem associated with the Saudi 
economy: "that commercial banks face a lack of protection from the legal 
system in the defaults by customers "(Al-Dukiel, 1995: 319). 
The ability to repay is a major issue with any commercial loans. To 
avoid defaults, Saudi banks give attention to the collateral provided more 
than the economic viability of the projecritself and its ability to generate 
cashflow to-cover repayments, as a study concerning small businesses in 
Saudi Arabia by Bandar Al-HaJar revealed(Al-Hajjar, 1989: 110,155). Banks 
always criticise the ability of applicants to provide the financial information 
necessary and, if provided, the quality of the information is often 
unprofessional. 
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On the other hand, the study by Al-Hajjar demonstrated another angle to the 
problem, on the demand side, by small firms. Commercial banks borrowing 
was ranked fourth in the preferred source of funding by small firms in Saudi 
Arabia. The unwillingness to borrow from commercial banks is attributed 
largely to religious and confidentiality reasons(Al-Hajjar, 1989: 225). 
So, risk capital financing (venture capital) offers an important source 
of funds that if developed may ease the problem of financing small 
businesses in Saudi Arabia. 
Summary 
Small firms have a very important influence on the future growth of 
developed and developing economies. Research has shown that there are five 
main types of economic benefits produced by small businesses : innovation, 
employment, 'shock absorber' role in declining sectors, increased 
competition, and flexible specialisation. 
The problem to fully fund growth internally is well documented in the 
literature. But due to their inherently high-risk nature, it was shown that most 
institutional sources often refrain from financially supporting these 
economically beneficial firms in their early stages. 
Risk capital was identified as an important source of funds in 
developed countries (US). Also infori-nal sources which often provide equity 
financing were found to play a major role in financing small businesses in 
Saudi Arabia. 
However, to develop a research question that fits the framework of 
Saudi Arabian economy and its practices, more insights on venture capital 
financing will be presented in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter Three 
Venture Capital (An overview) 
3.1 Venture Capital Overview 
The concept of venture capital is usually associated with equity 
long-term finance. Venture capital companies look for new, speculative 
firms or unlisted technologically oriented enterprises under internal 
expansion. Their goal is to receive a very, high capital gain when these 
firms go public. The importance of the venture capital industry in the 
financial system structure is the role that venture capital plays in solving 
the equity gap. Commercial banks have always been reluctant to finance 
small firms where the risk of failure is very high. Venture capital, formal 
or informal, fills the need of potential high-growth firms by obtaining 
equity finance and also managerial assistance. Yet, without this risk 
capital, such ventures are aborted, stillborn or, worse, dead in early 
infancy. The definition of the concept that appeared in the the Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin:, 1984, should provide a clear picture of the 
role that venture capital plays 
"an activity by which investors support entrepreneurial talent with 
finance and business skills to exploit market opportunities and thus 
obtain long term capital gains". 
This definition surnmarises the venture capital as: 
equity finance; 
not just money, but time and effort; 
generates return through capital gain; and 
requires patience. 
Small and medium size enterprizes (SMEs) have been given considerable 
attention in developed countries because of their contribution to the 
overall economy. SMEs are believed to be an important source of 
innovation, a generator for new jobs and a seedbed from which new large 
companies emerge. However, their growth and success is not guaranteed 
due to the fact that they face many difficulties and challenges. SMEs face 
competition from large corporations. But Coutarelli believes that the main 
difficulties SMEs continue to face is the means to'finance their future 
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growth (Coutarelli, 1977). The route to success involves a very high risk 
for SMEs so they have to pay a higher price to the providers of funds. 
Macmillan's study of the financing problems of small businesses, in 
England in 193 1, is believed to be the first major report on this. The study 
concluded that SMEs faced serious challenges in acquiring long term 
financing and equity capital. This situation later became known as the 
"Macmillan gap". Similar studies performed between 1935 and 1940 in 
the USA reached the same conclusion( Dominguez, 1974). The 
regulations of many government's., in developed countries, set out to 
support SMEs in their needs for risk capital ý 
3.1.1 History 
Risk capital has been around SMEs for centuries with wealthy families 
and individual investors backing Merchants in their trading businesses. 
In Arabian history the Modarabah Contract (in which one provides money 
and the other provides effort to create a business entity) was well known 
before Islam. Also, in the United Kingdom the provision of equity finance 
for small companies is part of the British financial, tradition, when the 
investment trusts spread the risk of investment through buying shares in 
other companies( Harrison, 199 1). 
However, Risk Capital in its formal model - venture capital firms - 
was born in the United States in 1946 with the formation of ARD, the 
first firm, as opposed to private individuals, providing risk capital for new 
and rapidly growing firms, usually in the manufacturing and technology 
sectors (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). The firms, J. H. Whitney and 
Company, and Payson and Trask have all served as pioneers in the venture 
capital industry and their success was a major indicator to new entries in 
the'industry (DominsUiz, 1974). Bygrave et al. (1992) Dominguez(1974) 
believed that the inspiration of these companies' success demanded that 
the government play an active role in solving SMEs problems by 
mobilising risk capital and improving small-company-building know-how. 
The small business investment companies (SBIC) was a major move, in 
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1958, to "create government licensed and regulated pools of venture 
capital to encourage the formation and development of new and early 
stage ventures" (Bygrave et al, 1992: 21). Subsequently, the venture 
capital industry has been a place for many government actions and 
incentive programmes to promote risk capital supply. As a result, the 
market for risk capital had grown rapidly in the US until the end of the 
eighties, when the number of VC companies reached over 700, investing 
$3.94 billion in 1,729 portfolio companies (Bygrave et al, 1992). 
However, as the revolution in new technology, especially in the 
information sector, slowed down at the end of the eighties, many experts 
in the industry argue that this adversely affected the rapid expansion of 
venture capital in the United States. 
In the UK, the Macmillan Report in 1931 was a major push for the 
government to take action to deal with SMEs' problems. According to 
Coopey (1994), the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation 
(ICFC) can be identified as the origin of the UK VC industry. The ICFC 
was founded in 1945 and later became the basis of Investors in Industry 
(3i), the largest venture capital firm in the UK. (Harrison et al (1991) 
argue that the UK Venture Capital industry was slow to develop prior to 
1980, with only a small number of venture capital companies actively 
providing risk capital (in equity form) with a total investment of just ; C20 
million. However, during the 1980s an enormous expansion occurred in 
the number of private capital funds. There were over 150 funds which 
invested over EI billion in the United Kingdom in 1988. According to the 
British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) survey (1996), in 1995 there 
were 110 members of the Association. This is now the largest in Europe, 
accounting for 47% of the total venture capital investment. It is second 
only to the United States in World importance. 
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3.1.2 Global Venture Capital ,,, 11, 
The venture capital industry had been an American phenomena. 
prior to 1980. It came into existence shortly after the Second World War. 
It originated with a few wealthy families who decided to finance emerging 
industries. The success of these pioneers has attracted many institutions 
to enter into venture capital financing. In a study of the European venture 
capital industry during the early 1980s, Tyebjee and Veckery (1988) 
concluded that 
"venture capital is as yet in its infancy in Western Europe ... the 
investment activity manifested by European venture capitalists has 
been relatively small. "( P: 123 ). 
They noted that European venture capitalists invested about one-eighth as 
much as their US counterparts over the four years from 1981-84. Even 
after allowing for the different sizes of the economies, the figures were 
only slightly less dramatic; viewed as a fraction of the gross domestic 
product, European investment was about 22 per cent of US levels. 
however, the situation has now changed. In 1988, more capital was 
committed to venture capital pools in the United Kingdom and Europe 
than in the United States (Bygrave, 1992). Since then, the venture capital 
industry has entered the global village. Many academic research papers 
have revealed the spread of venture capital financing all over the world 
(Europe: Roure, 1990; Tyebjee, 1988; Dennerlein, 1989; Oohe et al, 1991; 
China: Choy, 1990; Korea: Rah, 1994; Japan: Choy, 1990; Malaysia: 
Boocock, 1996; Canada: McNaughton, 1991; New Zealand: Perry, 1991; 
Taiwan, Pandy, 1996; Australia; Ryan. 1991). "Canada and a host of other 
countries in Asia, South America, and Africa have also experimented with 
or created substantial ventur e capital industries and the former Soviets 
have a great interest in how the American's venture capital works"( 
Bygrave, 1992: 67). 
72 
k6- 
3.1.3 Academic Interest in Venture Capital 
The success of venture capital backed companies has increased the 
significance of venture capital as an area of academic interest and 
research. Prior to 1980, there was limited academic interest and research 
in the field. Given the importance of venture capital financing to 
economic development, as well as venture capital creation, it is not 
surprising that venture capital has emerged as a topic of increased interest 
and research effort. , 
This field has been given considerable attention by academic 
researchers in the United States during the last fifteen years and it is 
becoming of increasing importance in Western Europe, especially in the 
United Kingdom which 
"is. experiencing a venture capital 'boom'. Investment has grown 
rapidly, and as a fraction of domestic product is nearly five times that 
of its closest followers"( Roure, 1990: 244). 
Research on venture capital has been concerned with three areas: 
(1) the operation of venture capital firms; (2) the relationship between 
agents, venture capital firms, investors and investees; and (3) the impact 
of venture capital on venture firms (micro) and regional development 
(macro) (Fried et al 1988). However, the greatest research emphasis has 
been placed on the investment decision; most notable has been the work 
of Tyebjee and Bruno (1984a), Macmillan (1985), Roberts (1991) and 
Fried and Hisrich(1994). Also, the portfolio of venture capital firms has 
also been studied at great length (Hutt and Thomas, 1985; Brophy, 1981; 
and Bygrave and Timmons, 1985). Other areas in the venture capital 
industry have received attention from researchers such as: Does venture 
capital play a positive role in the economy? (Chan, 1983; and Bygrave 
and Timmons, 1992); Adverse selection (Amit et al, 1990; and Lerner, 
1994); Sources of information and risk avoidance (Fiet, 1991). 
By examining this volume of literature, venture capital research, 
while still in its infancy, has advanced to the point where a simple, 
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descriptive -models 'of. the venture capital process can be tentatively 
developed ( Fried, et al, 1988). 
On the other hand, venture capital research outside the US is very 
limited, except in Europe, where research is slightly more active. In the 
case of the developing World, knowledge about venture capital, formal or 
informal, is non-existent. The availability of a formal venture capital 
market in the developing world is a subject under question. Barry (1994) 
expressed this point of view. 
"In many parts of the developing world, venture capital is virtually 
non-existent; raising funds for new ventures from private groups or 
family members is common. - The so called informal markets are 
often more important than the formal markets"(p. 12). 
3.1.4 Classic VC vs New Model 
Venture Capital started as a support for innovation in seed or start- 
up small companies. In the US start-up financing peaked in 1983, 
accounting for 43% of the deals made, then declined steadily from 1985 
onwards, accounting for only 10% of the 1,437 companies that received 
financing and just 9% of total capital invested in 1989. Bygrave and 
Timmons (1992) after representing this change argue that two dominant 
external and internal forces have led to a transformation of the venture 
capital industry in the United States. These forces have replaced the 
classic venture capital skills that add value in company forming, building 
and harvesting, with financial engineering know-how which concentrates 
on short-term gains. 
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3.1.5 Investment Process 
This area has been of major interest to researchers in the venture 
capital literature. Most of the work had focused only on the evaluation 
criteria for new opportunities rather than looking at the entire investment 
decision process and the evaluation criteria as a stage of the process 
model. The most notable papers which have focused on the entire model 
are the work of Tyebjee and Bruno (1984a) and Fried and Hisrich (1994). 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984a) analysed 90 deals made by 41 venture 
capitalists., The aim of the study was to see how venture capitalists found 
prospective deals and to examine post investment activities. The 
research found that the investment activity of venture capitalists follows 
an orderly process involving five stages shown in Figure (1) and 
explained as follows: 
Figure*(I): 
Referrals Deal Origination] 
FScreening 
Evaluati 
Structuring 
I Post Investment Activitiesý 
* Tyebjee et al, 1984, p. 1053. 
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The First Stage is the deal origination: - this stage describes how venture 
capitalists become aware of potential investment opportunities. The study 
reveals that various intermediaries play an important role in matching 
venture capital investors with young ventures and cash needs. Fried et al 
(1994) argue that even if VCs open their doors for deals 'cold' without 
any introduction, they seldom invest in them. "The bulk of the VCs 
efforts to generate investment proposals, focus on developing a network of 
referees. " (Fried et al, 1994: 3 1). 
Second Stage: - screening, for time and cost reasons, VCs only 
concentrate on a manageable set of potential deals. So all new deals go 
through screening criteria which reflect the fund's preferences in terms of 
size, technology, product, market scope of the venture and stage of 
financing. In Fried et al's work (1994) there is a major difference in this 
stage from that discussed by Tyebjee and Bruno', s (1984a). The screen 
phase described earlier is what Fried et al called VC firm-specific screen 
because they discovered that most deals that were not rejected in the 
specific screen which involves cursory glance to business plan are still 
quickly discarded, so they add to the generic screen. The generic screen as 
Fried and Hisrich define it involved analysis of the business plan in terms 
of the generic criteria. - "These criteria expand upon the three basic 
constructs identified by Hisrich and Jankovics (1990): Concept, 
management and return" (Fried et al, 1994: 30). 
Third Stage: - Evaluation. This phase can be identified as the most 
important stage that new deals go through. New ventures are given 
iderable analysis by venture capitalists. The risk involved with consi 
venture capital investment is very high and liquidity is very low so VC 
investors put real effort in to assessing the venture before investing funds. 
However, "few formalise this assessment into, a computation of an 
expected rate of return or determine its sensitivity of future uncertainties. 
Instead the evaluation procedure seeks to subjectively assess the venture 
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on a multidimensional set of characteristics" (Tybejee et al, 1984a: 1053). 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) argue that this stage is divided into two phases 
and the progress between phase, I and phase 2 can be noticed by the shift 
of the venture capitalist's interest about a project. Phase I involves 
gathering additional information about the proposal and is compared to 
the information in the entrepreneur's business plan. Phase 2: at some 
point the VC develops an "emotional attachment' 'to a proposal and this is 
where the second stage of evaluation starts. The amount of time given to 
the venture increases and the evaluation goal shifts from looking for an 
interest in 
,a 
proposal to determining what the obstacles to the investment 
are and how they can be overcome. 
Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation has 
received considerable attention from researchers (Tybejee et al, 1984a; 
Wells, 1970; Macmillan et al, 1985; Macmillan et al, 1987; Hall, 1993; 
Rah, 1994; Fried et al, 1994; Hisrich, 1990 and Boocock, 1996). 
However, 'the interesting aspect of these studies is the similarity of most of 
the criteria characteristics. Macmillan et al (1985) suggested that The 
criteria characteristics can be grouped into six items: 
1. , The entrepreneurs personality; 
2. The entrepreneurs experience; 
3. Characteristics of the product or service; 
4. Characteristics of the market; 
5. Financial considerations; 
6. The venture team. 
However, only Macmillan et al (1987) addressed the issue of whether 
these criteria are helpful in distinguishing successful ventures from 
unsuccessful ventures. 
There are some weaknesses in these models: First, all the 
information was gathered from venture capitalists using ex post data- 
gathering techniques, as Hall et al (1993) notes: 
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"the results could be biased by inaccuracies -in the recall ability of, 
the venture capitalists, specially in trying to differentiate between the 
criteria that leads to success vis-a-vis those that lead to failure" 
(p. 26). 
Second, they are also open to errors and biases as a result of self-reporting 
of data. As Macmillan et al ý1985) explained, there is the risk that 
respondents May be affected by their comprehension of what a good 
response is. 
Fourth Stage: - deal structuring. If the venture capital firm is happy 
about a venture up, to this stage, the investment decision, enters into a 
negotiating process with the entrepreneur about the amount, form and 
price of the investment. However, Fried et al (1994) argue that this stage 
in the venture capital investment decision comes "much earlier in the 
process with the level of VC evaluation activities increasing significantly 
after pricing is settled. " (p. 35). Fried et al believe that after the evaluation 
reaches a positive stage the deal enters a closing phase, where details of 
the structure are finalised and legal documents negotiated. 
Fifth Stage: - Post investment activities. It is believed that venture 
capital investment is more than money and this is what makes the venture 
capital industry a unique method of proactive investor-involvement, "the 
role of the venture capitalist extends from investor to collaborator" 
(Tybejee et al, 1984b; p. 1054). 
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3.1.6 Venture Capital and Managing Risk 
Venture capital investing is all about risk. The lack of financial 
history and market data for the new ventures can be a major challenge in 
choosing potential deals. The fact that "the entrepreneur or the venture 
capitalist will pursue his or her own interests" (Fiet, 1995; p. 552), is 
another source of concern in the venture capital market. So, venture 
capitalists follow many strategies to control and minimise the risk, and 
improve the chances of success. 
(i) Network: 
Direct contact is not common in the venture capital market. Participants 
in this market rely on their network of contacts as a source of deals and 
risk-reducing information. "Venture capital firms and business agents 
certainly depended upon their own investor networks as sources of risk- 
reducing information" (Fiet, 1991; p. 171). Venture capital firms rarely 
invest in any 'cold' deals, in practice they focus on developing a network 
of referees. (Fried et al, 1994) 
(ii) Extensive Evaluation: 
When interest is shown in a deal, an extensive evaluation has to be made. 
The unique evaluation process that charactirised venture capital firms' 
decision is believed to have unique characteristics that contribute to the 
success of the venture capital firms ( Macmillan et. al (1987). by reducing 
risks and adverse selection. However, some writers (Chan, 1983; Amit et 
al, 1990) have questioned the ability of venture capitalists to solve the 
adverse selection problem. 
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(iii) Syndication: ,I-ý, i, ý 
The uncertainty that surrounds venture capital investments has led 
investors to syndicate with each other, not only to spread financial risk, 
but also, as Bygrave et al (1992) argue, to share information. The 
common practice in the US for established venture capitalists is to 
syndicate (Lerner, 1994). "It has been said that 100 decision makers 
control the US venture capital industry" (Bygrave et al, 1992 p. 185). 
(iv) Deal structure and management involvement: 
The financing agreement can help or hurt the expected return to risk ratio. 
It is believed that the terms of the agreement and the ability to intervene 
in the operational management serve as a safeguard for the venture 
capitalists in a risky environment (Ruhnka et a], 1991 and Tybejee et a], 
1984a). However, venture capital firms- are not interested in having 
control in a venture which may discourage creative management, the 
intention is to guide ventures to success by passing on their experience 
through co-operative management, involvement and support. 
(v) Diversified portfolio 
In accordance with practice in finance theory, researchers found thla 
venture capitalists also diversify their investments in order to reduce risks. 
Diversification can be achieved through investing in different industrial 
sectors, different geographical areas, different levels of risk or different 
stages of development (Ruhnka et al, 1991). 
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3.1.7 Venture Capital - The Development Role 
Venture capital firms play an important role in an economy, in both 
a macro and micro sense. They played a positive role in the financial 
market in closing the equity gap in the United States by their support of 
new and start-up firms which are generally ignored in the financial system. 
Their micro contribution can be seen in the added value within a portfolio 
firm. The financial and management support to small and innovative 
firms usually leads to an increase in small firms' chances of success which 
means new jobs and wealth in the economy. Yet, without venture capital 
support, many fail to get off the ground or do not reach their full potential. 
The crucial role that smaller-sized companies play in economic 
growth is evident from the economic development literature. They are 
often believed to be the generators of innovations which underlie the 
future of an economy. However, without a mechanism in the financial 
system to close the long-term investment capital needs of these firms, the 
development process can be hazardous. Many studies have recognised 
this gap, as early as the 1930s the Macmillan Committee in the United 
Kingdom supported these findings and then confirmed by similar studies 
performed by the US Department of Commerce (Dominguez, 1974). 
Risky capital was needed to support the fast growth in the industrial sector 
in the United States in the 1950s-60s and the United States was not the 
only case, "venture capital is often held to fill a gap in the financial system 
in Britain" (Coopey, 1994, p. 263). 
Banks, on the other hand, have generally invested in highly liquid 
or highly secure products which stand against long-term capital 
investment in SMEs. By examining the literature, four sources can be 
identified as the main providers of risk capital in developed financial 
systems. At the top of the list is the stock market, which should be 
ignored for this study because it provides equity financing only for mature 
firms. The remaining sources are venture capital firms, private investors 
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(business angels) and government programmes for SME firms. These 
sources have developed a different investment strategy based on long-term 
investment, a high proportion of which is in promising small and medium- 
sized firms. According to Bygrave et aL (1992 ), venture capital was 
crucial to the formation and growth of many high-tech companies (in the 
US). The contribution of these high-tech firms to the technological and 
economic development of their regions highlight the importance of the 
role that venture capital can play. Specialised venture capital investing 
knowledge plays an essential role in combining innovation, technology 
transfer and entrepreneurship in order to fuel the process of economic 
growth. 
"The NSF study (1982) found that a small segment of the venture 
capital industry is responsible for the creation, financing, and 
development of a surprisingly large share of all venture-capital- 
backed high technology companies" (Bygrave et A, 1992 , p. 230). 
Another study by the American Government Accounting Office 
(1982) found a large contribution to local, regional, and national economic 
development was made by venture-capital-backed firms in terms of jobs 
created, corporate and individual tax revenues, employee income and 
export sales (Bygrave et al., 1992 ). Silicon Valley and Route 128 are 
two of seven US venture capital complexes that stand out as examples of 
the link between venture capital, high-tech firms and economic 
development (Florida et al., 1988). 
In the UK, the first survey by the Venture Capital Association 
(1996) to assess the impact of venture capital on the UK economy 
concluded that venture capital has contributed significantly to the 
economic performance and global competitiveness of the UK. Venture- 
capital-backed firms out-performed leading UK companies on average 
annual increase rates in sales revenue, pre-tax profits, total net assets and 
job creation (BVCA, 1996). These outstanding findings have encouraged 
many Asian and other developed and developing countries to establish 
programmes to promote venture capital funds and release any constraints 
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on'its growth (McNaughton, 1991;, Bygrave et al., 1992 ; Anderson, 
1993; SCheela, 1994; Schwartz. 1994; Tyebjee, 1988; Choy, 1990; 
Gibson, 1992). 
, 
On a micro scale, venture capital involvement with the investee 
company can add value by passing the experience and knowledge of the 
venture capital executive team to the new venture. "Apart from funding 
growing companies, the venture capital industry provides a wide range of 
support which includes acting as a sounding board, providing access to 
commercial networks as well as advice on marketing and corporate 
strategy. They encourage companies to challenge their status quo, 
making them more competitive" (BVCA, 1996, p. 2). In that survey, 86 
per cent of venture-capital-backed companies claimed their company 
would not have existed or would have grown less rapidly without venture 
capital. Fried et aL (1994) pointed out that venture capital also offers the 
demand-side benefits that may make it more attractive to the ventures than 
a public equity offering. In addition to the management support, venture 
capital provides confidentiality in contrast with public disclosure which 
may be quite costly to the firm. Also, venture capital firms are producers 
of information in a market with imperfect information. Ventures benefit 
from this advantage by making substantial savings compared with the cost 
of obtaining the information themselves. 
However, not all scholars are in agreement about the positive role 
that venture capital plays in financial markets. Some researchers (Chan, 
1983; Amit et al., 1990) argues that venture capital markets may suffer 
from severe adverse selection. On the other hand, Barry (1994) believes 
that the venture capital industry has created an answer to this problem: 
"Contracting technology, the added value created via consulting assistant, 
and the unavailability of suitable funds from other sources" (p. 11). Also, 
the gradual injection of funds to ventures all act to add value and 
minimise the adverse selection in the venture capital process. 
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3.2 Venture Capital Firms in Saudi Arabia 
Two informal surveys were carried out at an early stage in the 
development of this thesis to provide exploratory data about the market of 
risk equity capital (REQ for small and start-up ventures in Saudi Arabia. 
The first one concluded that the market consisted of two sources of 
providers of REC: 
(1) Formal large firms, mainly publicly traded companies; 
(2) Individual investors; 
The second survey was completed by unstructured interviews with a 
few of the formal large firms and informal individual investors to gain a 
knowledge of the general composition and activities of risk capital market. 
The results can be surnmarised in a few points: 
There are about 12 to 15 firms (the numbers are rising) which invest 
(equity capital) in start-up or expanding ventures. 
Hands-on-management is considered to be a very important aspect 
of the investment. They usually require a seat on the Board of 
Directors. 
Industrial or industrial services ventures are largely the only 
projects that are considered by these companies. 
Long-term objectives are the main forces in the philosophy of these 
firms to establish and expand the industrial base in Saudi Arabia,. 
one of the main objectives in the government's 
development plans. 
All these issues are in line with the concept of venture capital in 
developed countries. However, other issues contrast with the practices of 
venture capital: 
- The mechanism for exit was found to be the sale of the project by 
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public offering, or any other method to realise the capital gain. 
However, in the context of Saudi's firms, keeping the project alive in 
their own portfolio was the main practice of the majority of risk capital 
firms in Saudi Arabia. - This was believed to be due to the short history 
of these firms and the lack of a strong stock market. 
Support for entrepreneurial projects was found to be very weak in 
Saudi firms and most ventures that these firms invest in are: 
(a) created by the risk capital company itself. This practice 
violates the intermediation role that venture capital 
companies play; 
(ii) created by two or more of the risk capital firms; 
It is obvious that these companies do not support small 
entrepreneurs who are managing small growing businesses. Their role in 
closing the equity gap that small firms face is very limited. So, this area of 
research is not applicable to Saudi Arabia. Hence the second source of 
venture capital financing was researched. This is cited in the litarture as 
the Informal Investor or Business Angel source of funds. 
The second part of the survey was concerned with informal 
investors who devote some of their wealth to be invested in small growing 
businesses. Many investors in the survey argue that the size and 
importance of this market is underestimated by public policies. They play 
an essential role in the growth of new firms. The ignorance of banks and 
the limited government funds for small firms have given these investors a 
chance to expand their activities. In the next chapter a comprehensive 
review of past literature about informal investors will be presented. 
Research gaps will be identified to establishe the need for this study. 
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Chapter Four 
Review of the literature 
Informal Venture Capital Investors 
4.1 Evolution of the Literature 
This chapter will provide a brief literature review about the second 
source of venture capital Investors and identify some areas which warrant 
further investigation. In particular, an emphasis will be placed on research 
conducted on the full investment process and investment criteria. 
Compared to more established disciplines, which have been 
analysed for centuries, the study of entrepreneurship and the funding of 
small entrepreneurial ventures has only evolved over the last 25 years in 
the US (Bygrave, 1989) and 'even less in the UK. Indeed informal 
investors who provide venture capital for new or growing businesses have 
not been considered by researchers until recently. In view of the fact that 
informal risk capital has existed for centuries, the first study that can best 
be determined, according to Wetzel (1986a), came from the'Federal 
Reserve studies' that preceded the passage of the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958; a study by Albert Rubinstein was part of the 
Federal Reserve research. 
I Later, this area attracted more researchers: New England (Baty, 
1964; Wetzel et al, 1981; Shapero, 1983), Texas (Hoffman, 1972), 
Boston area (Brophy, 1981; Charles River Associates, 1976), Sunbelt 
Region (Gaston and Bell, 1988), the East Cost (Haar'et aL, 1988), the 
Knoxnville Region (Sullivan, 1990). This volume of research was 
concentrated on the USA. However, studies have also been carried out in 
the UK (Mason and Harrison, 1991-1997); (Osnabrugge, 1998); in Canada 
(Riding et al, 1988); and in Sweden (Landstr6m, 1993). ' A review of the 
previous papers can be summarised in the following'points, as Landstorm. 
(1993) stated: 
The research can to a large extent be characterised as 
descriptive. It has been important for researchers to give 
evidence of the scope and characteristics of the informal 
risk capital market. 
91 
k&-, 
The research has mainly considered the financing of 
entre-preneurial ventures from the supply side, whereas 
the demand side has almost been taken for granted. 
The research has been dominated by studies from the 
USA which means that our knowledge to a large extent 
reflects conditions in the USA. " (P. 527). 
Although this field only has about a dozen dedicated researchers, it is still 
growing and slowly spreading to many other countries (Mason, 1996d) 
It is argued that informal risk capital is very important to the 
financial ý system. In developed countries a gap exists in the financial 
needs of small firms which cannot raise capital through formal 
institutions: formal venture capital firms, banks and stock markets 
(Mason, 1996a ). According to Bygrave et aL (1992), the formal venture 
capital industry has moved from the classic venture capital concept. The 
formal venture capital firms in the 1990s are more interested in short-term 
goals. The financing of start-up, or early stage, is becoming a very small 
part-of venture capital firms' portfolio. However, on the other hand, 
studies on developed countries concluded that informal risk capital is 
more appropriate than venture capital as a source of early-stage finance 
(Walker, 1989). In Wetzel's study (1986a), the age of firms in the 
informal investors' portfolio is dominated by start-up to young firms 
(80%). This important role that informal risk capital plays has increased 
the interest of academics and policyinakers in the field. 
In developing countries, the informal investors are ma or providers 
of capital due to the lack of an established financial system. According to 
Barry (1994) the informal market in developing countries is often more 
important than the formal markets. Formal venture capital is vertually 
non-exist, raising money for new projects from private groups or family 
members is common. 
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Hajjar's study (1989) concerning small businesses in Saudi Arabia 
concluded that informal investors are the major providers and the most 
preferred option of external financing. 
- This thesis noticed the limited knowledge about informal risk 
capital in developing countries.. The characteristics and behaviour of 
informal investors (supply side) will be investigated through a survey 
targeted on the informal investors in Saudi Arabia. However, the 
researcher anticipated a challenge in identifying the informal investors in a 
country where information is a very scarce resource. Also, researchers in 
developed countries found that identifying informal investors is the 
greatest obstacle facing research in this field (Wetzel, 198 1, and 
Landstr6m 1993). 
4.1.1 Review of the Literature 
In the overview of the informal Investors literature, only a very 
general outline will be given so as to identify research gaps, which need 
furtherattention, and so provide support to the importance of this study. In 
addition, a comprehensive review of past research findings will be 
incorporated when it is applicable into the analysis of chapters 7-8. This 
allows a more direct comparison to be conducted in the result chapters and 
provide a better picture for the findings of this study. 
4.1.2 Informal Investors Background 
Research since 1980 has improved the knowledge about informal 
risk capital. Several studies (Wetzel, 198 1; Gaston, 1989; Mason et al., 
1991; Riding et al, 1988 and Osnabrugge, 1998. etc. ) have tried to build a 
descriptive model about investor demographics. However, this research 
has focused mainly on the exploratory stage, in building a demographic 
picture and behaviour of informal investors. According to Landstr6m 
(1993), "the typical informal investor in the UK, the USA and Sweden 
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seems to share some similarities as well as showing some differences" 
(p. 534) and can be broken down as follows: 
Table 4.1 
Demographic Characteristics of Investors 
UK USAýý- ` 'Sweden, Deniogiaphic Charkteristics 
Age (share of informal investors 55 years or more) 
Experienced entrepreneurs 
Present occupation (business owner or manager) 
Net worth (share of informal investors who 
are millionaires in USA) 
Proportion of wealth invested in informal 
investment 
<5% 
44% 25% 47% 
21% 83% 96% 
49% 69% 69% 
19% 37% 39% 
34% 32% 17% 
ý!: 25% 21% n/a 34% 
Sources: 
Gaston, 1989; 
Mason et A (199 1); 
Landstr6m, 1993. 
Mason et al. (1991) notes that the vast majority of UK informal 
investors' management experience is mainly in the area of business 
professionals, which is also the case in the USA. As Gaston (1989) 
notes, in the US professional groups outside the business community 
contain few informal investors. However, the educational background 
contains a more diversified group. According to Wetzel (1981), 95% 
hold at least a baccalaureate degree and over half (51%) hold post- 
graduate degrees, with 44% graduates and 48% undergraduates in 
technical fields. - 
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4.1.3 Investment Activity 
The investment activity of informal investors can be summarised in 
the following table: 
Table 4.2 
Review of Investment Activity 
Investment Activity ... UK-T'' .. ýUSA-, - -Sweden' 
Number of opportunities received per informal investor 29 9 10 
Number of opportunities considered seriously 5(17%) 3(33%) 5(50%) 
Number of investments made 2(7%) 2(22%) 3(30%) 
Share of informal investors who make 
0-1 investment/last three years 
ýA investments/last three years 
52% 
12% 
42% 
9% 
28% 
35% 
Amount invested per investor in the 
past three years 
E29,000 
$54,000 
n/a 1.2m. SEK 
$218,000 
Sources: 
Gaston, 1989; 
Mason, 199 1; 
Landstr6m (1993). 
According to Mason et aL (1991), the large number of 
opportunities received by UK informal investors reflects "in a number of 
cases 'to' the membership of investor syndicates or financial matchmaking 
organisations such a LIWC and UCR" (p. 19). 
Investors are motivated by many reasons: the most important 
reason given for participation in risk investment is the opportunity for 
high capital gain. The participation in the entrepreneurial process is the 
most important non-financial motive in investing in risk capital 
opportunities. Other reasons reported by business angels were: psychic 
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income, the desire to contribute to social objectives and -personal 
satisfaction (Wetzel, 1981; . Gaston, 1989; Mason et al., 1991; 
Landstorm, 1993; Stevenson et al, 1994; Osnabrugge, 1998). 
Clearly* the previous two areas have received extensive attention 
from researchers in this field, however, all the past researches are 
concentrated in developed countries. Knowledge about the characteristics 
and investment activities of Informal Investors in developing countries 
does not exist. In chapter 7, this study will provide more insights on those 
investors in one of the developing countries( Saudi Arabia) with extensive 
comparison to previous research in developed countries. 
4.1.4 Information Networks 
As information about investment opportunities and entrepreneurs is 
not publicly available, so information becomes an expensive resource. In 
order to receive investment opportunities, informal investors rely on their 
own sources to obtain information in identifying and evaluating potential 
investments. According to Mason et al. (1991) and Wetzel (1981) the 
most important sources of information are business associates, friends and 
personal search. In the UK, accountants are suggested as being a very 
important source of information (Mason et al., 1991). Also, the literature 
was concerned about the effectiveness of these channels of 
communication. It is also a question about trust, which means how much 
of the information is transferred to investor. The Mason survey revealed 
that "business associates and friends are also the sources of information on 
investment opportunities that are most likely to result in investments being 
made" (Mason et al., 1991, p. 21). However, Mason provides another 
dimension on the usefulness of various referral sources by examining the 
efficiency rate, which is simply, as Mason explains the proportion of 
investments made to investment opportunities received. The most efficient 
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sources of information are stockbrokers which are surprisingly less 
frequently used as a referral source(Mason et. al., 199 1) 
The presence of intermediaries among informal investors could 
support the flow of information in this market. - However, because it is 
very difficult for these intermediaries to support themselves financially, 
informal investors help themselves by what is called in the literature 
'networks and venture capital clubs'. According to Hoffman (1972): 
"The venture capital network is a group of two or more 
venture capitalists who share investment information with 
each other ..., venture capital intermediaries are individuals 
who inform investors of the identity of new/small companies 
that are seeking venture capital, and they also inform 
new/small companies of the identity of venture capitalists 
who might invest in the company. " 
(Hoffman, 1972, p. 18) 
Clubs, another form of intermediary function among informal investors, 
are places where investors meet and hear presentations from entrepreneurs 
seeking finance, their underlying purpose is to disseminate private 
investment information. The organisers volunteer their services and do 
not expect compensation (Fiet, 1991). The geographical area of the 
networks and the degree of effectiveness can vary considerably. 
According to the Panel on Venture Capital in the United States (1970) 
(Hoffman, 1972), some networks operate only in a given or specific local 
area; other networks operate regionally; and few operate throughout the 
country. It is also confirmed that these networks do not operate at the 
same degree of effectiveness (Hoffman, 1972). However, the literature 
does not explain how these networks are formed or the reasons behind the 
effectiveness of some networks. 
Co-investing among informal investors occurs as a strategy to 
increase the efficiency of the investment decision. According to Aram 
(1989), some business angels benefit from other investors' judgement. 
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SO, if an investor finds another 'investor willing to put money into the 
business, this will improve the attractiveness of the project. Wetzel's 
study (198 1) about informal investors in New England revealed that: 
"Informal investors participate with other individuals in 50% or more 
of their risk capital investments. Informal investors are apparently 
accustomed to sharing investment opportunities with close but 
informal groups of friends and business associates. " 
(P. 19) 
However, the anticipation that co-investing may be used as a strategy for 
other reasons such as improving the information networks is an area that 
lacks any previous research. So, while this area has received a moderate 
attention from researchers, there are still many questions to be answered. 
Indeed this study will try to fill, an important gap in the literature in the 
following two areas; 
- the efficiency of information networks in a developing country; 
- an extensive investigation about the reasons behind the co-investing 
strategy. 
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4.1.5 Investment Evaluation and Decision Criteria 
Investing in specific information like Informal venture capital 
involves high risks which can be divided into market and agency risk. 
"Market risk is due to unforeseen competitive conditions 
(Porter, 1980-1985) and investment complexity (Butler, 
1983; Williamson, 1988). Agency risk is caused by the 
separate and possibly divergent interests of investors and 
entrepreneurs (Alchain and Dewsetz, 1972; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1978)" (Fiet, 199 1, p. 11) 
As entrepreneurs usually know their own collateral, moral character and 
their business conditions, so differences exist between the two parties in 
this market; the venture capitalists face information asymmetry. 
According to Fiet (1991), informal investors try different strategies to 
improve the inequality of information: 
(1) networking among investors; 
(2) co-investing among themselves; and 
(3) investing in similar types of risk-reducing information. 
However, informal investors rely on their friends, associates and 
personal intuition when measuring risk. Hoffman (1972) commented: 
"Neither Rubenstein, the Federal Reserve system, nor Baty 
were able to identify the use of sophisticated or 
mathematically-oriented measures of risk or probability 
assessment by either institutional or individual venture 
capitalists. " (Hoffman, 19972, p. 24) 
.1 
Regarding the relative informality and lack of sophistication of the 
evaluation methods, individual venture capitalists rely very heavily on 
their contacts in business and technical areas in assessing the prospects of 
the entrepreneur, the technology and the market of the prospect venture. 
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Studies about informal investors found that there are a few 
concepts in the contract that investors are concerned about (Wetzel, 198 1; 
Mason et aL, 1991; Hoffman, 1972). According to Mason et aL (1991) 
only two factors are regarded as the most important by the majority of 
investors: 
- the management team 
- the growth potential of the market. 
Other factors that investors regard as important are: 
uniqueness/distinctiveness of the product or service 
industry of the business venture 
the rate of return 
the exit mechanism 
the nature of the competition. 
In addition to factors relating to the company and its management, 
those'relating to the tax, position, investment preferences and personal 
orientations of individual investors have also been briefly discussed in the 
literature as possibly affecting whether a given investor invests in 
new/small companies (Hoffman, 1972). However, the management team 
or entrepreneur remains the key for investing or rejecting a proposal. 
Investors are concerned with the previous performance of the team, their 
experience, technical capability, educational background and the mix or 
diversity of managerial talents represented within the company (Hoffman, 
1972). Another important issue here, as sited by Mason et A (1991), - is 
the confidence in the entrepreneurs. According to this study: 
"The lack of confidence in the entrepreneurs was both the most 
frequent reason given by angels for not investing ... and the single 
most important reason for not investing. " 
(p. 29) 
The importance of the growth potential of the market can be 
explained by the nature of risk capital investing. The holding period is 
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long and the risk involved is high. Investors look for growth potential 
projects to compensate and to satisfy the risk/reward ratios that they 
accept. According to Wetzel (1981), the portfolio minimum rate of return 
is 20 % per year. Gaston (1989) reports 22% as the median annual rate 
amongst US informal investors. On the other hand, UK investors require 
higher rates of return than their US counterparts. According to Mason et 
aL (1991), informal investors are looking for a minimum rate of return on 
investment (Rol) which ranges from a median of 45% for pre-start-ups 
and 32% for start-ups. 
However, the investment criteria of informal investors have 
received very limited attention. A few researchers (Mason et al 1996c; 
Mason et ýal 1996b, c; Haar et al, 1988; Landstorm, 1993; Stevenson & 
Coveney1994; and Freear et al. 1991) have addressed this area. In 
particular, they focused on: the investors preferences, rather than criteria 
actually used, initial stage rather than due diligence or overall evaluation 
( Mason et al. 1996b, 1996d, 1996c) and a number were constrained by the 
small size of investors. Even with research -progress in this area, many 
researchers have stressed the need for more examination into the 
investment criteria and decision of informal investors (Wetzel, 1987,1993; 
Freear & Wetzel, 1992; Mason, 1 993,1996b; Haar et al. 1988; Harrison & 
Mason, 1992) 
Another limitation in the literature about informal investors' 
investment decision is the lack-of a theoretical approach that may give 
more insights to understanding the investors' decision behaviour. 
Fiet(1991) and the recent work by Osnabrugge (1998) are good examples 
in this direction. However, this study will investigate the investment 
decision behavior of informal investors in a developing country where 
research is clearly needed. 
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4.1.6 Post-Investment Experience 
The post-investment experience refers to the mechanisms that 
investors use to accelerate control over their investment after funding has 
been made. Two strategies are discussed in the literature. First, the 
involvement of the investor with -the investee firm from the time of 
investment to the exit and realisation of that investment. Secondly, the 
staging of finance over time. 
The uniqueness of venture capital is not only that it provides risk 
capital to ventures, but also the added value through the management and 
technical support it receives in a micro sense. However, while this was 
raised as a question in the literature of institutional venture capital firms, 
the literature of informal investors does not include any study which 
investigated whether a venture is better or worse off with investors being 
involved in its management. 
Findings on the post-investment experience of informal investors 
are,. however, more limited and often not based on research-based 
evidence( Mason et al. 1996d). Many of the studies conducted have been 
quite general. This area has been covered in Hoffman (1972); Wetzel 
(1981); Freear et al (1991); Mason et al (1991); Stevenson et al. (1994); 
and Landstorm. (1993). 
Studies showed that informal investors' involvement in the 
companies in which they invest is very strong. According to Mason et aL 
(1991), as a common practice, investors usually have a close relationship 
with their investments, ranging from a passive role to a consulting help on 
an "as needed" basis. I 
In Wetzel's (1981) study, investors had played an 
"active" role in three-quarters of the ventures in which they invested 
during the past five years. 
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Voting control is usually the most important, factor concerning 
entrepreneurs who are looking for risk capital. They are always afraid of 
losing control of, their firms when giving up some of their ownership. 
Research in the UK about voting control found that: 
"The majority of business angels are minority shareholders in 
the companies in which they invest. Just 10 per cent of deals 
involve a business angel taking a majority stake ... only in a 
minority of cases does the entrepreneur lose absolute control 
of the firm to the angel. " (Mason et aL, 199 1, p. 25) 
This is confirmed, by previous studies in the US. Wetzel (1981) notes 
that out of a total of 287 financing reported, voting control was less than 
50% in three-quarters of the financing and less than 10% over half their 
financing., However, Wetzel is concerned that the aggregate voting 
control when taking the syndication by business angels may represent a 
I arger amount than the pattern shown above., 
Hoffman (1972) in his study discussed business Angels' relationship 
with companies in which they invest by searching for the managerial and 
financial constraints which are imposed, and may depend on the 
company's age, to control their investment. The main constraints are: 
- Representation on the company's board of directors 
- option to "take over" or replace management if the company fails to 
operate profitably 
limits on the use of the investment proceeds and/or control of the 
company's financial structure 
financial limits, including a ceiling on salaries, dividends, etc. 
investor approval on major policy decisions 
"tying up" the company's management to work for long-term goals. 
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On the other hand staging of finance has been investigated by some 
researchers. Mason et al. (1996d); Coveny (1996) and Osnabrugge (1998) 
conducted generally this aspect of infori-nal investors decision. However, 
limited knowledge was available about the reasons that motivated 
investors to stage financing. 
Summary 
Research since 1980 has improved the knowledge about informal 
risk capital. Several studies (Wetzel, 1981, Gaston, 1989, and Mason et 
al., 1991, Osnabrugge, 1998 etc. ) have tried to build a descriptive model 
about the investor demographics, investment activity, and the relationship 
between the informal investor and the portfolio firm. Also, the decision- 
making has attracted some researchers (Haar et al., 1988, Riding et al., 
1993, and Mason et al., 1996a, 1996b; Osnabrugge, 1998). The 
Information network, agency and market risk were investigated by Fiet 
(1991); Osnabrugge, (1998). The first international comparison was 
developed by Mason et al. (1991) - UK vs US - and then Landstr6m 
(1993) - UK and USA vs Sweden. Also, the role of informal capital in 
regional development has-been given attention from some researchers, 
e. g. Hofman (1972). However, literature lacks any research about 
informal investors in developing countries. It is argued here that 
understanding the informal risk capital in developing countries may lead 
to finding ways for achieving economic empowerment. It is hypothesised 
that the informal venture capital in developing countries is working 
inefficiently in the information network between supply and demand and 
in locating scarce resources (capital) towards needy projects. 
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4.2 Informal Venture Capital in Saudi Arabia 
An overview of the financial system in Saudi Arabia was given in 
Chapters land 2. It was argued in chapter 2 that the formal financial 
institutions ignored small businesses. Most of the time, claims of these 
institutions on the private sector were considered to be liabilities of large 
firms, usually in the trading sector. The growth of small firms, which 
form the majority of the economy, was left to self-financing or individual 
investors, usually friends or relatives as revealed in Al-HaJjar's study 
(1989). Government agencies have provided a significant contribution to 
the growth of medium sized projects but not yet in favour of smaller 
projects. 
In the earlier sections of this'chapter, a clear picture of venture 
capital investors ýwas developed. Those investors exist in developed 
countries to support, financially and managerially, small and start-up 
businesses. Governments in developed countries have created many 
programmes to motivate these investors. The commitment by venture 
capitalists to provide their experiences - in management or technical 
'know-how'- to growing small scale projects has provided an extra benefit 
to equity financing support. These two characteristics make the venture 
capital investors a unique source of finance to help small firms to strive 
for long-term goals which are only reached with difficultyý through debt 
financing. Debt financing (if available) forces small firms to work for 
short-term goals to be able to repay the debt. 
In order to develop the research question, this thesis argues that the 
venture capital concept needs to be expanded in the Saudi economy due to 
the fact that: 
- The problems in financing small firms are still believed to exist. 
The acceptance of such a contract is well rooted in the society as a 
financing method appreciated by Islam. 
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in addition it is hoped that, the benefits - managerial and technical - 
of venture capital can be provided for small firrns in Saudi Arabia 
which are not available directly through government financing. 
In this section, a rationale for the research question will be 
developed by studying the main Islamic financing methods and venture 
capital in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
4.2.1 Islamic Financing Methods 
The view that defines Riba as the interest rate is believed to 
dominate the opinions of most Shari'ah (Islamic Law) scholars. Riba is 
clearly prohibited in the Holy Qu'ran, the basic source of Islamic ideology. 
Muslin society has to rely on specific methods to transfer funds between 
savers and investors. These financial practices include: Mudarabah, 
Musharakah, Deferred sale, Murabahah. Ijarah, Lease Purchasing 
Financing and Qard Hasan. In this section, only two methods will be 
briefly discussed: Mudarabah and Musharakah, because these two are 
equity financing, which is the main characteristc in venture capital 
financing. 
Mudarabah 
Mudarabah is a contract that organises the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the capital provider where in this contract the 
entrepreneur provides his or her effort only. 
The two share profits according to the proportions that have been 
agreed upon and capital alone is liable for any loss; in this case, the 
entrepreneur loses his or her time and effort. 
The limitations on the entrepreneur's use of the fund can vary from a 
situation where the agent is generally free to act as he or she sees 
fit' for the pursuit of profit to a situation where the contract specifies 
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the activities of the entrepreneur. In this case, he or she has to 
follow these restrictions. 
The life of this contract, may not be a specified contractual period 
for the business. 
(iv) The responsibility of the fund provider is limited to the amount of 
the fund provided. 
These issues covering the conditions of a Mudarabah contract explains the 
general view but do not imply full agreement on these conditions by 
Islamic jurist schools. A full discussion of the contract is beyond the 
scope of this study. I 
Musharakah 
Musharakah is another form of the profit-loss sharing contracts in 
Islamic Law. In this the fund is provided by all the owners of the project. 
The profit is shared according to the proportions that were agreed upon in 
the contract. However, any loss has to be bome by the capital providers 
only., This contract is very similar to the partnership firms found in the 
conventional system. All the partners have the right to participate in the 
management of the project. Any one or all of them also have the right to 
waive this right. 
Islamic economists (M. - Khan, 1991; , W. Khan, 1985; Chapra, 
1987) argue that these Islamic financing techniques, if introduced into a 
financial system, will lead to a more stable banking system because in 
profit-loss sharing methods liabilities always equal assets. These 
financing methods can provide risk capital that is badly needed for capital 
accumulation even in developed economies. Inflation can be assumed to 
be less because Mudarabah and Musharakah finance production not 
consumption. 
Without challenging the truthfulness of the previous argument, it is 
argued here that Muslim'society has to face the question of how to apply 
these techniques in a modem financial system to channel funds between 
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savers and investors. Islamic banks have existed for almost 30 years but 
the use of profit-loss sharing methods is yet to be established. Ausaf 
Ahmad (1987) in his survey of Islamic banks noted that, "Murabahah 
operation (debt method) dominates the financial operations of all those 
banks for whom relevant data are available both in terms of number of 
operations undertaken as well as in terms of finance provided. "(p. 75) 
The experience of the Islamisation of the financial system in 
Pakistan can be raised as an excellent example of the difficulties in 
introducing profit-loss sharing techniques. Without planting the use of 
these techniques in the roots of society, the transfer from a conventional to 
an Islamic system may result in only a 'terminology' change. Islamic 
economist Khan (1985) supports this argument: "I have looked very 
closely at the efforts of Islamization [in Pakistan]. To say the least, the 
whole exercise has resulted in merely a change in terminology without 
even laying the foundations of the system. In the past five years, there 
has not been a single experiment of a truly Islamic financial arrangement. " 
(p. 18) It is argued here that new formal institutions should be organised 
to gradually expand the utilisation of pure Islamic financing techniques 
and to improve the individual practices that were proved, in Hajjar's study 
(1989), to exist widely. When these institutions succeed, the movement 
towards Islamisation will not be such a challenge as it was. 
Venture capital success in developed countries and the very 
important structural similarities between venture capital and the Islamic 
financial instruments 'Mudarabah' and 'Musharakah' can help the Saudi 
economy in applying these Islamic instruments and can also provide better 
opportunities for that class of society with limýited access to capital. 
However, the challenge of the use of profit-loss techniques on a 
large scale is believed to exist today, and the practices of Islamic banks do 
not show any noticeable development. The constraints on the development 
of these methods are believed to be inherited from these problems: 
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asymmetric information. 
Agency Problem: 
- moral hazards 
- adverse selection 
Also, the nature of banks as short-term intermediate institutions has put 
pressure on Islamic banks with regard to the utilisation of profit-loss 
sharing techniques. Other studies eg. (HaJar, 1989) mentioned the 
unwillingness of entrepreneurs to forgo some of the ownership and 
information confidentiality issues which are considered to be major 
obstacles on the use of formal 'Musharakah'. All these suggested that 
organisations more or less in line with venture capital firms should be 
introduced to supplement the efforts of Islamic banks in considering long- 
term objectives and for further use of Islamic profit-loss sharing 
applications. 
4.2.2 Informal Investors in Saudi Arabia - 
An important part of the informal surveys that were carried out at an 
early stage in the development of this thesis and briefly discussed at the 
end of the previous chapter were about the existence of informal investors 
in Saudi Arabia. These surveys have provided exploratory data about the 
market of risk equity capital (REQ for small and start-up ventures in 
Saudi Arabia. The first one concluded that informal investors play an 
important part in The Saudi Economy. 
However, many investors in the survey argue that the size and 
importance of this market is underestimated by public policies. They play 
an essential role in the growth of new firms. The ignorance of banks and 
the limited government funds for small firms have given these investors a 
chance to expand their activities. However, several points were raised by 
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the ten'investors that were interviewed about the informal risk capital 
market in Saudi Arabia: 
channelling information between investors and entrepreneurs seems 
to make investing in this market difficult; 
many investors argued that high quality entrepreneurs are rare in 
Saudi Arabia. However, the aim of ý opening a business is 
overwhelming but with repeated ideas and small potentiality of the 
market; 
the trust concept has been emphasised by several investors. - They 
make efforts to determine character and to distinguish between 
honest and dishonest entrepreneurs; 
liquidation through the stock market is a new concept to the Saudi 
economy. Investors always hold their share in the venture for 
dividends or they may sell it to other investors; 
failure of the informal risk capital market to utilise the large supply 
of risk capital that is available due to: 
supply of opportunities in the market being very low; 
outside investors are not very welcome by the owners of 
businesses even if they have to sacrifice growth 
opportunities; 
the high informality of entrepreneurs' presentation of their ideas 
and businesses; I 
the concept of added value in risk capital financing was not very 
clear within the group that were interviewed. Some of them 
argued that their involvement with the venture is very important 
for its success; others consider it unimportant if the relationship 
with the entrepreneur is built on one hundred per cent trust. This 
group leaves market issues and the development of the venture to 
the entrepreneur's judgement and experience. 
These findings, along with the literature survey results, formed the 
main base on which the analytical framework which is presented in the 
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next chapter and will be tested with a larger sample and a, formal 
questionnaire instrument. 
The informal venture capital market in Saudi Arabia is still lacking 
a study to explore its behaviour and practices. Research has shown that 
the informal market in developing countries is expected to be considerable 
(Barry, 1994). A Muslin society like Saudi Arabia, where sharing and 
co-operation are rooted in social life, makes this expectation most 
acceptable. However, to the knowledge of this author, this market has 
not been explored in previous research in the Islamic world at large. The 
only knowledge that is available to this researcher is that informal venture 
capital financing is the second source of finance to small firms in Saudi 
Arabia after the entrepreneur's own'wealth, which is confirmed in Hajjar's 
study (1989). But, the characteristics, preferences, evaluation criteria and 
structure of information channels of these investors are still unknown. 
A full understanding of the informal investors' market in Saudi 
Arabia is very important to provide facts to policyrnakers in order to 
expand the market-and increase efficiency in the market. Research is 
badly needed on this market if the intermediate role for these investors is 
to be'improved. It is argued here that the model that was developed in the 
literature concerning the venture capital market in developed countries 
will not be appropriate for understanding the same market in Saudi 
Arabia. The differences in culture and economy decrease the truthfulness 
of the model to explain the practices of informal investors in Saudi Arabia 
unless research advocates this action. It is suggested that research at this 
stage concerning informal investors in Saudi Arabia has to build a new 
model about this market activity and then a comparison with existing 
models should take place. 
A study like this can also fill a gap in the literature concerning the 
behaviour of informal investors in a developing country. As a pioneer 
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study about risk capital investors in Saudi Arabia, the study will attempt to 
Answer the following question: 
Research Question 
What are the characteristic, investment activities 
and the decision behaviour of informal investors 
in Saudi Arabia? 
It is also hoped that this study will fill an important gap in the 
development and application of Islamic profit-loss sharing (PLS) 
techniques (Musharakah and Mudarabah)., These techniques, as was 
discussed previously, are still widely practised by individual investors. 
The institutional applications of these methods, in the Islamic world, still 
face many problems. 
As a pioneer study about risk capital investors in Saudi Arabia, 
answering the research questions will provide a full picture and general 
understanding of the risk capital market in Saudi Arabia and through some 
light of developing countries on general. This research is hoped to open 
the door for further focus and specific studies. In the next chapter, the 
objectives of the study and an analytical framework will be developed. 
This will provide a better picture for understanding the different aspects of 
informal investors' investment decision behaviour. 
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Chapter Five 
THEANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
Having reviewed the literature on venture capital research, it was 
clear that research in this area does not exist in Muslim countries. The 
early survey that was performed for this thesis, in Saudi Arabia, notes that 
formal risk capital is very small and, to a large extent, is not connected 
with entrepreneurial activities. However, informal risk capital is believed 
to be large and active. Hajar's study (1989) concluded that informal risk 
capital financing is the second largest source of finance to small firms in 
Saudi Arabia after the entrepreneur's own wealth. Research in developed 
countries raised the importance of inforinal investors in the growth of 
SMEs. Gaston (1989) calculated that the informal venture capital market 
in the USA is over twice as large as the private placement market and 
eight times larger than professional venture capital investments in terms of 
the amount invested. Its importance as a source of finance for 
entrepreneurial ventures, especially at the start-up stage, is now widely 
recognised. It is estimated that SMEs in the UK have raised about E2 
billion from the informal venture capital market. Also, the importance of 
this market is not simply about its size but also for the added value that is 
generated with the money, such as entrepreneurial experience and 
business know-how (Mason et aL, 199 1). 
In Saudi Arabia, as a developing country moving towards 
privatisation, the importance of small businesses' growth cannot be 
ignored. Informal investors play an important role in these businesses by 
providing finance. - Without understanding the informal investor 
characteristics, behaviour and attitudes, govemmenV policies towards this 
source of finance may fail. This thesis, as a pioneer study about the 
infonnal risk capital investor in Saudi Arabia, will attempt to fill this gap. 
However, because the subject consists of many potentially relevant 
variables which interact in a complex fashion, together with the 
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consideration of the study as the first ever investigation about the informal 
risk capital market in Saudi Arabia, a deliberate attempt was made to 
examine and include a large number of variables in the study at the 
expense of giving up the richness that might be achieved had fewer 
variables been examined. 
5.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This research begins with the operational definition of the focal 
point of the study: the informal risk capital investors, also called business 
angels, who are those investors whose activities meet the following 
specific criteria: 
1. That they should provide equity financing to a new or growing 
business; 
2. That the financing should have occurred during the last five years; 
3. That the investor has no close family connection with the entrepreneur. 
The informal investors are private individuals who provide money 
to a private business through non-institutional channels. The business 
must produce a product or service and must have been founded by 
someone other than the investor or his close family members, such as 
father, son, brother or uncle. The investment must be in the form of 
equity. This does not include any of the following: 
- investment made through professionally managed venture capital 
funds, or through the public stock market, 
interest free loan provided to a family member to establish or expand 
his business, 
investment in investors' own business, 
real estate speculations (investments in land or buildings), 
investment made to a venture that is owned by a close family member. 
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In most risk capital literature, investments that were made to a 
venture with family connections were excluded. However, in Saudi 
Arabia's culture the concept of family may be confusing. The term 
"family" in Saudi Arabia means the extended members of all people who 
carry your family or tribe name. This usually consists of hundreds of 
family members who you may never have met. So, for the purpose of this 
study, excluding all family connections will underestimate the size of 
informal risk capital financing in the Saudi economy. On the other hand, 
this study is not the first study to include family connections. Sullivan M. 
(1990) in her Ph. D thesis at the University of Tennessee included the 
investments, of all family and friends. 
5.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study aims to: 
1- Specify the characteristics and investment activities of informal 
investors in Saudi Arabia; 
2- Formulate and test hypotheses related to how informal investors make 
their investment decisions during: 
- Deal origination, 
- Evaluation, 
- Post-investment. 
It is important that the research study should be based on a theoretical 
framework. Agency theory will be used to explain informal investors' 
decision behaviour throughout the complete investment process to reduce 
the possibility of agency risk (i. e. the risk that the entrepreneur will not 
use the investors' money in the responsible manner agreed upon). 
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Figure 5.1 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Informal Investors' characteristics and decision-making behaviour 
In Saudi Arabia 
MCharacteristics 
-Investors' profile,. 
-Investment opportunities received, 
-Stage of financing, 
-Investment sector, 
-Investment size, 
-Location, 
-Investment motivations, 
- Return. 
(2)Decision-Making behaviour 
- Deal origination, 
- Evaluation, 
- Post-investment. 
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5.3 The characteristics of informal investors 
This objective aims to build a profile for informal investors in Saudi 
Arabia: age, region, current job, education and experience. Also, this 
question should improve our understanding of investors' investment 
characteristics by looking at the following variables: 
- stage of development 
- geographical distance 
- investment size 
- industry distribution 
- portfolio diversification 
- number of investments. 
5.4 The investment decision-making behaviour 
The basic problem in the analysis of venture capitalists' behaviour in 
their decision-making may be the lack of an appropriate analytical 
framework. The review of the literature in an earlier section showed that 
theory-driven research is rarer than exploratory research. Recent studies 
have focused on issues such as the conditions under which businesses will 
or will not obtain funding from venture capitalists, the relationship 
between investors and entrepreneurs, and investors' characteristics. While 
previous research is important for this research as an exploratory study 
about the market in Saudi Arabia, it has been of very little help in building 
the theoretical framework. It is argued here that building a theoretical 
framework will give the research academic character and improve 
understanding the market structure and investors' behaviour. This 
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approach can help future research in its theory and developments in the 
venture capital market. 
Therefore, in order to build the theoretical framework, other 
literature has to be reviewed, such as: information economics, finance, 
strategic behaviour, contract theories, transaction economics, agency 
theory, organisation theory and decision-making theory. 
However, the framework which materialises does not mean that all 
the literature has been examined. It only touches on those areas related to 
developing a perspective theoretical framework for this research. An 
exception to the nature of previous research studies is given by, Fiet 
(1991), Reid (1995), Leland et aL (1977), Gompers (1995) and 
OSnabrugge (1998). 
Reviewing the literature, particularly in the areas of information 
economics, transaction costs and agency theory, has enriched the 
conceptual understanding of the nature of the market and the contractual 
relationships between investors and entrepreneurs. It is believed that a 
broader literature will provide insights into the behaviour of informal 
investors' decision-making. 
In this chapter, it is first assumed that perfect information exists in 
the market, then we relax this assumption and study the problems that 
arise under asymmetric information. The asymmetric information which 
exists in the market may explain most investors' behaviour in their 
decision-making. 
5.4.1 Information and Capital Markets 
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In the conventional paradigm, capital markets are perfect. 
Individuals and firms are assumed to be able to obtain as much funding as 
they want at the market interest rate. The theory also suggests that capital 
markets are informational efficient, when prices perfectly reflect all the 
available information (Stiglitz, 1985). 
Fama (1970) introduced a model of capital markets in which he 
assumed the existence of three types of efficiency: strong form, semi- 
strong form and weak form. The strong form exists when the value of a 
firm is a reflection of all information about it, no matter what its source. 
Semi-strong form exists when the value of a firm is a reflection of all the 
publicly available information about it. Weak form exists when the 
value of a firm is a reflection of only all historically available information. 
Information seems to be a very important element of the efficiency 
of financial markets. Copeland and Weston (1988) concluded that most 
research supports Fama! s semi-strong form. However, the problem that 
faces research when testing venture capital markets (formal and informal) 
against these forms is the diminished flow of investment information. 
This market is characterised by information asymmetry. 
Poindexter (1976) argues that compared with other capital markets, this 
limited flow of information is claimed to be mainly due to the relative 
scarcity of market intermediaries. 
Thus, the main function of the venture capital market intermediary 
is to ensure that both supply and demand in the market get as much 
accurate information as possible upon which to base their investment 
decision (Fiet, 1991). However, intermediaries find it very difficult to 
exist in venture capital markets, as Fiet (1991) argues, because it is 
difficult to support themselves financially. "Risk capital markets function 
sporadically and are fragmented by nature, they simply do not provide 
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consistent remunerative opportunities for intermediaries" (Fiet, 1991, 
p. 15). Thus, this characteristic of the market complicates the decision to 
invest in the market and creates high asymmetric information between 
investors and entrepreneurs after funds are made available to the venture. 
It is argued here that the asymmetric information in the risk capital 
market can be divided into two levels: pre-investment and post- 
investment. 
5.4.2 Pre-Investment Stage 
In this stage, asymmetric information is very high. Investors face 
difficulty finding opportunities which give rise to search costs. Also, 
when an investor mects an entrepreneur, knowledge differences between 
them create asymmetric information. 
Entrepreneurs usually know their own collateral, industriousness, 
moral character and business prospects better than venture capitalists. in 
essence, entrepreneurs possess inside information about the enterprise for 
which they are seeking financing (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Investors 
would benefit from knowing the true characteristics of entrepreneurs and 
the quality of their proposed ventures (Jensen and Meckling, 1978). 
Because of the lack of information transfer, investors face the risk 
of adverse selection (infonnation concerning the characteristics of a 
venture) and moral hazard (information concerning the true characteristics 
of an individual entrepreneur). 
Without information transfer, the market may perform poorly. 
Akerlof (1970) argues that under asymmetric information, average quality 
price will be offered in the market which will lead to a reduction in the 
supply of good quality projects. 
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However, investors take different mechanisms into account in their 
decision-making and evaluation criteria in order to decrease the risk of 
asymmetric information. 
5.4.2 (a) Search Costs 
The lack of intennediary function increases the cost of finding 
opportunities. Investors and entrepreneurs find it very difficult to identify 
each other. 
Search costs can be identified as part of the transaction cost. As 
Coase (1960) explained in his well-known article: 
"In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who 
it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal 
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to 
draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that 
the terms of the contract are being observed and so on. " 
(Coase, 1960. p. 15) 
So, search cost is an important factor in transaction costs, which is 
going to increase with the expansion of search activities. The asymmetric 
information that characterises the risk capital market will lead to an 
increase in search costs. Investors in this market face a very poorly 
defined environment within which to find good prospective deals. The 
typical investment prospect is too small a company to be identifiable as a 
potential customer (Tyebejee et al., 1984). The search by a venture for an 
investor, and the search by an investor for an opportunity can be an 
expensive, time-consuming business. The search is compounded with 
pitfalls and dead-ends that often end with failure and frustration (Gaston, 
1989). For this reason, we could expect that various players may act as 
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important matching intermediaries. As mentioned earlier in the literature 
review, informal investors rely on friends and associates, etc. to find 
investment opportunities. Investors create referral networks that deals 
pass through. These networks will decrease the search costs and provide 
a first gate to control risk. 
Hypothesis (1) states: 
Given the absence of intermediaries, investors rely on friends more 
than on other sources of information for finding investment 
opportunities. 
However, existing studies in developed countries have confirmed 
that business angels are unable to find a sufficient supply of investment 
opportunities for their available resources. Mason etaL (1991) states that 
"the UK evidence indicates that 7 out of 10 investors would have made 
more investments had there been a sufficient deal flow" (p. 10 ). 
5.4.2 (b) Evaluation 
When an opportunity reaches an investor, he/she uses different 
criteria to minimise the fear of being caught in a bad deal. These criteria 
evaluate all the aspects of the venture. 
However, the lack of previous research on the investment decision 
process of infortnal investors will challenge this study to develop a 
general decision process which can be accepted on a logical basis. It can 
be argued here that Mason et aL (1996) indicate that the business angels' 
investment decision takes two stages of evaluation: the initial screening 
stage, where investors reach a decision about the proposal within an 
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average of 10.7 minutes; and the evaluation stage, where investors make 
ftirther research and collect more information about the opportunity. 
Boocock and Woods (1997) indicate in their study about the decision 
process in formal venture capital that the exact number of stages differs 
between studies, but there is a general agreement that the investment cycle 
takes at least two stages: screening and evaluation. 
In the initial screening stage investors use specific criteria to test if 
the venture meet the investors' minimum objectives. Previous studies 
have found that business angels reject between 93% and 97% of the 
investment opportunities that they receive (Mason et aL, 1994; Riding et 
A, 1993). 
Riding et aL (1993) and Mason et A (1996) found that the potential 
of the product or service in the market place was the most important 
aspect of the deal that investors were concerned about at this stage, 
followed by the entrepreneur/management team and financial criteria. 
However, the initial screening stage does not satisfy investors about 
the quality of chosen projects. Asymmetric information will affect the 
ability of investors to distinguish good quality ventures. Moral hazard 
prevents direct information transfer. Under these assumptions, adverse 
selection may exist. The owners of low quality projects will foist these 
upon an uninformed market. Investors, on the other hand, will assign 
average project quality value. This will drive out the good quality projects 
from the market, leading to bad projects or the market may fail to exist, 
much as Akerlof s (1970) market for used cars will result in only "lemons" 
for sale. 
In order to prevent the adverse selection problem, investors invest 
in specific information. Rational investors would only invest if they 
expected to earn a return with a positive net present value more than any 
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other projects with the same level of risk. Because specific information is 
specialised, it is of little or no value for reducing risk in more than one 
deal (Barney et aL, 1986). 
However, this study performed an overall analysis of the 
investment criteria. It should be noted that the literature illustrated that 
different criteria have different weights of influence at various stages of 
the investment process (Riding et al., 1993; Mason et al, 1996). 
Unfortunately, investigating evaluation criteria in a time line requires an 
observation of the decision when it is being made. Getting such access is 
difficult and not possible on a large scale. 
To evaluate a deal, investors direct their resources towards 
gathering information about the deal: "examples of specific information 
for venture capitalists are assessment of the character and integrity of the 
entrepreneur, market studies to evaluate the potential for a new product" 
(Fiet, 1991, p. 18). Investors use specific criteria to reduce market risks 
(market risks are due to unforeseen competitive conditions) distinguish 
good projects and prevent adverse selection on the venture quality. So, 
Hypothesis (2) states: 
Informal investors use specific criteria to prevent investment in a low 
quality venture. However, investors consider the product's market is 
the most important criterion. 
On the other hand, investors use different criteria to reduce the risk 
of adverse selection on the quality of entrepreneur. So, 
Hypothesis (3) states: 
Informal investors depend on specific criteria to prevent the selection 
of low quality entrepreneurs. Howeverg investors consider the 
entrepreneur's track record is the most important criterion. 
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However, informal investors tend to approach close friends and 
associates for investment information and advice (Aram, 1989). 
Investors would seek additional information to assist them in deciding 
whether to invest or not. While investors gather information about the 
venture and its entrepreneur from different sources, they usually rely on 
their expertise and intuition to make their decision. 
On the other hand, informal investors prefer syndication to assure 
that their evaluation and agreement to invest in the project is approved by 
other investors. When investors find a promising firm, they typically do 
not make a binding commitment to provide financing. Rather, they send 
the proposal to other investors for their review. Another venture 
capitalist's willingness to invest in the firm may be an important factor in 
the lead venture investor's decision to invest (Pence, 1982, Lerner, 1994). 
The syndication is a chance to check out investors' own thinking against 
other knowledgeable sources (Lerner, 1994). Aram (1988) examined 
patterns of co-investing among business angels in the eastern Great Lakes 
region: 
"Fifty-three respondents indicated that they had co-operated 
with 140 co-investors to provide capital to new ventures 
during the previous three years... Moreover, angels that 
limited their co-investments to those with other assets, rather 
than other types of investors, tended to have more 
entrepreneurial experience and to invest more in very-early- 
stage firms. " (Aram, 1989, p. 344). 
In addition, investors may co-invest to improve their network. It is fair to 
asume that offering opportunities to other investors will inhance the 
relationship and improve the size of the network. This clearly can be true 
if investors co-invest with investors not already in the existing network. 
Hypothesis (4) states: 
Investors co-invest in order to improve network size. 
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5.4.3 Post Investment 
After making the financial investment, many investors will apply 
different strategies to monitor ventures and entrepreneurs to ensure their 
quality. In firms when an entrepreneur sells off some of his or her 
ownership of the firm to outsiders, differences will be generated between 
on entrepreneur's interest and those of the outside shareholders (Jensen et 
aL, 1978). As the entrepreneur will not bear all the costs of any money 
paid, his attitudes about risks and non-pecuniary benefits will change, and 
this will increase as long as his ownership decreases. This may exist as 
far as the asymmetric information is not fully overcome and the investor is 
not given some control over management. 
In order to monitor venture quality and the entrepreneurs' 
behaviour, investors use different methods in the post-investment stage. 
Staging capital is considered a powerful mechanism to control 
risks associated with the venture and reduce monitoring costs. As 
Sahlman (1990) notes, staged capital infusions are the most potent control 
mechanisms a venture capitalist can employ. Gompers (1995) states that 
entrepreneurs may have private benefits from managing the firms they 
establish which may not be perfectly correlated with investors' monetary 
returns. Entrepreneurs may have incentives to continue projects which 
should be abandoned. Entrepreneurs also may invest in projects that 
generate high personal benefits but low monetary returns for investors. 
So, investors will benefit from using staging of financing to provide 
incentives to the entrepreneur's behaviour and minimise monitoring 
costs. Therefore, 
Hypothesis (5) states: 
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Investors use staging of finance to reduce monitoring costs. 
Active involvement of informal investors in the ventures is another 
important mechanism " to protect the interests of the venture capitalist and 
ameliorate the information asymetry " (Sahlman, 1990, p508). However, 
the involvement may take a passive approach such as financial statement 
monitoring and board of directors' involvement or a hands-on 
involvement approach where investors have close contact with the daily 
operation of the venture. 
5.4.4 Controlling Agency Risks ( framework) 
Agency relationship can be created when one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) contract with another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf, which involves giving dccision-making authority 
to the agent. If both parties are utility maximisers there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always perform the contract in the best 
interests of the principal. This problem in the principal and agent 
relationship exists in all organisations and in all co-operative efforts, at 
every level of management, in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, 
etc. (Jensen et al., 1978). Two problems occur in agency relationships. 
One is the agency problem that exists when the agent's and principal's 
goals are different and it is expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing. The second is the problem of risk-sharing when 
the two parties have different attitudes towards risk. The problem here is 
that the principal and agent support different actions because of different 
risk attitudes (Eisenhardt, 1989). In fact, Norton(1995) believes that " few 
other financial settings contain as many potential agency cost problems as 
venture capital investments( ... ). Many times the investment is backed 
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only by intangible assets and trust in the ethics and abilities of the 
entrepreneurial team"(p. 23). 
In an agency relationship such as risk capital financing, the principal 
provider of funds, who bears the risks for the agent's actions and this is 
what complicates the decisions in such a relationship. To reduce these 
risks, the principal will try to shift some of these risks to the agent so, this 
should increase the agent's incentives to increase effort. 
Asymetric information (which will increase the agency risk) clearly 
exists in the pre-investment stage as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
However, some literature suggests that the relationship between 
entrepreneur and investors in the post-investment stage will become that 
of partners. Investors are becoming inside investors so asymmetric 
information which took place during the evaluation stage should be 
solved. Investors will not fear agency risk. Entrepreneur and investors 
will have the same information, so the entrepreneur may not have a 
chance to pursue his or her interests. Also both have the same goal, which 
is to direct the venture towards success. Admati et aL (1994) describe the 
venture capital investor as: 
"an investor who not only provides capital but also works 
closely with the firm, monitors it frequently, and is generally 
very well informed about the firm's prospects and investment 
opportunities. Venture capitalists are obvious examples of 
inside investors. " (p. 371) 
Presley et A (1994) supported this view in their study about asymmetric 
information between manager and investor and showed that a Mudarabah 
contract (equity financing) in fact resolves the agency problem because it 
ties a manager's compensation to the outcome of the project, giving him 
incentive to choose the individually optimal level of investment. 
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However, it is argued here that the agency problem will not be 
overcome in the venture capital contract, even if the investor is considered 
to be a partner in the venture. An investor is not involved in the daily 
operation of the venture; information flow is believed not to be the same 
to both partners, entrepreneur and investor. Osnabrugge (1998) stated that 
there are certain pieces of information, having a material affect on the firm 
and the contract, which are available to one party and not to the other. 
This information asymetry can be of concern if the agent decides to use it 
for his/her own advantage, rather than for the benefit of the firm Other 
literature concerning venture capital, expresses investors' fear about 
agency risk which supports this study's view (Reid, 1995; Fict, 1991, etc). 
Empirical evidence suggests that investors adopt specific methods in their 
contract with the entrepreneur to control agency problems. 
The literature has identified two primary approaches which may be 
applied by investors to reduce agency problems. The first, the principal 
agent approach, is essentially the 'classical' agency theory and is 
primarily concerned with determining the optimal contract between 
principal and agent(Hart, 1995; Jensen & Meckling, 1978). The second is 
the incomplate contract approach. 
5.4.4(a) The Principal-Agent Approach 
This approach relies on the idea that contracts can be complete. So, 
when dealing with the potenial effects of moral hazard or adverse 
selection, the principals can limit divergences from their interests by 
incurring screening costs to reduce asymetric information between them 
and agents. More comprehensive contracts can then be formulated to 
influence the agent's behaviour(Pettit & Singer, 1985). These contracts can 
either be behaviour or outcome-based. 
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Behaviour-based contracts are aimed to ensure that the agent 
behaves as was agreed upon and where the principal will incur monitoring 
costs (Sappington, 199 1). Such contracts are believed to be feasible if the 
principal can observe and verify the agent's behaviour. Since moral 
hazard prevents direct information transfer, the ability to observe and 
monitor the actions of agents/entrepreneurs may provide the principals 
with information ('signal') on the quality of their firms (Leland & pyle, 
1977; Ross, 1977). 
However, in this sense, monitoring refers to more than just, 
measuring'or observing the behaviour of the agent. It also includes efforts 
to control the behaviour of the agent, primarily to align it with what was 
agreed contractually(Jensen & Meckling, 1978; Sappington, 1991). Ways 
to control and observe the agent's actions range from budget restrictions, 
to participating on the board of directors. 
If infonnal investors apply this approach to risk capital financing, a 
thorough screening and evaluation will be incurred to reduce asymetric 
information. Then a comprehensive contract will be written and 
entrepreneurs are expected to behave according to its rules. Unfortunately, 
when the risks of a firm increase, the principal (infonnal investors) is less 
able to infer from monitoring whether the principal-agent contract has 
been breached, and so the costs of monitoring rise and the value of the 
firm decreases(Audretsch, 1995). 
Outcome-based contracts are aimed to reward the agent based on 
outcomes and thus, this is used as a surrogate measure for behaviour when 
the agent's behaviour cannot be observed( Fama & 
Jensen, I 983a; Hart, 1995). This may be done through the use of outcome- 
oriented contracts. Eisenhardt(1989) sums up the essensce of these 
arrangements: 
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" such an outcome-based contract motivates behaviour by 
coalignment of the agent's performances with those of the principal, 
but at the price of transferring risk to the agent. The issue of risk 
arises because outcomes are only partly a function of behaviours. 
Government policies, economic climate, competitor actions, 
technological change, and so on, may cause uncontrollable variations 
in outcomes ( ... ) When outcome uncertainty is low, the costs of 
shifting risk to the agent are low and outcome-based contracts are 
attractive"(p. 61). 
If informal investors are able to measure outcome, this approach seems 
very attractive which clearly will lead to a reduction in monitoring costs. 
However, measuring outcome and choosing a fee schedul that more 
appropriately motivates entrepreneur at the time of contracting is a 
complex procedure. 
Both options for controlling agency costs have their advantages and 
disadvantages, although both involve information gathering and contract 
formulation. This trade-off between the costs of measuring behaviour and 
the costs of measuring outcomes and transfering risk to the agent is at the 
heart of principal-agent theory(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
5.4.4 (b) The Incomplete Contracts Approach 
The principal-agent stream of research is clearly concerned with 
determining the optimal contract, behaviour versus outcome, between the 
principal and the agent whilst placing more emphasis on an ex ante rather 
than on ex post stage. In contrast, the incomplete contract approach put 
more emphasis on an ex post control. So, both provide a risk reduction at 
every stage of the investment process, but each places more emphasis on 
different stages. 
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The standard principal-agent model assumes that to write a comprehensive 
contract is without cost. Hart (1995) states: 
" One important factor missing from the principal-agent view is the 
rcognition that writing a (complete)contract is itself 
costly( ... )Agency theory ascribes all contracting costs to the cost of 
observing variables. If a variable is observable by both parties, then 
the theory assumes that it can be contracted on costlessly. But this is 
not the same as supposing that it is costly to write a contract"(p2l). 
Three causes are found in the literature for the incompleteness of 
contracts. First, the transaction cost which argues that the costs of 
contracting for unlikely events may well outweigh the benefits. Secondly, 
the bounded rationality, which argues that agents either have only limited 
ability to evaluate elaborate contingencies or are not able to foresee 
unlikely contingencies. A third explanation for incomplete contracts is 
asymmetric information which argues that a person may refrain from 
including a certain clause in a contract in order to signal his/her type 
(Spier, 1992; Hart et A 1987). Due to these three explanations, the 
incompleteness of the contracts will lead to renegotiation when new 
information arises. 
According to Hart et al (1987,1995), because contracts are not 
complete and cannot specify each party's obligations in every 
contingency, it is the ex post allocation of power and control that matters. 
So, to control the agency problem and exert power over the 
investment, informal investors become more involved in the investment. 
This creates an active inside investor, not a sleeping partner. 
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Summary 
This chaptcr has dcvclopcd the frarncwork for this study. It c1carly 
defined the scope of the study and discussed the two main objectives that 
the study should meet: 
- The characteristics and profile of Saudi informal investors; 
- The decision-making process to invest in SMEs. 
To deal with the agency problem that is created in such contracts, two 
main theoretical approaches were reviewed. Principal-agent approach 
where informal investors make a huge effort to reduce the asymetric 
information in the ex ant stage, then formulate a comprehensive contract. 
This is followed by informal investors' choices to control entrepreneurs' 
behaviour through outcome-bascd contracts or the monitoring behaviour 
of a contract. Incomplete contracts, where due to some reason informal 
investors will not be able to write a comprehensive contracts, so informal 
investors place more emphasis on active (hands-on) involvement in 
investment. 
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Chapter Six 
Research Methodology 
Introduction 
Having established the analytical framework for this study, this chapter is 
concerned with the research methodology, which is simply the framework or 
plan for the study to be used as a guide in the collection and analysis of data. 
Its purpose is to ensure that the research's instrument, sampling and statistical 
methods are relevant to the research problem being investigated. 
This study is aimed at enhancing and developing a descriptive model of 
the personal profile and the behaviour of informal risk capital investors in a 
developing country. The development of the questionnaires to examine the 
market in Saudi Arabia was guided by the existing literature. In addition, the 
topic was discussed with businessmen, members of the Chamber of Commerce 
in two regions, and research centres. In order to improve the design of the 
research instrument, this was followed by a short exploratory survey with a 
few risk capital investors from formal and informal firms. As this was the first 
ever study on the iisk capital market, looking at the previous surveys was not 
an option. The aim was to provide a minimum level of knowledge about the 
risk capital market in Saudi Arabia. 
Figure 6.1 explains the research process undertaken in this study in 
order to meet its objectives: 
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Figure 6.1 
Research process 
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6.1) RESEARCH PURPOSES 
Knowledge about any phenomenon is a very important determinant of 
the purpose of the research: 
"The design decisions become more rigorous as we proceed from the 
exploratory s e, where we try-to-explore new areas of organisational 
research, to hg, -Ag5-WpJive_sta e, where we try to 
describe certain 
characteristics of the phenomena we are interested in knowing about, to 
the hypotheses 
-testing stage, where we examine whether or not 
the 
conjectured relationships have been substantiated and an answer to the 
research question. " 
I (Sekaran, 1992: 94) 
This research falls mainly within the first and second stages In fact, the 
exploratory stage was covered partially by this study w ith additional 
information being obtained from the literature where knowledge about the 
study area in developed countries has been well researched. A question was 
raised at this stage as to whether it was acceptable to use knowledge about a 
research area in developed countries and test it in developing countries which 
differ economically and socially. A prior knowledge of the subject is important 
to provide sufficient information to frame hypotheses that are able to be tested 
through the variables measured in this research. A first-stage exploratory study 
had to be perform 
' 
ed. The two sources, exploratory study and literature, gave a 
sufficient base for framing hypotheses about the subject. 
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6.2) RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
Several research strategies are generally used in the venture capital 
research area. In the literature, Fried argued that, 
"Traditional financial research methodologies are not well suited to an 
examination of the venture capital investment process. The transactions 
involved are private; what little information that is available comes from 
secondary sources". (Fried, 1994: 29) 
By examining the literature, some methods used by main stream researchers 
can be identified as primary sources of data: 
(1) Personal/telephone interviews; 
(2) Questionnaires; 
(3) Case studies; 
(4) Observations. 
Other sources, such as secondary sources (Bygrave and Timmow, 1985; 
Vickery, 1988), business plans (Macmillan and Subba Narasimha, 1986). 
The analysis of data has used many techniques, ranging from conceptual 
analysis (Roure et aL, 1990) to regression as well as factor analysis (Macmillan 
et aL, 1987). The choice of technique is a result of the complexity and 
sources of data. In the next sections, the primary methods will be discussed in 
more detail. 
(6.2.1) Observation 
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Data can be collected by the researcher, directly observing people in 
their natural work environment. There are two ways for these methods to be 
perfonned: 
- Participant observer: where the observer is involved in the natural work 
enviromnent; 
- Unnparticipant observer: where the observer sees things happening 
without any involvement (Sekaran, 1992). 
Either way will take one of two forms: structured or unstructured observations 
which are affected by the knowledge about the particular aspects under study. 
This way of conducting research has some advantages which lead to the 
elimination of the respondent's bias by his or her involvement in answering 
questions in survey methods: 'therefore there is no need to depend on "second 
hand" accounts of phenomena from respondents who put their own 
interpretation on events' (Saunders et aL, 1997: 199). However, there are some 
drawbacks: the observer may put a bias on the data, especially if there has not 
been sufficient good training. Also, the behaviour of respondents may be 
affected by observation and this problem can be more pronounced if 
observation only takes places for a short time (Sekarana, 1992). 
This method was not suitable for this study as it was believed that 
gaining access to organisations in. the sample would be very difficult. Also, 
time and the multiple number of companies in the study would be another 
obstacle for this method to be useful. This study wanted to investigate 
practiecs in the industry not in a singlc company. 
(6.2.2) Case Study 
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The case study approach calls for an in-depth analysis of the unit to be 
studied: archives, interviews, questions and observations. Thus it sets the 
stage for getting meaningful information (Lang and Heiss, 1984). 
This method represents an intensive analysis and focus on a single 
organisation. In addition, it may be used in a comparative case study where 
"organisations are chosen to be representative of different possible positions or 
stances, regardless of the relative frequency of these stances in the population" 
(Jankowics, 1995: 180). This is clearly different from the survey approach 
where organisations are chosen to be representative of some population, as 
Jankowics explained. In order to generalise results, a case study's findings need 
multiple studies, which will combine theory building, and theory-testing 
empirical studies (Eisenhardt, 1989: 597). 
However, this method does not meet the needs for the study. The focus 
of this thesis is to build a general knowledge about the informal investors ' 
profile and investment activities, which will not be possible with a few cases. 
(6.2.3) Face to face interview 
Interviewing is often claimed to be "the best" method of gathering 
information, its complexity can sometimes be underestimated (Eastcrby-Smith 
et aL, 1996). It can be defined as a direct verbal contact between the 
researcher and the sampling population. It may be performed by face-to-face 
or by telephone interviews. Saunders (1997) classified interviews according 
the structural nature of questions as: 
Structured interviews; 
Semi-structured interviews; or 
Unstructured interviews. 
149 
Each one of these styles can serve a specific research problem. The 
choice between an unstructured and structured way of conducting an interview 
depends on the researcher's understanding of the research problems and 
variables. 
The advantages of an interview over other methods can be summarized 
from the work of Sckaran (1992), Babbie (1973), Robin and Babbie (1989) and 
Lang (1984), with direct interviewing: 
- The rate of response is expected to be high; 
The presence of the interviewer can eliminate 'don't know questions' and 
confusion; 
In an interview the researcher has the opportunity to observe non-verbal 
language from the respondent. However, this point may involve some 
unethical practices but discussion of this is beyond this brief introduction to 
interviewing. 
On the other hand, there are some disadvantages to interviewing as a 
research method: 
It is time-consuming and costly - especially when geographical limitations are 
encountered; 
- There is the problem of interviewer bias. [Which can be eliminated to some 
extent by training the interviewer. ] 
In this study, interviews were used to a limited extent in the early stages 
of the research. It provided a basic knowledge about the important issues 
related to the informal market in Saudi Arabia. This approach was very helpful 
alongside the literature in the development of this study instrument. However, 
interviewing infonnal investors has been cited in the literature as a difficult 
task (Osbnubruge, 1998) because investors prefer to remain anonymous to 
avoid being deluged with investment proposals. It was found that performing 
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interviews with the informal investors on a large scale needs a previous and 
established relationship which this research does not have as it is the first 
attempt to connect those investors with the academic. Also, the other obstacle 
to a large scale interview is the broad geographical area that this research 
covered which would have required an extensive investment in terms of both 
time and money somethin which is not available to this study. For these 
reasons a group of only five informal investors was interviewed in the 
development of the questionnaire. The main reason for this was to provide a 
basic knowledge of the research variables about informal risk capital investors 
in Saudi Arabia. This basic knowledege was believed to be vital to the 
development of the research questionnare. It helped in the adaptation of the 
questionnaires found in the literature on the Saudi market. Bias in the 
interviewing method was controlled through various techniques developed by 
Easterby-Smith et aL (1996). 
1 
(6.2.4) Questionnaires 
"A questionnaire is a preformulated written set of questions to which 
respondents record their answers, usually within rather closely defined 
alternatives" (Sekeran, 1992: 200). This method can be performed by one of 
two approaches: 
personally administered questionnaires; 
Mail questionnaires. 
Each of these has its advantages and disadvantages. The main 
disadvantage with personally administered questionnaires is that a wide 
geographical area and a large sample can be very difficult to cover (Sekeran, 
1992: 200). In this study, a mail questionnaire was used to reach a large 
number of investors. However the mass mailing method was not suitable for 
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reaching informal investors, so a new mailing method had to be used. This will 
be discussed in the sampling section. 
Either approach can include open- or closed-ended questions. This 
study benefited from the systematic nature of and subsequent analysis 
provided by closed-ended questions. 
6.3) Data Collection 
Data collection Process: 
Data collection took place in three stages: 
6.3.1 Instrument Development. 
6.3.2 Sampling Design. 
6.3.3 Instrument Distribution. 
6.3.1 Instrument Development 
6.3.1 (a) Questionnaire Design: 
The survey instrument adopted in this study was a questionnaire of 
closed-end questions in a multiple choice format. Basically, the questionnaire 
was designed in such a way so that most respondents would be able to fill in 
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the answers without the aid of the researcher so the mail questionnaire method 
could be utilised. 
For the researcher, data from closed-end questions would be relatively 
easier to process and analyse so that the researcher could benefit from the 
standard format of the answers for statistical tests. Open-ended questions can 
be time-consuming when administered to a large number of respondents. As 
answers might not be uniform, the researcher may also misinterpret the answers 
and thus miscode the responses. In contrast, because standard answers can be 
selected from multiple-choice questions, these are much easier and quicker to 
code with greater accuracy. This would not only save time and money but 
would also result in a greater response rate. 
In developing the questionnaire, preliminary research had to be 
conducted by the researcher to review previous questionnaires about informal 
investors. Two pioneer questionnaires were the main sources of this study 
questionnaire. Wetzel is considered to be the leading researcher in informal risk 
capital investors in the United States and his questionnaire (1981) one of the 
main sources for developing the instrument for this study. Mason and Harrison 
are the pioneer researchers in this field in the United Kingdom and their 
questionnaire (1991) was a great help in the development of the questionnaire 
in this study. Apart from that, many articles, PhD theses and the exploratory 
survey about informal investors in Saudi Arabia were reviewed in order to 
develop a valid questionnaire. 
Previous researchers using questionnaires to investigate informal risk 
capital investors have typically received a very low rate of response. For 
example, Wetzel's (1981) usable response rate was 1.3%, Aram's (1989) was 
0.3% and Mason et aL's (1991) was 1.5%. Therefore, the questionnaire for this 
study was designed and will be distributed with an aim of maximising response 
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and thus increasing the power of statistical tests. Many suggestions put forward 
in Dillman's Total Design Method or TDM (1978) were followed. 
The first step in Dillmaifs method focuses on writing questions in a 
manner so as to strengthen constructive validity. This includes determining 
the question structure (open-ended or closed-ended or between) which will best 
generate valid data and devising wording which will be clear, accurate and 
nonbiased. 
Next, is the importance of wording. Dillman provided many suggestions 
to avoid wording problems: 
keep the wording as simple as possible; 
avoid unconventional phrases; 
do not be vague; 
avoid bias; 
avoid objectionable questions (such as questions that are 
considered quite personal). 
Considerable attention is given to the physical design of the 
questionnaire. The TDM stresses the need to present an attractive, well- 
organised questionnaire that looks easy to complete: 
- no questions are permitted on the front or back pages; 
- should be grouped questions; 
- place questions that elicit personal information should be placed at the 
end of the questionnaire; 
- clear directions should be given on how to answer; 
- the front and back pages should be carefully designed; 
- the size of the questionnaire should be about 12 pages. 
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Pretesting is a very important procedure in TDM. A specific set of TDM 
suggestions in pretesting this study questionnaire were followed: 
are all the words understood? 
are questions interpreted similarly by all respondents? 
does the questionnaire create a positive impression - one that motivates 
people to answer it? 
does any aspect of the questionnaire suggest bias on the part of the 
researcher? 
to find out the length of time needed by respondents to complete the 
questionnaire. 
To maximise the rate of response, Dillman suggests some procedures 
during the data collection stage, such as: 
- Minimising the cost of filling in the questionnaire in terms of time (short, 
clear questions) and money (providing postage); 
- appeal to respondents and a personal appreciation of their help to 
complete the questionnaire; 
emphasizing confidentially; 
convincing the respondent that his or her response is important; 
maintaining total anonymity of respondents. 
three mailing follow-ups. 
One particular concern in designing the questionnaire about informal 
investors was whether to gather aggregate data on the investors' past 
investments, as was Wetzel's approach (1981) and Mason et A's (1991), or 
whether, following Haar et al (1988), to focus on one specific investment. 
It was decided to take the first approach in this study, the main reason 
being that this survey was the first study about informal risk capital investors in 
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Saudi Arabia and considered that a broader and general view would be more 
appropriate. 
6.3.1(b) Testing of Questionnaires: 
Validity is the main concern at this stage. The clarity and the focus of the 
questionnaires with regard to the research variables were considered in depth, 
(field work). The first draft of the questionnaire, which was developed in the 
previous stage, was then given a trial test. Three experts - two on venture 
capital research and the other familiar with the Saudi Arabian context - 
reviewed the English version of the questionnaire. The researcher then travelled 
to Saudi Arabia to manage the data collection process. 
The English version of the questionnaire was translated into Arabic and 
then went through three evaluation stages: 
- Two Arabic language professionals reviewed the translated draft. 
- Two associate professors in Imam University's Management Department 
reviewed the Arabic version. Comparative proof reading of the Arabic and 
English versions was also undertaken. An important element in questionnaire 
evaluation that was pointed out to the evaluators is to test the questions in 
accordance with the computer output requirement in order that the data 
produced can be processed and analysed using the statistical package for social 
science (SPSS). 
- The questionnaire was then pilot-tested with regular investors and a few 
available informal venture capital investors. 
Ten regular investors and four informal risk capital investors were asked 
to answer the questionnaire and give their comments on the following aspects: 
- The clarity and understanding of the questionnaire. 
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The layout and the ordering of the questions. 
The length of time needed to complete the questionnaire. 
The interpretation of the questions by all respondents in the pilot test. 
The strength of the questionnaire to tap all the important variables that 
cover the study objectives. 
Based on the comments from the pilot test, minor modifications were 
made to the questionnaire. Many respondents noted that the clarity of the 
covering letter is very important to reach the right investors. Many 
respondents argued that while investors' practice risk capital financing, the 
concept of "venture capital" remains a new label to their transactions, so the 
questionnaire's covering letter had to be very clear and specific about what 
kind of investors the study was looking for. 
Then the questionnaires were translated into the Arabic language. To 
evaluate the Arabic version, the questionnaire was passed to two associate 
professors in the Management Department at Imam University, who were 
fluent in both languages. Then Arabic language specialists evaluated the 
questionnaires. Finally, the questionnaire was piloted with a few known 
informal investors and businessmen. 
A final draft of the questionnaire was then produced to be distributed to 
the informal venture capital investors in Saudi Arabia. Copies of the 
questionnaires in the two languages is provided in Appendices A-1 and A-2. 
6.3.1(c ) Context of Questionnaire 
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As shown in Appendix (A-1), the front cover of the questionnaire 
contained a brief introduction to the investors. The importance and meaning 
of the concept of informal risk capital investors was clearly and precisely 
explained. The respondent was assured of his anonymity and the confidentiality 
of the responses. 
In general, the questions content can be divided into three sections: 
Parts A and D comprise questions related to the investor's investment 
history and personal background following the suggestions of the Total Design 
method. As Dillman (1978) suggested, explicit personal information was 
placed at the end of the questionnaire in Part D. 
The questions in Part B are behaviour questions related to the decision 
criteria that informal investors use to evaluate the project and the entrepreneur 
when deciding to invest or not. The rest of this part is dedicated to the 
investors' behaviour towards syndicating and staging their finance. 
Part C is made up of attitude questions. As the main objective of the study 
was to improve the understanding of investors' decision behaviour, this part 
focused on the main issues related to the decision behaviour which identifies 
investors' attitudes towards the obstacles and development of the risk capital 
market in Saudi Arabia. Figure 6.2 shows a full overview of the questionnaire 
development. 
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Figure 6.2 
Overview of the Questionnaires development 
First full literature review of 
previous questionnaires, 
Interview with informal investors, 
Writing up the first draft of the 
questionnaires. 
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- Evaluation of the questionnaire by 
three expert researchers, 
- Rewriting the questionnaire. 
- Translation into Arabic, 
- Evaluation by experts in 
management, 
- Arabic language evaluation, 
- Rewriting the questionnaire, 
Pilot test, 
Rewriting the questionnaire. 
Contents: 
lst- Investment Activities. 
2nd- Decision Behaviour. 
3rd- Attitudes. 
4th- Personal Profile. 
I Distribution 
6.3.2) Sampling Design 
For most research topics, it is impossible for the researcher to collect data 
that covers the whole population due to restrictions of time, money and often 
access. Sampling is the solution where a researcher chooses a significant 
sample to represent the population. Saunders et al. (1997) and Sekarana (1992) 
argue that using sampling gives a better understanding of a phenomenon 
because with a small sample the researcher can give more time to designing 
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and piloting the means of collecting the data. Also, with a smaller sample more 
detailed information can be obtained and a better quality of interviewer can be 
hired. 
6.3.2(a) Literature Of sampling design: 
From the previous section it can be said that knowledge about the 
population is the first step in the determination of a sample. From the research 
questions, it is clear that the population that the study should identify is the 
informal venture capital investors in Saudi Arabia. 
Identifying the informal investors is very difficult and time consuming. 
Their market transactions are held privately where very little (if any) 
information is publicly available. Research in developed countries raises the 
obstacle of identifying these investors of interest to the research area (Wetzel, 
198 1; Mason et al, 199 1; Fiet, 199 1). Wetzel (198 1) argued that 
'the low-key nature of the targeted investor base prevented the sole use of 
traditional research methods such as mass mailing, due to the negligible 
response rates anticipated, further, the types of individuals expected to be 
involved in risk capital financing, represent a wide range of social and 
economic population segments' (p. 18). 
Therefor as Wetzel stated, 'the total population of informal investors is 
unknown and probably unknowable' (1983. p26). So, researchers investigating 
informal risk capital investors have had to rely on non-convcntional methods to 
reach investors. Thus, a review of previous research methods is desirable. 
Two of the first pioneer studies utilised a snowball sample. Baty (1964), 
Hofman (1972) and Fiet (1991) studied different regions in the United States, 
and Mason et al. (1991) in the UK by using a snowball to reach informal 
venture capital investors. According to Kadushin (1968) 'A snowball is a 
device for obtaining an open-ended sociometric, starting with a given list, 
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usually a sample of some universe, each respondent is asked to name several 
others who are then interviewed and so on' (In Hofrnan, 1972, p. 77). 
Researchers argued that this method has a very high response, in the Hofman 
study 85%. So, the method is very powerful way of locating the sample in a 
field when the exact population cannot be identified. However, researchers 
recognized that it was impossible to infer that their subjects were representative 
of all business angels( informal investors). Baty (1964) claimed that he could 
not demonstrate that his sample was randomly selected. However, he argued 
that the typically low response rates of mailed surveys also made their 
representativeness doubtful. He also argued that no research decision could 
compensate for the possible biases that might exist in studies with such low 
rates of response. Fiet (1991) in his study profited from specific populations 
where the chance of finding business angels was very high. For example, at the 
Central Taxes Venture Group, thirty potential investors were in attendance and 
were invited to respond. Thirteen usable responses were received from 
investors. 
The second method for reaching business angels was taking a large- 
scale postal survey (Wetzel, 1981; Harr et al, 1988; Tymes et al, 1983; and 
Mason et al, 1991). Under this method targeted lists were developed from the 
files of regional organisations, growing firms, high-income investor, business 
school alumni and high-income professions. In the Wetzel (1981) survey with 
the financial backing of the US Small Business Administration (SBA), the 
study was able to mail ten thousand brochures describing the research and 
inviting participation in the study. After nine months of intensive searching, 
together with the assistance of several professional organisations, only one 
hundred and thirty-three business angels were identified, a 1.3% response rate. 
Mason et al (199 1) summaries the problems faced with this method. First, the 
types of mailing lists involved a bias where particular occupations are 
considered. Second, respondents are likely to be biased towards active and 
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successful investors. Third, it is relatively expensive. Finally, the usable 
response rates are generally extremely low. 
The third method is working the other way. In this type of sampling, 
investors are located through ventures that they invested in or had a relation 
with. It is favoured by studies that have been sponsored by the US Small 
Business Administration (SBA). Mason et al (1991), Aram (1987,1989), 
Gaston et al (1986,1988) used this approach. Gaston and Bell (1986) studied 
informal venture capital investors in the Sunbelt region of the US. They 
utilized this method by drawing a list of one hundred thousand firms. Then 
each one was mailed an invitation to participate in the survey. After mailing 
the survey to those whom accepted the invitation, as many as four follow-up 
letters were also mailed to respondents. Aram's (1989) study was also 
sponsored by the SBA, so he was able to send out 20,000 invitations to CEO's. 
The study response rate was less than 0.3%' about 55 usable questionnaires. 
The main disadvantages of this method are: the response rate was low, it was 
very expensive, and labour-intensive. 
6.3.2(b) Choosing the sampling approach: 
The sampling process that will be used in this study was based on the 
reported experience of other researchers. While the identification of informal 
investors has improved in many developed countries after the establishment of 
introductory services, the situation is still difficult in a country such as Saudi 
Arabia, which has not yet recognized the importance of those investors to 
entrepreneurial activities. The next comments can be concluded from the 
previous discussion about sampling literature in informal risk capital investors: 
1. Large-scale mailed questionnaires are very costly and generate a very low 
response rate. However using this method as a start up to reach the diverse 
population improves the effectiveness of the snowball method. 
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2. The most effective means of locating business angels is to utilize snowball 
sampling, targeted toward specific populations of potential investors. 
Investors, who are generated from the large-scale mail, are contacted to 
introduce the questionnaire to other informal risk capital investors. By building 
the base of the sample list from the large scale mailing probability sampling is 
increased in the snowball method which is considered as probability sampling 
method by Diamantos(I 997 ) 
6.3.2 (c) Sampling Size 
Sampling size is one of the most important elements in reducing 
sampling error. While there are other reasons for sampling, such as the 
practical difficulty of collecting data from, testing, or examining every 
element in the population, the reason for sampling in the population of informal 
investors is apparent because the population list is not known. As discussed 
earlier, identifying informal investors is extremely difficult and time- 
consuming because directories do not exist. 
Sampling error is the difference between the sample's and the 
population! s parameters. Sampling error can be reduced by increasing the size 
of the sample. However, there is seldom a definite rule as to how large a 
sample should be for a given study. In this study the aim is to increase the 
sample size to be able to test our hypotheses and to be able to compare the 
result to previous studies. Roscoe (1975) has, however, provided 'rules of 
thumb' for determining sample size: 
1 1. Sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most 
research. 
2. Where samples are to be broken into subsamples (males/females, 
juniors/seniors, etc. ) a minimum sample size of 30 for each category is 
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necessary. 
3. In multivariate research (including multiple regression analyses), the 
sample size should be several times (preferably 10 times or more) as large 
as the number of variables in the study. 
4. For simple experimental research with tight experimental controls 
(matched pairs, etc. ) successful research is possible with samples as small 
as 10 to 30 in size. ' (Roscoe, 1975, section 19,92, p. 253) 
Bearing these suggestions in mind, all possible effort was directed at 
increasing the sample size. As mentioned earlier, sampling in the informal 
venture capital market is a challenging task because directories or lists of 
investors do not exist. Therefore researchers have to depend on the following 
data collection process to reach an acceptable sample size. 
6.3.3) Instrument Distribution 
The method of data collection for this study was greatly affected by the 
lack of availability of a sampling frame, as identified in the research literature. 
The sampling frame refers to a list of all elements in the population from which 
the elements for the sample are to be drawn. Examples of the sampling frame 
are: directories, lists, records, electoral rolls and Census statistics. In the case 
of this study, a sampling frame that lists only informal investors who provide 
financing for small firms does not exist. Therefore the researcher had to use 
the sampling methods used by pioneering researchers as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. According to Wetzel (1981), 'informal investors are difficult to 
research - geographically dispersed and tough to identify. (P. 62). 
In order to identify informal investors, the researcher went to Saudi 
Arabia to collect data. The collection took place between May and October 
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1998. The length of time that was spent on collecting the data was to 
maximize the result of the snowballing method and minimize the bias of 
summer holidays. It was found that many wealthy people leave Saudi Arabia 
in the summer time (July/August). 
In Saudi Arabia, the data collection process was divided into three 
stages: 
- developing the Arabic version of the questionnaire; 
creating a potential list of informal investors; 
distributing the questionnaires. 
While the Arabic version of the questionnaire was under development, 
the researcher started to compile a list of potential informal investors. The 
literature suggests that the most common group where informal investors are 
found is amongst those who have a 'sufficiently high discretionary income', as 
Mason etaL stated (1991, p. 10). In Mason et aL's study, six mailing lists were 
used that listed owners-managers of SMEs, high-income groups, investors in 
speculative stocks, etc., and other potential groups such as subscribers to 
venture capital reports. The Wetzel (1981) study had followed a similar 
approach by creating a series of target lists, mainly names developed from the 
files of regional organisations providing support services for entrepreneurs and 
small, growing firms in New England. The lists generated by these 
researchers were not primarily infon-nal investors lists but were expected to 
have some informal investors' names contained in them. In fact the absence of 
the population frame may be considered the main reason for the low response 
rate to the mail method in this kind of research. In this study, the same 
approach was followed. Names of potential investors were developed through 
contacting organisations that had lists of high-income people; small business 
support units were contacted in three cities - Riyadh, Judah and Dammam. 
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The Chambers of Commerce in ten cities were asked to support and provide 
lists for the study. The council of Saudi Chamber of commerce supported the 
study by issuing a letter to be sent with the questionnaires to investors 
encouraging them to respond and raising the importance of the subject. A copy 
of the letter is presented in Appendix A. 2. Another important organisation in 
Riyadh called Alweseedh, which provides a mediation service between 
entrepreneurs and investors, was very helpful in providing lists of investors in 
Riyadh, Judah and Dammam. This research as stated by Mason et al (1997), 
sought to deliberately draw a sample ' from a variety of different sources in 
hope that any biases in individual sources would be cancelled out. '(P2). 
However, as Haar et aL (1988) argued, due to limitations of the mailing 
approach, the sample is likely to be biased towards active and successful 
investors. Mason et aL (1991) also stated that this method involves bias to 
particular occupations. Therefore this study combined the snowball method 
with the mailing approach. As explained earlier, the snowball method means 
that finding informal investors usually leads to identification of one or more 
other investors. Experts in research methods, such as Diamanto (1997), 
considered the snowball approach to be a probability sampling method. In the 
literature of informal venture capital investors, many studies have utilized 
snowball sampling (Baty, 1964; Hoffman, 1972; Fiet, 1991; Mason et aL, 
1991; Landstr6m, 1993). Friends, relatives, small business owners and any 
known informal venture capital investors were contacted to identify names of 
informal investors. The result of the use of the two methods and a comparison 
to the literature can be summarized in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
Table 6.1 
Mailing Procedures and Response Rate 
167 
Mailing Size Response Comments 
Date No. % 
First Mailing 
(General) 500 20 4% - Most names on the list found 
15/6/98 not to be informal 
(Snowball) 20 8 38% Investor. 
1/7/98 
- The time was not 
appropriate; many investors 
were on summer holiday. 
Second Mailing 689 83 12% 
(General) 
29/8/98 
Third Mailing 117 54 46% 
Snowball) 
25/8/98 
Total No. =1326 Response No. =165 Snowball Response =45% 
Not Applicable =9 Mailing Response = 9% 
Usable Response =156 
Table 6.2 
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Literature Comparison 
Author Country M. Size Response. Rate Country 
No. % Population* 
Prof. Wetzel U. S. 10,000 (128) 1.3% 255.6 Million 
Prof. Mason U. K. 4118(60) 1.5% 57.8 Million 
Prof. Aram U. & 20,000 (55) . 
3% 2055.6 Million 
small firms) 
ProL 
Landstor Sweden. 124=( 52 42% 8.7 Million 
Gaston U. S. 240,000 (435), . 
002% 255.6 Million 
small firms) 
Current Saudi 1326(156) 11 % 16 Million 
Arabia 
II 
Sources: 
-Wetzel (1981) 
-Aram (1989) 
-Mason(1991) 
-Gaston(1989) 
-Landstrom(1993) 
*World Atlas(1994) 
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Two weeks after the mailing of the questionnaires, the researcher started 
to contact potential investors by telephone to encourage their participation in 
the study. By far the most common reason for not sending back the 
questionnaire was that the person was not an informal investor. The other 
reason was that the respondent was out of the Kingdom. Approximately two 
thousand local and national contacts were made during the data collection. 
The personal contact by telephone helped to improve the use of the 
snowball method. Investors were encouraged to identify any other informal 
investors that they may have known. This way of locating investors is believed 
to reach a wide range of the social and economic segments that informal 
venture capital investors are expected to be associated with. 
While this study benefited effectively from the use of the snowball 
method, others who plan to follow this same data collection strategy should be 
aware that its results were quite expensive. New researchers in the area are 
advised to concentrate on a specific city to minimise the cost in terms of money 
and time of data collection. It is believed that many of the difficulties that this 
study faced in data collection were due to the limited information that was 
available to researchers in this new area of research and the nature of most 
developing economies. 
6.4 Generalisation of the Results 
While considerable effort has been made to reach a large sample of the 
population of informal venture capital investors in Saudi Arabia, the study 
realised the difficulty of identifying invisible investors. The size of the market 
can be extremely hard to measure. Also, the understanding of the concept of 
venture capital financing in Saudi Arabia was very weak, therefore the 
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researcher had to spend a considerable amount of time explaining the idea to 
potential investors, so as to minimise the confusion with other practices which 
may have resulted in a respondent filling in the questionnaire when he was not 
an informal investor. The researcher had to examine all completed 
questionnaires; this resulted in the removal of nine questionnaires that were 
marked inapplicable respondent. Finally, as Landstr6m (1993) states, the 
informal venture capital market is believed to be constituted of a very 
heterogeneous group of investors. As the population is frameless choosing a 
sample was very difficult. The study had to rely on more convenience 
sampling, which may have limited the representativness of the sample chosen. 
As mentioned earlier in the informal venture capital investors research in the 
US and the UK practical reasons restrict the feasibility of random samples and, 
therefore most of the literature relies on convenience samples (Mason, 1993, 
Aram 1989, Gaston 1989, Wetzel 1981, Freear et al 1994, Haar et al, 1989, 
etc). The shortcoming of the available approaches for collecting accurate 
samples are clear and, as stated by Freear et al (1996), ' the reliability of data 
collection techniques needs improvement. Identifying a representative sample 
of the entire angels (informal investors) population is a challenge that remains 
unmet'(p3). All these factors may potentially affect the conclusions drawn 
from this study. However, Mason et al (1996) argued that due to these 
research limitations in the informal venture capital investors market, a group of 
randomly selected investors would not necessarily be more "representative" 
than one collected with a convenience sample. 
However, the researcher believes that this study was courageous in 
shedding light on an invisible market in a developing country where 
information and data is extremely rare. It is hoped that this pioneer study will 
encourage the interest of other researchers and policyrnakers in a very 
important aspect of the Saudi economy. 
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Chapter Seven 
informal Investors Profile and Investment Activities 
(Descriptive) 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a background of characteristics and 
investment activities of informal investors. An understanding of their background 
may give more insight into the decision-making behaviour of investors. Also, 
the presentation of these characteristics is very important to academic research, as 
this study represents pioneering work that investigates this informal market in 
Saudi Arabia. 
The literature suggests that informal investors share some similarities 
(Harrison et A, 1992; Landstr6m, 1993). Moreover, culture, economic climate 
and other social variables may play an important role in diversifying the 
background and investment activities of investors in different countries. 
Harrison et A (199 1) point out: 
"It would be foolhardy in view of the different entrepreneurial 
traditions, fiscal climates and wealth distribution to assume that UK 
business angels (informal investors) necessarily exhibit similar 
characteristics, motivations and investment behaviour (as those in the US). " 
(p. 470) 
It is argued here that if the previous statement is true when comparing the 
UK with US investors, it must be true when comparing Saudi Arabia with any 
developed country. Saudi Arabia has many specific characteristics. It is still 
considered as a developing country, but one with accumulated wealth from oil 
exports. However, during the past decades the fall in oil prices and government 
policies which have diminished its large participation in the financial market in 
order to improve the role of private sector investment, have created a gap in the 
financial system. 
But, as was discussed in Chapters 1& 2, the banks could not fill the gap 
because of economic, legal and social problems. Secondly, the small stock market 
has failed to stimulate investors' wealth because of the limited number of shares 
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available. In addition, other forms of financing institutions, such as formal 
venture capital firms or investment companies, which are of specific interest to 
this study, do not exist in the Saudi financial market. On the other hand, 
procedures for identifying informal investors which were discussed in the 
methodology chapter, may increase the difficulty of producing a meaningful 
international comparison between populations that in reality constitute a very 
heterogeneous group of investors. 
These factors have created an environment in the Saudi capital market 
which high-lights the importance of informal, venture -capital investors filling 
the gap. It appears, therefore, that informal investors in Saudi Arabia and 
informal investors in developed countries, such as the UK and US, exist in a 
different environment and this may caution comparisons between the current 
study results and the literature of informal investors. 
This study will provide some literature comparisons but the result must be 
viewed with extreme caution. It is believed that if the comparison is taken in its 
cultural context, it will add greater insight to our understanding of those investors 
in different countries. This may improve the policy recommendations that might 
result from the current study. 
The informal investors' background and investment activities will be 
addressed through the following sections: 
- investors' profile 
- investment opportunities 
- stage of development 
- industry sectors 
- investment size 
- forms of income 
- motivations. 
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Investors' Protile 
Informal investors in Saudi Arabia are mainly middle-aged, with an average 
age of 44 years. The frequency distribution in Table 7.1 shows that 730/o of 
investors are in the age range of 30-50 years, relatively few are either under 30 
years old (1.9%) or over 60 years; of age (7.7%). 
Informal investors In Saudi Arabia are well-educated. 'Fable 7.2 shows 
that 86'No of tlicrn hold at least a university degree and nearly 41 IYO hold a graduate 
degrec master's or PhD. Investors who undcrtook business or science (mainly 
engineering) studies are more likely to be involved in entrepreneurial activities 
than those in any other fields Of Study. According to Albaladli's (1996) Study 
concerning Saudi individuals' investment in international markets, which 
invcstigated not only financial invcstnicnt but also rcal investnictits in projects 
ide the King(lom (KSA), Satidi investors are well-edticated witli niore than OLltS1 1 ll ID 
50% ofthe study's sample holdimg, at least a university degree with all average age I 
of 40 years, nearly 70'V,, of the sample being less than 45 years of age. 
Table 7.1 
Frequency Distribution of Age Level 
Age < . 
10 30-40 41-50 51-60 ---60 No 
Response 
Folal 
Frequency 3 57 57 24 12 3 156 
Per cent 1.9 36.5 36.5 15.4 7.7 1.9 100 
Cumulative P. 2 39.2 76.5 92.2 100.0 
In contrast to these findings, wIllic tile literature found that informal 
ilivestors are well-cclucatcd (Milsoll el (, 1., 1991, UK; Wetzel, 1981, US), which 
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is similar to Saudi investors, Investors in the UK and US are older than those In 
Saudi Arabia. The influence of tax rates oil the rate of capital and wealth 
accumulation may explain the age issue in developed countries, as noted by 
Harrison cl al. (1991), but It is not an important factor in Saudi Arabia. The 
young investors in Saudi Arabia inay reflect the differences between middle-aged 
and older investors with respect to entrepreneurial background. Tile older 
generation has accIIIIII. Ilated Nvealth during the revolution of income in the 1970s 
from oil price boonis and arc more likely to have less entrepreneurial experience. 
Table 7.2 
Frequency Distribution of Education Level 
Education Level Frequency Per cent Cumulative 
No Formal Hucation 3 1.9 2.0 
Secondary or Less 15 9.6 11.8 
University- Business 27 17.3 29.4 
University- Art 30 19.2 49.0 
University- Science 15 9.6 58.8 
Post- Graduate 63 40.4 100.00 
No Response 3 1.9 - 
Total 156 100.00 
Saudi's informal investors are experienced investors, like their International 
counterparts (Harrison et al., 1991; Gaston, 1989; Riding et (IL, 1988; Haar cI 
al., 1988). As Table 7.3 shows, more than 90% of the sample has fOLInded One 
venture and nearly 70% has founded two or more. On their current ernployinent 
status, more than 60% of Saudi inforrnal investors (Table 7.5) classify 
themselves as self-employed. A further 15.4% of investors describe thernselves 
as professional workers (generally accountants and engineers) who are mainly 
involved in consultancy *obs. Their close contacts I with their clients have 
encouraged them to make financial commitment. Just over I I% of informal 
investors are in paid employment managing a private firin, and a minority of 
7.8% are government workers. 
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Table 7.3 
Frequency Distribution 
Of Entrenreneurial ExDerience 
Ventures Founded Frequ 
ency 
Per cent Cumulative 
Never Created a business 15 9.6 9.8 
Just One Venture 31 19.9 30.1 
Two or More Venture 107 68.5 100.00 
No Response 3 1.9 
Informal investors in Saudi Arabia are rich in terms of income; nearly 75% 
of the sample had annual incomes of E25,000 and over, and 32.7% had incomes 
in excess of E150,000 Table 7.6. Similarly (and not surprisingly), the vast 
majority (65.4%) of informal investors have a net worth of f250,000 or more, 
excluding their principal residence, and nearly 42% have a net worth of f900,000 
or more table 7.7. However, the high wealth factor ShOLIId be viewed with 
caUtIon because of the sampling approach which was directed at wealthy people 
as tile most effective way of locating infomial investors. It is hypothesised that 
sub-groups may exist with different levels of wealth and richer investors are more 
likely to be interested in larger-sized investment Table 7.15. In contrast to these 
findings, the literatLII'C found Table 7.4 that infornial investors in the IJK and US 
are well-ofTbut not very rich. The reason why even very rich investors in Saudi 
Arabia are interested in entrepreneUrial finiis may be explained by the 111,11te(i 
investment opportunities in Saudi financial markets. There are investors who 
have accumulated wealth but the financial products that are available to thcril are 
very few. This argument is supported by Albaladh's ( 1996) study which pointed 
Out that more than 30% of the study sample (SaUdl investors) have investments 
outsldc the Kingdom, which may rcvcal the struggic of Saud' Ilivcstors in the 
Saudi investment environment. 
The sourecs of' wealth, which are sunimarised in Table 7.8, show that the 
ma ority Of SaUdi informal iII _j 
I invcstors arc financially self-made: nearly 75'Yo buill 
their wealth fi-om cntrepl-ClICUrial activities. Indeed, this pi-mous success may 
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lie behind the interest of those investors in financing and supporting 
entrepreneurial firms. Real estate, not surprisingly, is not a very important source 
of wealth to inforinal investors, with only 19.2% stating that they have gained 
some of their wealth through real estate investments. 
Table 7.4 
Comparative Analysis of "Typical" Investor Profile 
I Characteristics I -Suit Belt 2-New 3-Ottawa- 4-United Current 
Region England Carleton Kingdom Study(Saudi) 
(USA) (USA) Canada 
Age 49 N/a 50 53 44 
Education College- College- College- N/a Graduate/Post 
I itisiness or Technical or Business, Law Business/Scie 
Engineering Business/Eco. or Engineering nce 
I Sex Male 
Male Male Male Male 
Family Income ý'70,000 N/a >$150,000 E46000 f-150,000 
Cdn 
Net Worth 'S750,000 N/a >$ 1,000,000 f 312000 E-600,000 
Cdn 
Number of Past 2 every 3 1 every 2 1 every year 2 every 3 -2 every 3 
Investment years years years years 
Average Value $37,500 $50,000 $109,000 Cdn E22,000 in total 000,000 
of Investments 
Stage of N/A Start-tip N/A Young Firms Start-up 
Financing 
ý 
- 
t 
Within 50 Within 50 Within 300 Within 50 Within 
Preferences miles miles miles miles 100kni 
(-60iiiilcs) 
Business/ Manufact. II igh tech II igh tech Consti. Sei-vce. Manufact. 
industry Firiance/Real Manufact. Manut'act. Distribution Services 
F sate High tcch Retail 
Manufact. Construe 
j Minimum 20(YO 20% 3 2% 3 1%, 20%, 
Required Rate 
of'Return 
Liquidation 3-4 years 5-7 years 5 years 3-5 years Long term 
Expectation investment 
Previous Start- 5 O'YO 7 5'YO 84% 67'Yo 88% 
up ý__x_perience surveyed surveyed surveyed surveyed surveyed 
Source: witil nioditication -, nori ano Kiaingk iw)); mason et al ( 1991 ). 
I- Gaston and Bell ( 1988); 2- Wctzel (1981 )ý 3- Short and Riding( 1989); 
4-Mason, I larrison and Clialoner( 1991 ). 
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Table 7.5 
Table 7.6 
Occupation Frequency Per cent Cumulative 
Managing A private Business 18 11.5 12.00 
Governinent Official 12 7.7 20.0 
Self Employed 96 61.5 84.0 
Professional ( Doctors.. etc) 24 15.4 100.0 
No Response 6 3.8 - 
Total 156 100.0 
E I= Approximately 6.5 Saudi Riyls 
Frequency Distribution of Occupation 
Fre(piency Distribution of Income 
Income Frequency Per cent umulative 
< 150,000 SR C 23,000 3 1.9 2.0 
15 1,000 -3 00, OOOSR E 46,000 36 23.1 26.0 
301,000 - 500,000 SR (-f 77,000 30 19.2 46.0 
50 1,000 -1 Million SR (-f 154,000) 30 19.2 66.0 
Over One Million SR 51 32.7 100.0 
No Respons 6 3.8 - 
Total 156 100.0 
Table 7.7 
Frequency Distribution of wealth 
Wealth Frequency Percent Cumulative 
< 500,000 SR ( -f 77,000 6- 3.8 4.1 
500,000-1000,000 SR (-f 154,000) 15 9.6 14.3 
Over I ni -2000,000 SR (- 008,000) 24 15.4 30.6 
Over 2ni -4000,000 SR ( -, E615,000) 15 9.6 40.8 
Over 4m -6000,000 SR ( -f 923,000) 21 13.5 55.1 
Over 6000,000 SR 66 42.3 100.0 
No Response 9 5.8 - 
Total 156 -fo 0 -0 -- 
tI- Approximately 6.5 Saudi Riyls 
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Table 7.8 
Fre(juencv Distribution of Wealth sources 
Source of' Wealth Frequency Frequency No Total 
Yes No Response 
Creating Previous Projects 117 36 3 156 
75.01YO 23.1% 1.9% 
Real Fstate 30 123 3 156 
19.2% 78.8% 1.9% 
Savings from previous 36 117 3 156 
Jobs 23.1% 75.0% 1.9% 
Inlicritance 24 129 3 156 
15.9%) 82.7% 1.91yo 
- An investor may have inore than one source of wealth so yes column will be more than 156. 
7.2 Number of Investment Opportunities Received 
Investors were asked to estimate the nUmber of investment opportunities 
they had received in the last five years. In contrast to the main stream of the 
literature, the period of time examined is five years and not three in order to 
capture as much as possible of the investment activities in the Saudi risk capital 
market since this is the first attempt to invcstigate this market. The responses 
indicate that on average, inforrrial investors have been aware of 23 Ilivestillent 
oppominitles Table 7.9 during the past five years, with a median of' 15 
opportunities. More than half (50%) of investors received relatively f`ckv 
Investment opportunities 15 or fewer In the past Five years. I lowcvcr, a small 
minority of investors receive infonnation on substantially larger numbers ot 
investment opportunities; less than 15'Vo of investors hear of' more than 50 
opportun i ties. However, there is a considerable variation around the average 
of opportunities received which may indicate that sorne investors are more active 
than others, or may indicate that tilcy are linked to informal cliamicls of' 
Information. 
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Table 7.9 
Frequency Distribution 
Number of Investment Opportunities Received By Investors 
Number of' -10- <5 5-15 16-28 29-49 50-99 100+ No 
Inveshments Response 
Frequency 83 33 Is 18 4 
Of Investors 
Per cent 0 53.1 21.2 11.5 11.5 2.6 0 
Mean 23.5 
Mehn 
- 
15 
This argument is supported by the literature. Harrison et al. (1992) Found 
that in a number of cases investors receiving infon-nation in excess of 50 
investment opportunities are those who are members of investor syndicates or 
financial matching organisations. 
While the average of investment opportunities received seems parallel to 
the literature results Table 7.4, the high number of investors receiving few 
investment OPPOI-tUnItICS raises concern about the efficiency of' the information 
channels which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Howcver, a significant majority of Saudi infornial investors (67'Y,, ) invested 
in less than 4 invcstincrit opportLinitics during the last five years. One third of 
investors invested in more than 5 opportUnities during the same period Table 
7.10. Cross-tabulation Appendix B. 4 shows that investors who received a low 
number ofinvcstment opportunities may be forced to II a large percentage 
of the,,, owliju to limited choices for a waiting fund. However, those who 
received a large number of invcstment opportunities invested in a smaller 11ý 
percentage but which was large in absolute numbers. Improving tile informatioll 
channels is bclicved to enhance the investment activities of the majority of 
investors who receive a low number of invCstments and tapped their available 
fund which they claimed to be available for more investments. 
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A literature comparison Table 7.4 shows a similar result in averages, with 
UK investors more likely to reject a higher proportion of investment opportunities 
than other international investors (Harrison, 1992). 
Table 7.10 
Frequency Distribution of 
Number of Investments made By Investors 
Number of 1-2 3-4 5-7 8-12 13-24 
Investments 
Frequency 00 46 30 15 5 
01' Investors 
Per cent 38 29 19 10 3 
Mean 4 
7.3 Stage of Financing 
Informal investors have been cited in the literature as playing an iniportant 
role in firiancing businesses at their start-Lip stage (Wetzel, 1981; Landstr6m, 
1993; Aram, 1998; Mason et al., 1991 ; Amnareeta et al., 1998; 0snabrugge, 
1998). In Wetzel's study, 44% of the infornial investors made invcstments III 
start-LIP firms. As Table 7.4 shows, investors in the US are more likely to accept 
thc largcr risk in tlicir portfolio than UK or Swcdish investors. Saudi invcstors 
seem to be parallcl Nvith American invcstors In ternis of the stage of' finalicIng. 
Nearly 48/o of invCstilicilts made by Saudi investors were in the start-up stage 
Tabic 7.11. 
However, to some extent American investors "'vest in lilgh-tech. firms 
wilicil is not the casc with Saudi investors. Evcil wilcl, Saudi invcstol-s cl, 1111, tilc 
involvement of high-tcch. III their projects Table 7.12, It should be taken with 
caution. As the natUre of the technologY of tile Investment was decided by the 
rcspoliciclit in the qucstionnairc, respondents would not differciitiatc bctwccn 
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buying ready technology (as is the case in Saudi Arabia) and developing new 
technology M the West (as in the US). On the other hand, the larger arnount of 
interest in tile early stage of financing by Saudi investors does not necessarily 
indicate that Saudi investors cxcepct Ingher risk for higher returii. Saudi 
invcstors may invcst at this stage because there is a lack of access at later stages. 
The entrepreneur who starts a new project may find it more rational to except 
outside finance than the entrepreneur with a successful project. 
One informal investor who was interviewed (No. 5) rationallsed the 
behaviour of the market by simply stating that, 
"An entrepreneur with a well-established project might sell anything 
or every thing lie has or may sacrify fast growth before lie will look for 
someone to join him and share his profits. However, the opposite may be 
trLie for an entrepreneur with a straggling project!! ). " 
It is also claimed by other investors that even the two (entrepreneur and investor) 
who start a venture together may try to get rid of one another when the project has 
passed its critical stage. 
Table 7.11 
Frequency of Investors 
Stage of Development 
Stagc 
No. of 
investments 
Start-tip 
Firms 
No. IX) No 
Infant 
Firms 
% 
Young 
Firms 
No. % 
Established 
Firms 
No. fy, 
1-2 57 36.5 72 46.2 60 38.5 57 36.5 
3-5 45 28.8 21 13.4 18 11.5 15 9.6 
6-10 12 7.6 3 1.9 
11-15 6 3.8 - 3 1.9 
Did not Invcst 36 23.1 60 38.5 78 50.0 81 51.9 
Total 
Investors 
156 100.0 156 100.0 156 100.0 156 100.0 
Total ProJects 429 47.8 177 19 141 15.7 150 16.7 
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Table 7.12 
Frequency of Investors 
High Technology or Innovative Projects 
No. ol'Proýjects 1 2 3 15 No. 
Response 
Total 
Frequency 42 21 12 3 6 3 69 
Percent 26.9 13.5 7.7 1.9 3.8 1.9 44.2 100.0 
7.4 Investment Sector 
Informal invcstors in Saudi Arabia have made investments in a divcrsified 
portfolio which is clear from the frequency of investors in all six sectors except 
agriculture, in which only a small number of investors arc interested. This may be 
due to the change in government policies and tile fallurc of many agricultural 
projects. While a similar number of investors appears in the fivc sectors Table 
7.13, thC IlUnibcr of vcnturcs financed shows a different picturc. Investors in 
manufacturing and services invested in far more pr *ccts than t1lose in tile 01 other 
sectors. There are a few possible explanations for these findings. 
First, the supply of investment opportunities which are looking lor fiijýjjjcc 
is higher than in other sectors, where Ilew Young entrepreneurs critering flic 
market cannot survive on their own; however, tile case is diffel-clit with 
traditional sectors, such as retail, which may be Considered as iamily busilicsses. 
Second, investors in manufacturing may be motivated by the free Financc from it 
govemment agency (Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF)). Third, tile 
sample of tills study was biased towards very wealth and well-educatcd investors 
who might be interested in a larger investment, which IS ti-LIC in the case of 
manufacIL11-Ing and set-vices, especially when it involves buying technology. I 
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FOLirtli, cnti-clircnctirs starting a project in new sectors such as manufactUring and 
services may require support From experienced investors in all aspects of tile 
venture which is not tile case in traditional sectors such as trading and 
construction. Finally, Kamashky et al. (1995) point OLlt that trading and 
construction sectors are the most beneficial borrowers from the banking system in 
the GCC (Gulfcountrics), while manufacturing projects are the least. 
Table 7.13 
Frequency of Investors 
The Investment Sectors 
No. 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-14 Total No. 
Investments Investors Projects 
Sect`olý No. % No. % No. % No. % No. 'Yo Invested 
Retail/ Whole 69 6 3 78 129 
Sale 44 3.8 1.9 50 14.8 
Agriculture, 18 6 24 51 
Fishing 11.6 3.8 -- 15.4 5.8 
Manufacturing 42 15 9 3 69 208 
Industrial 26.9 9.6 5.8 1.9 44.2 23.9 
Manufacturing 51 is 9 78 
Consumer 32.7 11.6 5.8 
Construction 51 12 63 105 
32.7 7.7 40.4 12 
Services 48 12 3 3 66 174 
30.7 7.7 1.9 ýq 9 44.3 20 
Total nunibcr ofinvestors are 156 and total pro. jects 867 
On the other hand, the literature shows (Table 7.4) that there is a very high 
interest in manufacturing and services, with American investors interested in high 
tecilliology ventures and the British 11101-c interested "I consumer services. 
liowever, while it is very positive practice that Saudi "Ilvcstors are financing 
manufLICtUI-111g, with 55% of them claiming that they have financed at least oric 
pro . 
Icct in high technology or a product Ilew to tile market, it is important to look 
at tile cost of buyin,, _, 
technology and its role in transferrilig technology 1rom the 
West to the structure of the economy. The size of financing, which will he 
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discussed in the next section, shows that small and medium- sized firms require 
large sums of financing, which may be due to the ready technology that is bought. 
The Al-Mahmood study (1998) showed that only 6% of their study sample about 
SMEs firms developed technology inside the firm. This also needs to be taken 
with caution because of the bias of self-reporting. A more precise measurement 
is needed here. 
7.5 Investment Size 
Saudi investors invest in all sizes of investments, but a larger number of 
investors appear in columns C (-E46-108 ) and D (-LI08-308 ) Table 7.14. On the 
other hand, investors tend to spread their investments among different sizes, 
which is indicated by the higher number of investors in the range of number of 
investments 1-2 but lower in higher ranges. Thus, the number of investments per 
investor in each size is small. However, the means in columns A and F may 
indicate the existence of different segments in the market. Some investors may 
be interested in smaller investments while others are interested in larger ones. 
The cross-tab. (Table 7.15) may support the previous conclusion. It shows that 
wealth seems to be an influential factor in the size of investment. Richer 
investors tended to finance larger sized investments. A more precise statistical 
test with more data should investigate this relationship. The implications of this 
appear to be that the very rich investors, while they will remain an important 
source of financing for entrepreneurial firms, are not particularly supportive of 
very small firms. Well-off investors are more likely to be involved in small 
firms. This statement is supported by Mason et A (1991) who pointed out that 
informal investors in the UK are well-off but not very rich investors. 
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Table 7.14 
Frequency of Investors 
The Size of Investments 
( Thousands ) 
Amount ---100 SR 100-<300 SR 300-<700 SR 700-<2000 SR 2000-<5000 SR > 5000 SR 
No. (-E15 (-C 15 -< 46) (-E46-108 (-fIO8-308 -008-770) (-f>770) 
Investments A 13 c D E F 
1-2 21 45 54 69 36 30 
3-5 6 21 18 9 18 
6-10 3 3 0 3 6 
11-15 0 0 6 0 3 
Total 30 57 78 93 48 57 
investors 
Total 81 180 229 111 195 
Investments 
Investments 2.7 1.95 2.3 2.46 2.3 3.42 
per Investors 
(Mean) 
Tile average nivcstments in the literature per venture showed a variation in 
size. Wetzel (1981) stated the average size in the US is $50,000 (-f33,000), 
Haar el al. (1998) $130,000 (-f85,000) and Table 7.4 shows more of the picture. 
However, the current StUdy concerning informal investors shows a far higher 
average of investment per investor (-000,000), which is based on using the Illid- 
point of cach range as representative of tile typical investment witilill the range, 
IIICILiding all size categories and Using five million SR as representative of' file 
largest category. It is not very SUrprising, tlicrcforc, to see this large amount of 
financing if the context that those investors trade in is taken "to tile analysis. 
There are a few possible explanations for this finding. First, the sample of' file 
current study represents wealthier individuals who are able to commit more 
resources to informal investment VCIItLires. Secondly, as mentioned bcf'orc, 
indUstrial dcvelopnicnts In Saud, Arabia may requirc higlicr financing becaLISC Of 
the problem of buying In technology. Thirdly, Saudi 1 entrepreneurs may behave 
in a conscrvative way toward outside financilig, so thcy do not entcr flic markct of 
informal risk capital unless the required capi IIIII ital is very high. Finally, if financial 
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market competitors are taken into consideration, informal investors in Saudi 
Arabia may move to a larger size of investment without facing any competition 
from other financing, firms. This point is clearly stated by Wetzel et al. (198 1): 
"Informal investors have been a source of risk capital in amounts in all size 
categories below the typical interest threshold of professional venture capital 
firms. " (p. 28) 
So the development of formal venture- capital firms in Saudi Arabia may 
force informal investors to inject their wealth into smaller ventures. 
Table 7.15 
Cross Tabulation 
Wealth With Size of Investment (000s) 
Size Investments 
Wealth 
<100 
SR 
(-05 ) 
1 00-<300 SR 
(-f 15-< 46) 
300-<700 SR 
(-E46-108 
700-<2000 SR 
(-f 108-308 
2000-<5000 SR 
-f 308-770) 
> 5000 SR 
(-f>770) 
500 SR 3 6 0 0 0 0 
500 -1000 SR 6 12 
6 3 0 0 
> 1000 -2000 SR 12 12 
9 12 0 3 
> 2000 - 4000 SR 
0 9 9 9 6 
> 4000 - 6000 SR 0- 
9 21 12 6 3 
> 6000 S R- 
ý 
(9) 15 27 51 30 39 
fIý Approximately 6. -') saudi KIyIS 
7.6- Location 
Informal investors In Saudi Arabia prefer to invest in tile local market. 
AbOUt 80%) Of thC investors HI tllC CLII*rcilt study invcstcd within ýj 100-kni (60m) 
radius ofthe investor's home or workplace table 7.16.01, the other hand, only 
29% of investors invested in projects located in the range of 100-200 kin from 
their home or office, which clearly indicates that investors are looking for bigger 
cities. In Saudi Arabia, it is rare that the distance between two big cities is less 
than 200 kni. When tile distance rises to more than 200 kin, tile pcrcc,, taLýe of- 
investors rises to nearly 36%. UK and US studies as shown in table 1.4 have also 
conformed to the findings of the current study that infon-nal investors prefer local 
markets. This geographIcal pattem Is fikely to reflect the flollowing reasons, as 
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summarized by Mason et a] (1991) and Lumme (1998). First, inforinal investors 
receive iiii-ormation abOLIt investment opportunities from local networks, such as 
friends and relatives. Secondly, tile longer distance will discourage an active role 
and the monitoring of invcstmcnts. Finally, businesses are likely to look locally 
for financim, sources. In 
However, a comparison of the Means may indicate that some of Saudi's 
informal investors are national investors. Investments located more than two 
hundred-krn from the investor show a mean of 3.7 projects per investor which is 
very high when compared to other locations. Investors who make long-distance 
investments may be linked to a national inforniation network or may be wealthier 
investors who look for a larger amount of financing which is not always fOLInd 
locally. 
Table 7.16 
Frequency Of Investors 
Location of Investments 
I In Land Abroad 
of Investments No 100 ---100-200 --200 (itilfC. Arab C, Other . 
kin kni kiii 
1-2 No. 78 30 57 15 21 14 
1 Yo 50 19.2 36.6 9.6 13.5 9 
3-5 No. 36 12 6 9 9 9 
%() 23.1 7.7 3.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 
6-10 No. 12 3 3 - - 4 
7.7 1.9 1.9 2.6 
11-15 No. - - 6 
3.8 
16-25 No. - 3 - 
1.9 
Not Invested No 27 111 81 132 126 129 
% 19.2 71.2 51.9 84.6 80 82.7 
Total investors No 156 156 156 156 156 156 
100 
- 
100 100 100 100 100 
Total Projects 327 105 278 45 54 65 
Investmerits Per 2.5 2.3 3.7 1.8 1.8 2.4 
Investor (Mean) 
'I otal ol'projects are 874. 
lzows will be more the t. nunlbcr ofillvestors because sorne investors 
have invested in more than one location 
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A minority of Saudi's informal investors is interested in over the borders 
markets. The data does not show any significant interest in one region more than 
another. Some respondents that the researcher met personally showed an interest 
in Egypt, Europe and the United States. On a yearly basis these investors spend 
two to three months abroad during the summer when it is likely they are involved 
in business deals. Albaladh's study (1995) concluded that wealthier investors 
invest in retail, construction and manufacturing firms outside the kingdom more 
than less wealthier investors: nearly 58% of that study sample invested in 
construction and agriculture, 46% in retail and manufacturing. Other types of 
investment, such as in financial markets or bank products, were rated less. 
7.7- The Investment Motivations 
Financial return is by far the most important factor that motivates Saudi's 
informal investors in financing entrepreneurial firms. Nearly 85% of the investors 
chose financial return as a reason to invest table 7.17. It is surprising that 
avoiding interest rates as a reason for providing equity financing came third with 
only 28.8 % who stated that they were motivated by this reason. However, this is 
in contrast to the findings of Alsiekh et al (1993); their study, concerning the 
behaviour and attitudes of Saudi Stock Market investors, pointed out that interest 
rate avoidance was a very important reason to invest in stocks. This contrast may 
indicate that more active and wealthier investors in the Saudi economy are liberal 
in their attitudes towards interest rates. This may also be supported by the cross 
tabulation table7-18 between interest rate avoidance and the level of wealth. 
However, this generalization should be regarded with caution until statistical 
tests can provide proof, this does not apply to the current study owing to the bias 
towards wealthy investors in the sample. 
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Table 7.17 
Frequency of Investors 
Investment Motivations 
Motivations Yes No No Response Total 
High No. 132 21 3 156 
Return %, 84.6 13.5 1.9 100 
Interest No. 45 108 3 156 
Avoidance % 28.8 69.2 1.9 100 
Helping Young No. 39 114 3 156 
EntrepreneUr 25 73.1 1.9 100 
Helping Friend No. 42 111 3 156 
or i-clatives I yo 26.9 71.2 1.9 100 
SUPPOrtill, " S06,11 No. 57 96 3 156 
Beneficial Products (yo 36.5 61.5 1.9 100 
Community N 0. 9 144 3 156 
Recognition % 5.8 92 1.9 100 
Literature has reported the importance of non-financial rewards as a motivc 
for providing risk capital. Sullivan (1990) found three clusters arriong US 
informal investors. First investors who score very low on non-econornic reasons. 
The Second clustcr had high scores on both economic and non-economic factors. 
The third cluster showcd evidence of less interest in financial benefits but scored 
higher on non-financial factors. Wetzel (1981) and Mason et al (1991) 
emphasized the importance of non-financial return in US and UK informal 
investors' decisions. Many Saudi infori-nal investors are also motivated ill part by 
non-financial factors. Indeed, tile second most important motive with 36.5% 
(table 7.17) of' Informal invcstors is tile sLIPPort of socially bcncfic1al pro(lucts 0- 
services. However, It Is argued that a bias nlay affect tilis result because ill I sell' 
reporting survey respondents want to report the desired answcr. 
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Table 7.18 
Cross Tabulation 
Wealth and Avoidance of Interest Rate 
Is Interest avoidance a 
Wealth\ motive? 
Yes No 
< 500 SR 3 3 
500 1000 SR 3 12 
> 1000 - 2000 SR 12 12 
> 2000 - 4000 SR 6 9 
> 4000 - 6000 SR 6 15 
> 6000 SR 15 51 
fI- Approximately 6.5 Saudi Riyls 
7.8- Return Format and Expectations 
Saudi investors are very diverse in tile fon-nat of expected income from 
their investments. While literature stated the importance of capital gains rather 
than dividends income ( Wetzel 1981, Mason 1991), Saudi informal investors 
seern to prefer dividends income (table 7.19). The strong preference of dividcrids 
as a fonnat of income implies that SaLid, 'I'vestors would not be able to repeat 
risk-capital financing. In reality, investors can not continue adding new 1)t-(). Iccts 
to their existing portfolios. This behaviour may lead to losirig t os ivestors w1jo 1ý 1 
11 c 11 
have built Lip investing and monitoring skills. Also, it may discouragc new 
investors fi-om entering tile market if they are not eonfident of being able to 
rctricvc their money. Stex, ciison et al (1994) found that nearly hali' of' the 
infonlial investors in their UK sample would be encoul-jige(I to Invest more it' 
SL[itabic exit routes were made available. A possible cxplýjjjýjtjojj for tile low 
instance of liquidation is that tile Saudl ecollomy has limited exit routes. The 
main rOLItCS flor liquidation according to the literature are sell i lig/Illergi ng a 
velitLire with other companies or floating a VCIltUre oil the Stock Market (Mason 
1991 ). These two methods arc not well practised in the Saudi economy. The 
Stock Market C0110111.1ed with only about scvclltY collimmics during the last 
dccadc. Mct-gcr and takc-oxcr arc consIdercd as ncw pliclioniclia 10 )LIS' leSS 
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practices. However, literature stated that informal investors gave little thought to 
exit routes 
( Osnabrugge, 1998; Landstorin, 1993; Lurnme et al 1998) when compared to the It) 
fori-nal venture- capital firms. This may be partly explained by the lack of 
adequate exit routes actually available (Landstorm, 1993; Mason et a], 1991 ). 
Table 7.19 
Frequency of Investors 
Format of Income 
Income Format Frequency Per cent 
Long term capital gain 21 13.5 
Mostly ]on(, term capital gain 1ý - 
18 11.5 
- Part capital g., part current d. 45 53.8 
Mostly current dividends 42 80.8 
Current dividends 30 100.0 
Table 7.20 
Frequencv of Investors 
Ratc of RCtL11-11 
Rate of Return 
, Y() 
Investing 
In SMEs 
- 
Investing In 
Stock Market 
5-9 0 27 
10-12 12 75 
13-18 36 51 
19-25 87 6 
26-40 15 0 
Total 150 147 
No Response 6 9 
Rate of Return 
( Mean) 
20 11 
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On the other hand Saudi infonnal investors expect that the risk that they 
have taken in financing entrepreneurial firms should be rewarded with a 
minimum mean of 20% (table 7.20). The perception of informal investors of the 
risks involved in investing in companies at different stages of development are 
reflected in the difference between the minimum required rate of return on 
investing in Stock Market Shares and entrepreneurial firms. 
Conclusion 
Informal investors are a significant source of risk capital for small and 
medium-sized businesses in Saudi Arabia, and for both new and established firms 
in an economy with limited institutional financing. 
Informal Investors, as explained by the sample in the current study, are 
generally well-educated, wealthy, and of an average age of 44. They invest in 
firms at all stages but prefer the start-up stage. The size of their investments vary, 
with an average of nearly E300,000, which is considered to be relatively high 
when compared to the literature findings. Financial reward is the main motive for 
investing which is expected to be received in a dividends format. 
However, while the focus of the current study is on the decision-making 
behaviour of informal investors which will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
descriptive analysis of the profile and investment activities of the informal 
investors are very important in understanding the decision-making behavior in its 
context. As mentioned before, the informal investors' population constitutes a 
very heterogeneous group of investors. Following researchers will be able to 
compare and deduce the effect of the investors' profile on their decision behavior. 
The decision-making behaviour if examined alongside the investors' background, 
will contribute to academics' understanding about the existence of segments in 
the market. It will also help entrepreneurs in their search for the right investor for 
their venture. 
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Chapter Eight 
Decision Making Behaviour 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of testing the hypotheses that were 
developed in the analytical framework chapter. Investors' decision-making 
behaviour will be analysed to see how investors minimise the asymmetric 
information and control problems that are associated with it. The data from 
informal investors cover different stages of the decision process as explained 
in the literature (Osnaburg, 1998; Mason et A, 1995; Typejee et aL, 1984). 
In order to organise the analysis and provide a clearer picture of the flow of 
the decision-making process, this chapter is structured as follows: 
8.1 deal origination and information network 
8.2 Overall evaluation 
8.3 post-investment 
staging of finance 
involvement with investee venture 
8.1 Deal Origination and Information Network 
8.1.1 Information sources 
Inforinal investors operate in a very difficult environnient where 
information is extremely rare. The lack of intermediary function increases 
the cost of finding opportunities. As search costs increase, investors will not 
find it profitable to invest. In this poorly-defined environment, rational 
investors may find it in their interest to connect themselves to informal 
networks to share information about opportunities. It is believed that 
information concerning opportunities for investment in SMEs is transmitted 
to informal investors through different sources and channels of information. 
Early in the development of the venture capital industry, which is also 
supported by recent research, Rubenstein (1958) stated: 
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"The fraternity of individual backers of small businesses appears to 
be rather close knit, at least on a local level. A good deal of 
information is passed about by word of mouth. If one investor who 
enjoys considerable prestige among his associates, believes a situation 
to be promising and recommends it to others, his friends may 
participate merely on the basis of his recommendations ... " (p. 306) 
The Saudi informal venture capital market is expected to be even less 
efficient than the same markets in developed countries, especially after the 
introduction of matching services in developed countries. Consequently, the 
reliance on the available information sources should be evident to Saudi 
informal investors. 
The null hypothesis reads: 
Ho: Information sources are equally important to the Saudi informal 
investors. 
Eight sources of information were developed from the literature and 
the preliminary interviews with Saudi informal investors. Respondents were 
asked to state the actual use of these sources in obtaining information about 
investment opportunities. 
From Table 8.1 ranks the information sources by using the Friedman 
Two-way ANOVA test, it is clear that the difference in the importance of 
information sources is statistically significant which implies the rejection of 
the null-hypothesis. Saudi investors attached different importance levels to 
their use of the available information sources. In contrast to the literature, 
active personal search is at the forefront of the sources of investment 
opportunities. Informal networks, such as friends and business associates, 
came second and third. On the other hand, formal information sources, such 
as banks, real estate agencies and Chambers of Commerce are the least used. 
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Table 8.1 
Friedman Test Two-Way Anova to Rank the Importance 
of the Information Sources 
Information Source Importance 
Rank 
Active Personal Search 6.25 
Friends 5.46 
Business Associates 4.82 
Entrepreneurs 4.71 
Consultation Agencies 4.01 
Chamber of Commerce 3.81 
Banks 3.53 
Real Estate Agencies 3.41 
Test Statistics 
N 153 
Chl-Square 204.021 
df 7 
Asymp. Sig. . 000 
Rcsearch in the US (Wetzcl, 198 1; Haar el al., 1988; Fict, 1991 ), the UK 
(Mason et al., 1991) and Swcden (Landstr6m, 1993) finds that business 
associates and friends are the most important providers of invcstinclit 
information. If this is the casc In devclopcd markets, wily (lo SaLldl 
investors insist oil searching for investments themselves, clearly inti-OdLICIng 
lugher search costs'? There are two explanations lor this. First, the number 
of investment opportunities that arc circulated in the informal network may 
be low and does not satisfy investors' available funds. Secondly, Saudi 
investors may hold a conservative view about market risks (which arc due to 
Unforeseen competitive conditions) and agency risks (which are caused by 
the separate and possibly divergent interests of investors and entrepreneurs) 
and this leads to a personal search for a Venture that they know and an 
cntrcprcnCUr that they can trust. 
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Table 8.2 
Correlations between the Number of Investment 
Opportunities Received 
and the Sources of Information (Spearman's rho) 
B RE BA R EN I APS CC CA IOR 
Correlation 
Coeff icient 
IOR . 140 . 103 . 065 -20.6 . 093 -034 . 001 . 
179 1.00 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 082 . 205 . 421 . 009 . 254 . 676 . 994 . 026 - 
N 156 153 153 156 153 156 153 153 156 
Banks (B) Real Estate Agencies(RE) 
Business Associates(BA) Friends(FR) 
Entrepreneurs(EN) Active Personal search(APS) 
Chamber of Commerce (CC) Consultation Agencies(CA) 
Investment Opportunities Received (IOR) 
In order to investigate the benefits of Lising one specific source of 
opportunities over others will provide insights into the effectiveness of tllcsc 
SOUrccs, Speamian's rho correlation was applied to the number ofilivestilielit 
opportUllities received (IOR) and the SOUrces of inforriiation. The correlation 
results in Table 8.2 show that generally correlation does not exist or is very 
low between the two variables. However, two points sholil(I be noted here. 
Friends are negatively correlated with the investment opportunities received. 
This may, even xvith the low correlation coefficicnt, support tile view 
dISCLIssed earlier that investors in the informal nctwork arc gencrating a 
lower number of investments which Increases the need 11or personal search. 
On the other hand, consultation agencies are J)Osltlvcly correlated (very low 
Coefficient) with the I1LInibcr of investments received. By taking the 
correlation I-CSLIlts and the ranking table, it is not surprising to colicILI(le that 
wbilc the ma jority of informal investors are linked to flicir int-ormal network 
which Linfortunatcly generates a low number Of "'vestments, a small group Of 
investors are linked to lormal sources sucl, iIS COIISLIltatioli agencies and 
reccivc a high number of' investments. These Fornial sources clearly arc not 
availabIc to most investors which leads to the low importance oftlic ranking 
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of these sources, as shown in Table 8.1. This view can also be supported by 
investigating the cross-tabulation tables that arc presented in Appendix B. 5. I 
8.1.2 Satisfaction of information channels 
Since the majority of investors receive a low number of proposals 
about investment opportunities, investors' satisfaction with the existing 
channels of nil'orrnation is expected to be low. The efficiency and 
effectiveness of these channels is very important in order to increase the 
choices that are available to investors and improve decision-making. 
According to Wetzel (1987), 
"The modern Financial theory rests on assumptions of cfficicrit 
markets - markets in which information about sources of funds 
and about investment opportunities is fully and freely available 
to buyers and sellers of capital. " (p. 305) 
Table 8.3 
Satisfaction of the Effectiveness of Existing 
Channels of Information 
Not 
Satisfied 
Little 
Satisfied 
Average 
Satisfied 
Satisfied Very 
Satisfied 
Total 
30 
- 
45 
- - 
54 18 9 
Percent 19.2 28 .8 34.6 11.5 5.8 100.0 Valid -Percent 192 28.8 34.6 11.5 5.8 
--- 
lbo-. o 
-tý-urnulative 
Percent 
192 48.1 82.7 94.2 100.0 
_ ean 
- 
2.56 Std. Dev. 1.10 
__ _____Med_ian___ 
3.00 
In a scale troin 1--) ano -*) ocing very satisnea 
Figure 8.1 
Very Satisfied 
Sat 
Av( 
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Table 8.3 and Figure 8.1 suggest that investors in the Saudi informal 
market are not satisfied with the flow of information. This view clarifies the 
understanding of the high rank of the personal search for opportunities, which 
in turn introduces a higher cost for the search for information. About eighty- 
two per cent (82.7) of investors claimed that they are "average" or "less 
satisfied"; only six per cent (5.8) of investors presented themselves as "very 
satisfied". Several researchers have also concluded that information does not 
flow efficiently among business angels (Gaston and Bell, 1986; Krasner and 
Tymes, 1983; Wetzel, 1981; Harrison and Mason, 1992; Short and Riding, 
1989). The result indicates that capital may be used in opportunities that do 
not represent the best choices in the market because of investors making 
decisions without being fully aware of the opportunities available. On the 
other hand, funds that are available to be injected in SMEs may not be utilised 
because of the low supply of investment opportunities. This point is 
supported by the next section. 
8.1.3 Utilisation of available funds 
The failure of the market to satisfy providers of funds will lead to a 
failure to utilise substantial available capital. Nearly two-thirds of informal 
investors in the sample would have invested more in the last five years if 
they had come across a greater number of suitable investment opportunities, 
as shown in Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2. Only about five per cent (5.7) would 
not have invested more if they had received a larger number of investment 
opportunities. This clearly indicates that the informal risk capital market in 
Saudi Arabia is a largely untapped source of funds for financing SMEs. 
Nearly 75 per cent of informal investors in the UK (Mason et aL, 1992), and 
54 per cent in the US (Gaston, 1989), are prepared to commit more funds if 
more projects are available. 
Unfortunately, this flow's inefficiency restricts the amount and quality 
of the proposals that informal investors receive. To improve the inefficiency 
of communications between investors and entrepreneurs, business 
introduction services have been organised in the US and UK to formalise the 
flow of information. According to Mason et aL (1993): 
205 
"Business introduction services attempt to overcome the two rna. jor 
sources of inefficiency in the informal venture capital market, namely 
the invisibility of'business angels and the high search costs of angels for 
business and businesses for angels, by providing a channel of 
communication between informal investors and entrepreneurs seeking 
finance. " (p. 27) 
Table 8.4 
Invest More If More Opportunities Available 
Strongly 
No 
No May be Yes Strongly 
Yes 
Total 
Frequency 6 3 54 42 51 16-6- 
Percent 3.8 1.9 34.6 26.9 32.7 100.0 
Valid Percent 3.8 1.9 34.6 26.9 32.7 10b. 0 
Cumulative 
Percent 
3.8 5.8 40.4 67.3 100.0 
Mean 3.83 Std. Dev 1.04 Median 4.00 
In a scale fi-orn 1-5 and 5 being strongly yes 
Figure 8.2 
Invest More If More Opportunities Available 
Strongly No 
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Yes 
The evaluation of these services is beyond the scope and relevance of this 
study as they are not yet established in the Saudi Arabia market. However, 
the next section discusses the Saudi informal investors' interest in 
participation in such services,, if they were available in the Kingdom. 
8.1.4 Participation in information network 
As investors are frustrated in finding sufficient investment proposals, 
it was thought that establishing a referral network service would help to ease 
the flow of information and improve the quality of proposals by the 
professional management of the network. The most striking result of 
investors' opinions about this network is the fact that over eighty per cent of 
the Saudi informal investors reported that they are interested or strongly 
interested in participating in such a service (Table 8.5 and Figure 8.3). The 
pioneer study by Wetzel (1981) in the US confirmed a similar result which 
led to the development of match-making services in the US and then in 
Europe. 
It appears from the previous result that a carefully designed 
experimental effort to bring to the attention of informal investors ventures 
that are seeking finance is welcomed by investors. Such services are 
assumed to improve the efficacy and flow of information between investors 
and entrepreneurs in the Saudi informal risk capital market. However, such 
a conclusion is holds true if the market is experiencing only a communication 
problem, but factors must be considered which may have created a shortage 
of investment opportunities that investors received. If a communication 
constraint is overcome, where information can be transmitted more easily 
than before, it is necessary to ask if investors are going to receive sufficient 
opportunities to utilise their available funds. In fact, the deal origination 
stage of an informal investor's decision is more complicated than that. 
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Table 8.5 
Participation in Information Network 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Little 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Total 
Frequency 6 6 12 54 75 153 
Percent 3.8 3.8 7.7 34.6 48.1 98.1 
Valid Percent 3.9 3.9 7.8 35.3 49.0 100.0 
Cumulative 
Pcrccnt 
7.8 7.8 15.7 51.0 100.0 
Mean 4.22 Std. Dev. 1.02 Median 4.00 
In a scale trom 1--) and -) being Mrongly Agree 
Figure 8.3 
Participation in information network 
Other factors are involved, such as tile number of opportunities actually 
seeking external equity finance. Therefore, to improve tile deal ()j-jg, jjatj-On 
stage, a full review of constraints that may affect investinent 0pl)0rtLInjtIcs 
that are available in the inflormal or formal networks is required. The next 
scction will look at this aspcct of the dcal origination stagc. 
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8.1.5 Constraints on the growth of the risk capital market 
Surprisingly, com in Lin i cation is not the only, and not even the most 
important, constraint affecting the number of opportunities that reach 
informal investors in the Saudi risk market. It appears from Table 8.6 that 
the risk capital market in Saudi Arabia faces equally serious difficulties. 
The following discussion is based on investors' opinions, or what may be 
called the supply side of capital; demand side opinions are not included. 
The ranking importance is not statistically significant, so the differences ill 
rank do not mean that one is more important than the other. The mean 
scores are very high - nearly four for all the four factors. 
Table 8.6 
Friedman Test to Rank the Importance of the Constraints on 
the Growth of Risk Capital Market 
Constraints that affect the growth of risk Importance 
capital market Rank 
Fritrepreneurs prefer not to sacritice some 2.59 
of their ownership 
Supply of good opportunities is low in 2.49 
Saudi Arabia 
Investors do not prefer equity financing 2.48 
Supply and demand matching problem 2.44 
(communication) 
Test Statistics 
N 147 
Chl-Square 1.426 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. . 699 
Arithmetic 
Mean Mcdian 
3.88 4.00 
3.98 4.00 
4.00 
3.92 4.00 
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(a) Entrepreneurs prefer not to sacrifice some of their ownership 
It is fair to assume that entrepreneurs are reluctant to give up part 
ownership of their business. Risk capital financing gives informal investors 
contractual arrangements that may transfer some or all of the control rights to 
them from the founders. Under these circumstances, even if an equity gap 
exists, entrepreneurs may not approach the risk capital market searching for 
equity finance and sacrifice the potential growth, or at least have equity 
finance as the last resort. Therefore, entrepreneurs must have a positive 
attitude towards sharing ownership. This can be established through raising 
the value-added that investors could bring to ventures. Informal investors 
invest their know-how as well as their capital in the ventures they finance. 
According to Wetzel (1995), almost three-quarters of the entrepreneurs who 
had a working relationship with their private investors consider their 
relationship to be productive. 
(b) Supply ofgood opportunities is low in Saudi Arabia 
The literature (for example, Wetzel, 198 1, Mason et al., 199 1, Lumme, 
1998) has rccognised that informal investors look for a venture that has a 
high potential growth. However, while quality is a subjective word, 
investors attach specific criteria to the quality of ventures and entrepreneurs. 
There are several explanations for the low quality of ventures that are 
seeking equity finance. Firstly, society's attitude towards entrepreneurship 
will affect the number of ventures that are created in the economy. When 
cultures encourage entrepreneurship, more innovative good quality business 
ideas will be forthcoming. Secondly, there is a possibility of an adverse 
selection problem where only low quality ventures seek equity finance. 
That is clearly explained by the lemon market which was developed by 
Akerlof (1970) and discussed earlier in the analytical framework chapter. 
Thirdly, informal investors may use very conservative criteria which may 
crowd out many growing businesses that are seeking finance. However, the 
key point is that there will only be an increase in informal venture capital if 
investors believe that they can find sufficient good quality investment 
opportunities. 
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(C) Investors do notprefer equityfinance 
The previous results indicate that the available funds for equity 
financing are far from being utilised. However, attracting new investors 
with currently negative attitudes towards equity financing can be achieved 
through incentives. 
(d) Supply and demand matchingproblem 
This problem was fully discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. 
Overall the importance of the, discussion of these constraints to 
improve the efficiency of the risk capital market does not, according to 
Wetzel (1987), lie only with the private benefits to investors and 
entrepreneurs, but also with the significant external social benefits as 
developed by Mansfield (1983) in his study to measure the external 
economies associated with technological entrepreneurship. 
8.1.6 Co-investing 
An important aspect of the deal origination is co-investing. According 
to Bygrave (1987), "where there was more uncertainty, there was more co- 
investing" (p. 151). Hence, co-investing maybe practised in this stage of the 
decision process to share information and expertise about investment 
opportunities which implies better networking. In this section, investors 
were asked how frequently they co-invested and the reasons that motivated 
them. 
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8.1.6 (a) Frequency 
Table 8.7 and Figure 8.4 examine the frequency of co-investing. 
Only a third oftlic study sample is very active and nearly fifty per cent are 
sometimes co-Investors, this means that more than eighty percent of Saudi 
informal investors fi-equently co-invest. Only ten per cent have never 
practised co-invcstment. 
Table 8.7 
The Use of Co-investing 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Total 
Frequency 15 12 72 54 153 
Percent 9.6 7.7 46.2 34-6 98.1 
Valid Percent 9.8 7.8 47.1 35.3 100.0 
CLIMUlative 
Percent 
9.8 17.6 64.7 100.0 
Mean 3.08 Std. Dev. 91 Median 3 
In a scalc from 1-4 and 4 bcing Otten 
Figure 8.4 
This result may raise sonic ill] sulterprctations wilen cornparc(l to tile 
literature because frcqLlCllCy categories are not presented. According to 
Harrison (1992), UK informal investors are operating more lndcpcn(lcntiy: 
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The use of Co-irvesting 
only forty-lour pcr ccnt have Liscd syndication, compared with the US 
situation where no more than nine per cent of informal investors operate 
individually. On the other hand, Saudi investors usually co-Invest with 
those who arc well known to them, mostly friends (mean 3.69) or fallilly 
members (ilican 3.20); other formal organisations arc less frequently 
reported Appendix B. L 
8.1.6 (b) Motivation to co-invest 
Since Saudi informal investors co-mvest frequently, the question 
which may be asked here is why this method is popular. The discussion 
with Saudi informal investors and the theoretical literature offers reasons that 
motivate informal investors to co-mvcsted finance. In this section, the 
importance of the variOLls reasons for co-investment is ranked in the case of 
Saudi Arabia. 
'Fable 8.8 
Friedman Two-Way ANOVA Test to Rank the I mportance of' 
Co-investing's Reasons 
Reasons to Syndicate Arithmetic Importance 
Mean Rank 
Reduce the risk of choosing a 4.33 2.43 
low quality venture 
Provide different expertise to 4.20 2.40 
the venture 
To improve the relationship to 2.38 11-7 
the investors network 
Test Statistics 
1ý rl N lylý 
Chi-Square 172.28 
Df 2 
Asymp. Sig. . 000 
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Null hypothesis: 
Ho: Saudi investors apply equal importance to the different reasons for co- 
investment. 
Table 8.8 indicates that Saudi investors co-invest mostly because they 
want to reduce the risk of adverse selection. As stated by Lerner (1994), 
venture capitalists, upon finding an attractive venture, typically do not make 
a binding commitment to provide funds. Rather, they send the proposal to 
other investors for their review. Another venture capitalist's interest in 
financing the firm may be an important factor for the lead investor to invest. 
It appears from Table 8.8 that co-investing is taken as a pre-investment 
strategy more than post-investment. However, both strategies are considered 
important reasons to co-invest. Surprisingly, it is rare that investors co-invest 
to improve their relationship with their networks. This low importance of the 
use of co-investing in improving the relationship to the network may be due 
to the fact that investors always co-invest with investors who are already 
familiar to them. Consequently, as the ranking of the reasons is statistically 
significant, the null hypothesis must be rejected. 
It is fair to assume that investors may differ in the ranking of those 
reasons to co-invest owing to the frequency of their co-investing. The 
Mann-Whitney U-test was applied to investigate the differences between 
'sometimes' and 'often' groups. 
The U-test results in Table 8.9 show that the two groups of investors 
do not differ statistically in their evaluation of the reasons to co-invest. 
As the frequency of co-investing does not seem to affect the ranking 
importance of the reasons to co-invest, another technique " Cluster Analysis" 
was used to see if different groups can be created from the sample. 
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Table 8.9 
Mann-Whitney U-Test to Compare the Mean Ranks of the Two 
Groups of Investors (Sometimes/Often ) About Co-investing Reasons 
Co- investing Variables The Use of 
Co-investing 
e-a -n- 
Rank 
S -u m of 
Ranks 
P-roVide different expertise to the 
new ventures 
Sometimes 72 61.25 4410.00 
Often 54 66.50 3591.00 
Total 126 
Reduce the risk of choosing a low 
quality venture 
Sometimes 72 61.06 439-6.50 
Often 54 66-75 3604.50 
Total 126 
To improve networking and receive 
more deals 
Sometimes 7 64.75 4662.00 
Often 54 61.83 3339.0 
Total 126 
Test Statistics 
Expertise Venture 
Quality 
Network 
Mann-Whitney U 1782.000 1768.500 1854.00-0 
Wilcoxon W 4410.000 4396.500 3339.000 
z -. 869 -. 956 
Aý_symp. -Sig(2-tailed) 
. 385 ____. 
339 
. 643 
a Grouping Variable: The Use of Co-investing 
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8.1.6 (c) Cluster analysis 
Following the cluster analysis decision process (Hair et aL, 1998), the 
following stages were developed: 
Stage 1 
The objective of the cluster analysis is to create two or more groups based 
on the responses to the co-investing reasons. 
Stage 2 
(a) The data were tested for outliers. A descriptive analysis was 
undertaken and found the data to be free of outliers. 
(b) Squared Euclidean distances were used as a similarity measure owing 
to the data level of measurement (Saunders, 1994). 
(c) According to Norusis (1994), the popular method for forming clusters 
is agglomerate hierarchical cluster analysis, where clusters are formed 
by grouping cases into bigger clusters until all cases are members of a 
single cluster. 
Stage 3 
A major issue with all clustering techniques is to decide the number of 
clusters. Unfortunately, no standard objective selection procedure exists 
(Hair et aL, 1998). 
However, there are a number of "rules of thumb" that can be applied, 
as suggested by Hair et A (1998). The 'agglomeration co-efficient, values 
can be used to determine the appropriate number. These values are shown 
in Table 8.10 for the final seven cluster combination steps; a large change in 
the value of the co-efficient indicates that two dissimilar clusters have 
combined. The step from 4 to 3 in Table 8.10 produces a noticeable 
increase. This suggested that there are four groups (Norusis, 1994; Hair et 
aL, 1998). 
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Table 8.10 
Cluster Analysis Proximity Values 
Number of, 
Clusters 
Agglomeration 
Coeffi'cienfi 
Percentage Cýpnge in 
ff 4 Coe ident to Next 
Level 
8 to 7 3.231 25 
7 to 6 3.860 20 
6 to 5 4.000 4 
5 to 4 4.000 0 
4 to 3 7.280 82 
3 to 2 11.667 60 
12 to 1 1 12.320 6 
Stage 4 Interpretation of the clusters 
Table 8.11 exhibits the essential information relating to the interpretation 
of the three-cluster solution. This table contains the results of an analysis of 
variance on the mean squares (between groups) and includes details of the 
mean values (centroids), unvariate F ratios, and the level of signification 
associated with the differences between group means. According to Hair et 
aL (1998), ANOVA (one way analysis of variance), in spite of its name, is 
concerned with differences between means of groups, not differences 
between variance. 
Table 8.11 presents the three clusters that were drawn from the sample. It 
is noted that the mean values of each cluster are significantly different at the 
0.001 level. The finding that the three clusters are significantly different for 
all the variables, is very important as it confirms that three distinct clusters 
have been identified. 
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Table 8.11 
Mean Ratings and Significance Levels for Three Cluster Solution 
(Using the three co-investing reasons variables) 
CLUSTERS 
123 
Co-investing R asons Double Post-stage Pre- F Sig. Group 
Variables Stage strategy invest. Mean 
Strategies strategy Ratio 
Provide different expertise 4.40, A. 00 1.67 68.171 . 000 4.20 to the venture 
Std. Dev. . 67 1.10 . 50 1 1 Reduce the risk of 4.48 2.00 4.00 44.153 . 000 4.33 
choosing a low quality 
venture 
Std. Dev . 63 . 00 . 87 
To improve the 2.53 1.00 1.33 8.63 . 000 2.38 
networking and receive 
more deals 
Std. Dev 
. _1.23 . 
00 
. 50 1 1 1 
Size of the Cluster No. 120 6 9, 
Investors 
Response No. 135 Investors Table 7.11 
Cluster I clearly shows that investors in this cluster are applying double- 
stage reasoning for using co-investing. This group is concerned about the 
uncertainty that is associated with entrepreneurial investment in the 
evaluation stage and in any event that may arise during the life of the 
venture. Therefore, this group feels comfortable in finding another investor 
willing to put money in and provide expertise support. Not surprisingly, this 
cluster has dominated the sample and 120 investors were identified as 
members of this cluster. The importance of sharing expertise has been 
clearly identified by other researchers (Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994) as an 
important motive for co-investing. 
Cluster 2 has the highest mean rating only at the post-investment stage, 
which indicates that this group of investors uses co-invcsting mainly for the 
post-investment stage to provide different expertise to the venture. 
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Cluster 3 presents investors who have been only concerned about the 
quality of the venture, so these investors arc motivated to co-invest in order 
to get other investors' opinions about the project. 
Unfortunately, the last two clusters, which have a single-stage motive to 
co-invest, were not very popular among informal investors. As Table 8.11 
shows, a very small number of investors were identified in Clusters 2 and 3. 
Stage 5 Validation of the Clusters 
Having successfully generated and interpreted a three-cluster solution, it is 
important that these clusters are validated to ensure that they are stable and 
generalisable. The process of validation and profiling is critical because of 
the exploratory and often a theoretical basis for cluster analysis (Hair et aL, 
1998). 
An important method to ensure the validity is to split the data into halves 
and analyse each half separately (Green et aL, 1988). This method 
necessitates the random splitting of the sample into halves. Table 8.12 
shows the results of the application of this method and then the practical 
significance was examined. If the clustering process is stable, the means of 
the two halves of the sample should be similar. 
Table 8.12 
Comparison of Group Means and Significance Levels for 
the Three-Cluster Solution from Splitting Data into Halves 
Clusters 
1 
Variables 
.1 
st 2nd 1 st 2nd 1 st 2 no 1 st 1nd 2st 2nd 
F Sig. F Sig. 
-ffx--pertise 4.48 
- - 
4.32', 4.00 3.33 1.80 1.33 34.17 0.000 29.10 0.000 
Venture quality 
- 
ý 
.5 3 4.42 2.00 2.33 3.80 4.67- 
-ý2 40 0.000 15.73 0.000 
Fe-jýýo rk 2.62 2.44 1.27 1.33 1.40 1.00 5.37 1 0.007 3.32 0.042 
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Table 8.12 shows that using the same method of cluster analysis, both the 
first and the second half of the data set were gathered into three clusters. An 
inspection of the data indicates that the variable means of the two samples 
for each of the three clusters are, indeed, in the same direction. Also, 
ANOVA analysis was conducted. The results of this, which are also 
presented in Table 8.12, indicate that the variable means for each half of the 
data are significantly different for each of the clusters. This provides further 
evidence that there are three clusters and that they are separated. 
Generally, the above results, through different tests, suggest that when 
Saudi informal investors co-invest, they do it to support their decision in a 
pre-investment stage as a mechanism to control the adverse selection 
problem and in a post-investment stage to provide different experience to the 
venture. However, the contribution of co-investing to the investors' network 
is considered less important by investors. According to Bygrave's (1987) 
study concerning formal venture capital firms, the principal reason for co- 
investing was the sharing of expertise. On the same lines, the current study 
raises the importance of sharing expertise as a reason for co-investing in the 
pre and post investment stages.. 
Summary 
Saudi informal investors face poorly-defined environments within 
which to locate investment deals. Testing the hypothesis about information 
sources indicates that investors rely on their active personal search for deals 
more than any other sources. This may introduce high search costs compared 
to network sources. Thus, informal investors are not satisfied with the 
information channels that are available to them. This results in a failure to 
utilise the funds that supply this market. 
However, while the low efficiency of information transfer in the 
informal risk capital market is a very strong constraint to its growth, the low 
efficiency that characterises the market cannot be linked to the information 
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problem alone. . -It is clear 
from the discussion in this section that there are 
other important constraints which jeopardise its efficiency and growth. In 
addition, co-investing, which is thought to improve the networking of 
information sources because of the new connections that are created, has 
very little effect on the informal investors' decision to co-invest. 
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8.2 Evaluation 
1. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, informal investors receive many 
opportunities but invest in a very small number of them. This indicates that 
informal investors are looking for a specific project and a unique 
entrepreneur to commit their funds for a long-term equity investment in an 
unquoted firm. These criteria are very important to see how these investors 
manage to control the agency and market risks that are involved in risk 
capital financing. These criteria also provide some insights into the 
emphasis that investors attach to investment criteria related to ex ante and 
investment criteria related to expost. 
In this section an overall evaluation of the investment criteria is 
undertaken. It should be noted that the literature illustrated that different 
criteria have different weights of influence at various stages of the 
investment process (Riding et aL, 1993; Mason and Rogers, 1996). 
Although this study did not investigate the evaluation criteria in the context 
of a time line, in fact a stage study can only be undertaken if the researcher is 
with the investor throughout an investment process. Getting such access is 
difficult and not possible on a large scale. Alternatively, a case study could 
be applied to capture the time line in the decision process but this approach is 
unobtainable in the informal risk capital market because of the lack of 
secondary data. On the other hand, a verbal protocol analysis can be 
conducted in the early stages of the investment process (as done by Mason 
and Rogers, 1996). However, such an approach is only practical in a small 
sample with easy access to the investors but is not possible in a large-scale 
quantitative questionnaire. As this study adopted the large-scale 
questionnaire, it concentrated on an overall evaluation of the factors 
influencing the decision to invest. It employs the same technique used by 
two of the most cited UK criteria articles in the literature - Macmillan et aL, 
1985 and 1987. This technique was also employed in a recent and most 
extensive study about informal investors in the UK (Osnabrugge, 1998). 
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8.2.1 Evaluation methods 
This section investigates the amount of research an investor undertakes 
to evaluate the entrepreneur, product, financial projection and market of the 
investee firm. The result should provide a good indication of how much 
diligence is shown by investors. The results show that investors rely on 
themselves to reach a decision to invest or not. However, while intuition is 
very important, they also follow a systematic approach Table 8.13 The 
definition of the systematic approach that is employed by investors is mainly 
concern about using scientific approaches to evaluate a proposal such as 
market research or financial projections. Many questions could be raised 
here about the kinds of approaches applied to reach 'Yes/No' answers about 
projects that required funds. The limited interviews available to this study 
about Saudi informal investors suggested the importance of formal and 
informal networks available to the investors to gather new information and 
evaluate the data provided by entrepreneurs. Indeed, the over-optimistic 
presentation of the entrepreneur's projections often troubles informal 
investors. Surprisingly, Table 8.13 shows little support to a link between 
investors' formal or informal networks. But the values of standard 
deviations may suggest that more results could be obtained from this data. 
Therefore, cluster analysis was employed to look for different clusters in the 
sample of the study. 
Table 8.13 
Friedman Test to Rank the Importance of Evaluation 
Methods 
Evaluation Methods -,,, , ý,, ,,, ýý i-, ý,,, Mean, ý: , Ranks 
Arith. ý 
Mean 
Std. 
De'v 
Non-nally rely on own evaluation and intuition 4.25 4.38 . 81 1 follow a systematic approach when evaluating 
an opportunity 
3-49 --5-. 7-3 1.13 
Normally rely on advice from a consultation agency -2.5 -5 -T 8 -8 1.47 
Normally rely on friends' advice 2.49 --f -92 1.26 
Normally rely on associate advice 2.23 2.65 1.07 
I UbL OLdUbLlUb 
N 153 
Chi-Square 205.23_ 
Df 4 
Asymp. Sig. . 000 
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The literature states that infonnal investors are not sophisticated 
investors. They rely more on 'gut feel' to make an investment decision and 
consult close referees. Mason and Harrison (1995) found in a UK study that 
informal investors "act independently, confident in their own ability to make 
good decisions, place considerable emphasis on the need to understand the 
investee business and r6ly more on instincts and character than on research" 
(p. 36). This is also supported by Osnabrugge's extensive study (1998) of 
infon-nal investors in the UK. Osnabrugge stated that only 15 per cent of 
business angels (informal investors) conducted extensive research and only 
30 per cent of them claimed to have estimated return percentages, while the 
majority had not, and were unable to give return estimates. The informal 
investors in the UK (Osnabrugge, 1998) rationalised their emphasis on gut 
feel by stating that it is based on many years of experience in, and empathy 
with, the entrepreneurial field. Similarly in the US, studies have shown that 
business angels rarely rely on professional advisors for research, electing to 
rely on trust in a few close referees instead (Haar et aL, 1998; Freer and 
Wetzel, 1991). Landstr6m (1993) found that Swedish informal investors 
conducted serious independent evaluations. 
8.2.1.1 Cluster analysis 
The presentation of results in Table 8.13 indicates some variation in 
the actual use of the evaluation methods which support the use of other 
statistical methods to investigate if different groups exist among the informal 
investors. 
Table 8.14 shows that there is a noticeable change in the percentage 
change in the co-efficient when moving from three clusters to two. This 
suggests that there are two groups in the data (Haar et aL, 1998; Norusis, 
1994). 
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Ta 1) 1e8.14 
Cluster Aijah'sis Proximitv Values 
Number- 
of' 
Clusters 
-('ocf'Iicleiits Change Percentage Change in-- 
('oetficiciit to Nexi Level 
9 215.5 22.5 10.5 
8 238.3 36.7 15.0 
7 275.0 39 14.0 
6 314.0 61.5 19.5 
5 375.5 65.5 17.5 
4 441.0 87.5 19.8 
3 528.5 141.5 26.5 
2 670.0 349.2 52.0 
1 1019.2 - - 
Table 8.15 
Mcan Ratings and Significance Levels foi-'I'NN, o Cluster Solution 
Using the evaluation methods variables) 
Clusters 
12 
Variables InfOrnial Formal 1, Sig. 
Approach Approach 
- - - I -Nomially rely on own 4.37 
43 7 
-6)(T2 
----- 
. 962 
cvalUation and IrItUitIO11 I 
2-Normally rely on friends' 3.84 2.31 85.257 . 
000 
advice I 
3-Normally rely on 3.00 2.44 1 . 
001 
associate advice 
4-NormallY rely on advice 1.53 3.75 182.641 - 
000 
fi-om a consultation 
agency 
5-1 f'ollow a systcmatic 2.84 4.31 104.002 . 
000 
approach \N'lien 
evalUating an opporturlity 
Size Of ClUster 57 
Table 8.15 exhibits tile essential infol-Illation I-clatill", to tile interpretation of' 
the two. clustcr solution This We conwins the results of an analyMs of' 
vaHancc on the iscan squares (between groups) and incILI(jes details of tile 
nican valLICS, Unvariate F ratios, and tile level of S'o l'i-c t- 'ated I'l IIa 1011 ilss()Cl 
flic differences betwecii i, 'I'OLII) Illeans. '1111C I)I'CSCIIIS ýI SM'111ASIMý I'C. SIlIt: 
-11C 11 
tjlC tWO CILIStCl'S are not si-, gililicillltlý' (III'lerent oil 111C (ICI)CII(ICIlce Oil theii- 
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own evaluation and intuition but they form two different groups on the 
referees' advice. 
Cluster I clearly shows that investors in this cluster are taking an 
informal route in their search for advice. They normally contact friends and 
associates to collect information about different criteria related to the 
underline projects. 
Cluster 2 presents investors who follow a systematic approach to reach 
a decision. These investors handled the evaluation professionally through 
consultation agencies. In contrast to the literature on informal investors, the 
size of this cluster is larger than the first cluster. The literature, as 
previously indicated, shows that informal investors in the UK and the US 
normally rely on their own evaluation and informal referees such as friends 
(Mason et aL, 1995; Osnabrugge, 1998; Haar et aL, 1998; Freer et aL, 
1991). The departure from this in the context of Saudi Arabia clearly 
indicates the differences in the economic development stages that these 
countries are experiencing. As discussed in the descriptive chapter (Chapter 
7), Saudi informal investors invest larger sums of capital in the firms that 
they participate in themselves than their international counterparts. 
Therefore, it is fair to assume that a larger number of Saudi investors will 
follow a professional approach to reach a decision to invest or not. 
Having successfully generated and interpreted a two-cluster solution, it 
is important that these clusters are validated to ensure that they are stable and 
generalisable. The process of validation and profiling are critical owing the 
exploratory and often atheoretical basis for cluster analysis (Haar et aL, 
1998). 
As explained in section 8.1 an important method to ensure the validity, 
is to split the data into halves and analyse each half separately. Table 8.16 
shows the results of the application of this method and the practical 
significance is examined. 
226 
Table 8.16 
Comparison of Group Means and Significance Levels 
for the Three-Cluster Solution from Splitting Data into Halves 
Clusters 
1 
Variables 1 st , 2 nq_ JSt 2nd 11 st 1 st 2nd 2nd 
F Sig. F Sig. 
Normally rely on own 4.26 4.47 4.37 4.38 . 322 . 572 . 242 . 624 
evaluation and intuition 
Normally rely on' friends' 3.93 3.77 2.29 2.33 45.671 . 000 38.936 . 000 
advice I 
Normally rely on associate 3.00 3.00 2.44 2.44 4.651 . 034 5.856 . 018 
advice 
I 
Normally rely on advice 1.56 1.50 3.71 3.79 74.393 . 000 109.299 . 000 from a consultation agency I I follow a systematic 2.89 2.80 4.29 4.33 39.663 . 000 66.687 . 000 
approach when evaluating 
an opportunity 
An inspection of the data indicates that the variable means of the two 
samples for each of the two clusters are, indeed, in the same direction. Also, 
ANOVA analysis was conducted. The results of this, which are also 
presented in Table 8.16, indicate that the variable means for each half of the 
data are significantly different for each cluster except the first variable. This 
provides further evidence that there are two clusters and that they are 
separatable. 
8.2.1.2 Investigation of the two clusters' background 
Comparing the means of the two clusters indicates that the informal 
approach cluster is less educated, younger, less experienced, receives less 
income 
Table 8.17 
The Two Clusters Background 
Informal FormTl r -F Sig. 
Education 4.28 4.59 
- 
2 
. 222 Age 2.67 
- 
ý 
-06 - 
-iý-089 
. 015 Experience 
_2.56 
f -61 -23-2 
- 
-. 631 
Income 1 3.56 3 69- '3 *0 0 335-1 . . 564 
kWealth 
1 4.50 
--" 
ý L4 6ý 3 2 .01 . 632 
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and is less wealthy. However, the results failed to provide significant 
differences between the two clusters; only age was significantly different 
where the formal approach group seemed to be older Table 8.17 
8.2.2 Overall ranking of investment criteria 
Asymmetric information that existed in the risk capital market will 
affect the ability of investors to distinguish good quality ventures and 
entrepreneurs. Moral hazard prevents direct infon-nation transfer. Under 
these assumptions, adverse selection may exist. The owners of low quality 
projects will foist these upon an unformed market. Investors, on the other 
hand, will assign average project and entrepreneur value. This will drive out 
the good quality projects or entrepreneurs from the market, leading either to 
bad proposals or that the market may fail to exist, much as Akerlof s (1970) 
market for used cars will result in only'lemons' for sale. 
In order to prevent investment in a low quality venture or entrepreneur, 
investors direct their sources to gather information about the deal - 
"examples of specific information for venture capitalists are: assessment of 
the character and integrity of the entrepreneur, market studies to evaluate the 
potential for a new product" (Fiet, 1991, p. 18). To perform this evaluation, 
investors use specific criteria to reduce risks that are associated with 
investing in growing, unequated ventures. Therefore, the ranking of these 
criteria should reflect the risks that investors fear from involvement in risk 
capital financing. Also, the ranking of these criteria will give insights into 
the importance of each criterion to reduce the risks that are associated with it. 
8.2.2.1 Ranking of all criteria 
Table 8.18 presents an overall ranking of criteria that evaluate different 
aspects of the deal, entrepreneur, product, market, financial issues and other 
attributes of the business. Also, the table demonstrates the heterogeneity 
within the whole group of informal investors. The standard deviation scores 
explain the agreement between investors on the ranking of a specific criteria. 
it is clear that, overall, the entrepreneur is the criterion that most attracted 
informal investors to the investment opportunities that were actually funded. 
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Five of the first ten criteria have to do with the entrepreneurs. Investors will 
not back ventures unless the entrepreneur has a good track record as a 
founder of previous ventures, has established a trustworthiness reputation, 
evaluates well and reacts to risk , is familiar with the venture's market and is 
capable of sustained effort. The second criterion is the product's market, and 
thus concern with financial factors. Although most past studies about 
inforinal investors have not used such detailed criteria for each criteria group, 
they do support the overall relative importance of the different groups 
identified in this study (Mason et aL, 1995; Mason et aL, 1996; Stevenson 
et aL, 1994). 
However, Osnabrugge's (1998) study of UK informal investors clearly 
supports the results in this study where the entrepreneur fundamentally 
determines whether the investor will place a fund or not. This is clearly 
noted by Macmillan et aL (1985), 
"There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse 
race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) 
who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place 
a bet at all" (p. 119). 
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Table 8.18 
Overall Ranking of all Criteria 
Variables 
iL 
N Mean Std. ', 
Dev 
Entrepreneur has a good track record 
as a founder of previous ventures 
156 4.71 0.53 
Product stimulate existing market 156 1 4.56 0.82 
Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 156 4.48 0.77 
Entrepreneur is familiar with the market 154 4.42 0.66 
Market has high growth rate 153 4.35 0.65 
Appropriate return 156 4.35 0.65 
Entrepreneur evaluates risk well 155 1 4.29 0.63 
Entrepreneur capable of sustain effort 156 4.08 0.76 
A well-established distribution channels 156 4.04 0.90 
Amount of Finance Sought 156 4.00 1 1.00 
Investor is familiar with the industry 156 3.83 1.00 
Entrepreneur provided some Equity 156 3.81 1.06 
Entrepreneur was recommended to the 
investor by a trustworthy source 
156 3.79 0. '84 
Low threat of early competition 156 3.71 0.97 
Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate when 
discussing venture 
156 3.55 0.98 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as an 
employee in other companies 
156 3.54 0.97 
investment could be easily made liquid 156 3.37 1.13 
Geographical Area of the project 156 3.31 1. i4 
Industrial Sector of the project 156 3.31 1.09 
Protection of product 156 3.17 1.21 
Entrepreneur has a family or friendship link 
with the investor 
156 2.38 1.29 
Government is a customer for the product 156 2.29 1.14 
Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social 
class or family name 
156 2.21 1.17 
Entrepreneur's father is a successful 
businessman 
156 1.83 1.02 
The differences between means are statistically significant in the 5% level 
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8.2.2.2. Comparison of particular investment criteria between 
investor groups 
The previous ranking evaluated informal investors as a single group 
and the standard deviation explained the heterogeneity within the group. In 
this section, it is intended to create sub-groups for informal investors and 
then to investigate the differences between these groups in the ranking of the 
evaluation criteria. 
Earlier in this chapter, two clusters were identified because of their use 
of evaluation methods. Informal and formal evaluation approaches are used 
by different groups among informal investors. Table 8.19 shows how these 
two clusters rank the different criteria related to the deal. 
The two clusters seem to rank criteria related to the entrepreneur 
similarly. None of the top entrepreneur criteria has generated statistical 
differences between the two groups. However, criteria relating to the 
product/market have generated significant differences on the potential of the 
market which is considered more important by the formal approach 
investors. Conversely, informal approach investors seem to operate locally 
with limited funds available. This result is very important for the 
development of regional entrepreneurial activities. 
in addition, other sub-groups were created among informal investors 
according to their personal background, education, age, experience, income 
and wealth, and then compared with each other on the ranking of the 
evaluation criteria However, the result did not produced any interesting 
differences, as presented in Appendix B. 2. 
To improve the understanding of the evaluation criteria, a detailed 
analysis of the criteria that relates to the entrepreneur and product/market 
will now be undertaken independently. 
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Table 8.19 
Comparison of Evaluation Criteria Among the Two Identifled Clusters 
Variables ýInfbrmal,, 
'approach" 
investors 
' Fornial, lý 'approach 
investors, 
T ýig. 
Product stimulates existing market 4.32 4.69 7.542 . 007 Market has high growth rate 4.17 4.50 10.240 . 002 Protection of product 2.95 3.38 4.809 . 030 Amount of finance sought 4.32 3.78 10.81ý . 001 Geographical Area of the project 3.63 3.19 5.987 . 016 Low threat of early competition 3.74 3.66 0.249 . 618 Appropriate return 4.47 4.31 2.385 . 125 Investor is familiar with the industry 3.74 3.88 . 671 . 414 Well-established distribution channels 3.89 4.16 3.077 . 081 Investment could be easily made liquid 3.53 3.34 1.001 . 319 Industrial Sector of the project 3.47 3.28 1.208 . 274 Government is a customer for the product 2.11 2.44 3.121 . 079 
Entrepreneur capable of sustained effort 4.26 3.97 5.446 . 021 Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social 
class or family name 
1.89 2.34 5.583 . 019 
Entrepreneur's father is a successful 
businessman 
1.63 1.97 3.982 . 048 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as an 
employee in other companies 
3.47 3.66 1.430 . 234 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as a 
founder of previous ventures 
4.79 4.69 1.334 . 250 
Entrepreneur is familiar with the market 4.32 4.49 2.42 . 122 Entrepreneur evaluates risk well 
- 
T32 4.25 0.354 
. 553 Entrepreneur has a family or friendship link 
with the investor - - 
2.42 2.3 _4 _T 1-2 5 . 724 
c ulate Entr, -preneur has an ability to aiTi 
when discussing venture 
3.63 3. Y2- --6-. 444 . 506 
Entr, -preneur was recommended to the 
investor by a trustworthy source 
3.89 3.72 1.538- . 217 
-Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 4.53 4.53 -. 00-2 . 966 Entrepreneur provided some equi ty 3.79 3.8.8 . 241 . 624 57 96 _T -7 
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8.2.2.3 Entrepreneur 
The most important investment criteria identified by the informal 
investors were the characteristics of the entrepreneur. In this section, 
analysis of the ranking of the criteria relating to the entrepreneur will be 
discussed. Factor analysis will be applied to provide more insight into the 
most important aspect (factor) of the entrepreneur as seen by informal 
investors. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis reads: 
Ho: Inforinal investors depend on specific criteria to prevent the selection 
of low quality entrepreneurs. However, they assign the same 
importance to different criteria related to the entrepreneur's 
characteristics. 
Table 8.20 indicates statistical significance for the ranking of the 
entrepreneur's criteria. This implies that the null hypothesis must be rejected. 
Clearly, Saudi informal investors assign different weights to different 
criteria. Due to the asymmetric information and then moral hazard 
information, the true quality of the entrepreneur will be hardly transferred. 
Therefore, to prevent the adverse selection problem, Saudi informal investors 
want to see a past success on the entrepreneur's record. This success has to be 
in entrepreneurial activities as a founder of a previous venture (criterion-1) 
not as an employee in other companies (criterion-8). Every entrepreneur 
may claim that he/she will be a successful one but investors may interpret 
this information differently, only a real success in the past will be an 
important motivation to support this entrepreneur which is clearly presented 
by the low standard deviation in criterion-1. Successful entrepreneurial 
experience will be highly respected if it is combined with by a positive 
reputation regarding the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur. The average 
rating of others as an information solurce about the entrepreneur may indicate 
that Saudi informal investors require close contact with the entrepreneur 
personally and do not depend on others to provide infon-nation. 
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Table 8.20 
Entrepreneur Criteria Ranking 
Variables Mean', Arithmetic St& Median 
............ Rank Mean Dev. - 
I -Entrepreneur has a good track record 9.68 4.71 . 53 5.00 
as a founder of previous ventures 
2-Trustworthiness/honesty of the 8.97 4.48 . 77 5.00 
entrepreneur I 
3-Entrepreneur is familiar with the 8.74 4.42 . 66 5.00 
market 
4-Entrepreneur evaluates risk well 8.30 4.29 . 63 4.00 
5-Entrepreneur capable of sustained 7.49 4.08 . 76 4.00 
effort I 
6-Entrepreneur was recommended to the 6.89 3.79 . 84 4.00 
investor by a trustworthy source 
7-Entrepreneur provided some equity 6.66 3.81 1.06 4.00 
8-Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate 6.02 3.55 . 98 4.00 
when discussing venture I 
9-Entrepreneur has a good track record as 5.89 3.54 . 97 4.00 
an employee in other companies 
1 O-Entrepreneur has a family or 3.71 2.38 1.29 2.00 
friendship link with the investor 
11 -Entrepreneur comes from acceptable 3.13 2.21 1.17 2.00 
social class or family name. I I I 
12-Entrepreneur's father is a successful 2.51 I 1.83 1.02 1.50 
businessman 
Test Statistics_ 
N 152 
Chi-Square 809.821 
Df 11 
Asymp. Sig. . 000 
However, although Table 8.20 presents variables individually, it was 
thought that if factor analysis was applied to it this would provide deeper 
insights into informal investors' ranking of entrepreneurs' criteria. The 
application of factor analysis will be discussed as follows: 
8.2.2.3 (a) Factor analysis (entrepreneur criteria) 
Criteria that were presented in Table 8.20 will be further analysed. 
According to Hair et aL (1998), "factor analysis is a generic name given to a 
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class of multivariate statistical methods whose primary purpose is to define 
the underlying structure in a data matrix" (p. 90). An important benefit of 
factor analysis is to summarise the data to drive underlying dimensions, 
therefore when interpreted and understood, it describes the data in a smaller 
number of concepts (factors) than the original individual variables (Hair et 
aL, 1998). However, the result of factor analysis does not show which 
factor is the most important but only surnmarises variables that are correlated 
with each other to form one factor. The combination between the ranking 
table Table 8.2o and the factor analysis result will give more insight into the 
most important aspect of the entrepreneur that investors consider in their 
decision. 
Table 8.21 
Correlation Matrix 
2 3 4 5 6 7' ,, '8' 9 12 
1.00 . 38 -. 
01 -. 04 -. 05 -. 106 . 08 . 20 . 06 . 11 . 24 . 46 
2' , . 38 
1.00 . 12 . 10 -. 04 . 
014 -. 03 . 20 . 08 . 10 . 17 . 47 
3 -. 01 . 12 
1.00 . 70 . 40 -. 
038 . 27 . 07 . 11 . 11 . 19 . 14 
4 -. 04 . 10 . 
70 1.00 . 47 -. 
043 . 28 . 09 . 17 . 18 . 06 . 03 
5 -. 05 -. 04 . 40 . 
47 1.00 -. 136 . 29 . 08 -. 02 -. 02 -. 05 . 05 
6 
, -. 
10 . 
01 -. 03 -. 04 -. 13 1.000 -. 04 . 22 . 37 . 25 . 05 -. 05 
ý7 . 08 -. 
03 . 27 . 28 . 
29 . 045 1.00 . 29 . 05 . 05 . 14 . 18 
8 . 20 . 
20 . 07 . 09 . 08 . 
22 . 29 1.00 . 12 . 41 . 10 . 31 , 9 . 06 . 
08 . 11 . 17 -. 028 . 37 -. 
05 . 12 1.00 . 41 . 02 . 05 
iO A . 11 . 
10 . 11 . 18 -. 020 . 25 . 
05 . 41 . 41 1.00 . 04 . 12 
1 . 24 . 
17 . 19 . 06 -. 050 . 05 . 
14 . 10 . 02 . 04 1.00 . 40 
12 1 . 46 . 
47 . 14 . 03 . 053 -. 05 . 
18 . 31 . 05 . 12 . 40 1.00 
Vqriables: 
1- Entrepreneur has a good track record as an employee in other 
companies 
2- Entrepreneur has a good track record as a founder of previous 
ventures 
3- Entrepreneur is familiar with the market 
4- Entrepreneur evaluates risk well 
5- Entrepreneur capable of sustained effort 
7-- Entrepreneur has a tamily or friendship link with the investor 
Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate when discussing venture 
Tn-trepreneur was recommended to the investor by a trustworthy 
source 
9- Entrepreneur's father is a successful businessman 
f -0 -- Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social class or family name 
11- Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 
12- ' ffn--trepreneur provided some Equity 
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The first step in factor analysis is to check the suitability of the data for 
factor analysis. Firstly, a visual examination of the correlations of each 
variable should correlate well with at least one of the other variables in the 
set. Secondly, the measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) should exceed the 
acceptable range (under 50). Finally, the Bartlett test must show that non- 
zero correlations exist at the significance level of . 0001, which rejects the 
null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix (Hair et aL, 
1998). Tables 8.21 and 8.22 present the results of these statistical tests 
which support the use of factor analysis. 
Table 8.22 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. (KMO) 
. 656 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi- 
Square 
436.461 
df 66 
Sigs 
. 000 
The second step is the determination of the suitable number of factors to 
beextracted. According to Hair et aL (1998), 
"the most commonly used technique is the latent root 
criterion. This technique is simple to apply to either 
components analysis or common factor analysis, which were 
used in this study. The rationale for the latent root criterion 
is that any individual factor should account for the variance 
of at least a single variable if it is to be retained for 
interpretation. Each variable contributes a value of I to the 
total eigenvalue. Thus, only the factors having latent roots 
or eigenvalue greater than 1 are considered significant. " 
(p. 103) 
However, to reach the most appropriate number of factors that explain 
the theoretical dimensions in the variables analysed requires trial runs 
extracting various numbers of factors until the best presentation is selected. 
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Thus, several factor solutions with differing numbers of factors are examined 
before the structure is well defined. 
Table 8.23 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Ei gen alue,,,,,,, 'z- V, 'I', 
Extraction Factors,, ' I I 
Factors Total Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 2.717 22.640 2.717 22.640 22.640 
2 2.039 39.634 2.039 16.994 39.634 
3 1.730 54.052 1.730 14.419 54.052 
4 1.087 63.114 
5 . 943 
70.973 
6 . 719 76.963 
7 . 652 
1 82.396 
8 . 571 
87.152 
9 . 495 
91.278 
10 . 404 
94.643 
11 . 379 97.801 
12 . 264 100.000 
Extraction Mettiod: Frincipai L; omponent Anaiysis. 
Table 8.23 shows that four factors have an eigenvalue of more than 
one which will explain 63.11 per cent of the total variance. However, it is 
observed that the eigenvalue of the fourth factor is very close to 1, which 
signifies the possibility that only one variable may come under that factor, 
and perhaps is better excluded. It was also believed that three factors are 
more suitable to explain the underlying variables. The first factor extracted, 
factor 1, has an eigenvalue of 2.717, which accounts for 22.640 of the total 
variance. 16.994 per cent of the total variance will be explained by the 
second factor. Therefore, the three factors that were selected will explain 
54.0528 per cent of the total variance. 
Table 8.24 presents the communalities of each variable in the initial 
stage if twelve factors have been extracted and after extraction when only 
three factors have been extracted. The communalities for each variable 
measure the amount of variance in a variable that is accounted for by the 
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three factors taken together. The size of the communality is a useful index 
for assessing how much variance in a particular variable is accounted for by 
the factor solution (Hair et A, 1998). 
Table 8.24 
communalities 
,x ý-, , ,,, "I Variables', -, ' Initial ý, Extraction 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as an employee in 
other companies 
1.000 
. 564 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as a founder of 
previous ventures 
1.000 
. 459 
Entrepreneur is familiar with the market 1.000 . 685 Entrepreneur evaluates risk well 1.000 . 747 Entrepreneur capable of sustained effort 1.000 . 565 Entrepreneur has a family or friendship link with the 
investor 
1.000 
. 545 
Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate when discussing 
venture 
1.000 
. 334 
Entrepreneur was recommended to the investor by a 
trustworthy source 
1.000 
. 426 
Entrepreneur's father is a successful businessman 1.000 -. 557 
Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social class or 
family name 
1.000 
. 588 
Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 1.000 . 312 Entrepreneur provided some equity 1.000 . 706 t: XlFa(; LIUII IVIULIIUU. rimuipai uumpurient/Anaiysis. 
Finally, the objective of this procedure is to group together the 
variables having large loadings (correlations) with one of the three factor 
solutions. This is done by using one of the two methods available for 
rotation of factors, orthogonal and oblique rotation. The former ensures that 
the factors produced will be unrelated to each other. The latter method 
produces factors which are correlated. However, no specific rules have been 
developed to guide the researcher in selecting a Particular orthogonal or 
oblique rotational technique. In this study, the VARIMAX orthogonal 
method was used because it has proved very successful as an analytical 
approach to obtaining an orthogonal rotation of factors (Hair et aL, 1998), 
and it has been a popular method in most business research. 
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Table 8.25 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Variables Skills 'Reputation Origin 
I. -Entrepreneur is familiar with the market . 819 2-Entrepreneur evaluates risk well . 849 3-Entrepreneur capable of sustained effort . 739 
4-Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate 
when discussing venture 
. 540 
5-Entrepreneur has a good track record as 
an employee in other companies 
. 746 
6-Entrepreneur has a good track record as 
a founder of previous ventures 
. 671 
7-Entrepreneur was recommended to the 
investor by a trustworthy source 
. 410 
8-Trustworthiness/honesty of the 
entrepreneur 
. 549 
9-Entrepreneur provided some equity . 834 
1 O-Entrepreneur has a family or friendship 
link with the investor 
. 713 
11 -Entrepreneur's father is a successful 
businessman . 
745 
12-Entrepreneur comes from acceptable 
social class or family name 
. 746 
Eigenvalue 2.717 2.039 1.730 
% of Variance 22.640 16.994 14.419 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: 
Varimax. 
Table 8.25 presents a satisfactory solution. The cut-off point for 
interpretation purposes is ±. 40, therefore any variables loading less than this 
will be deleted. Each factor loading is the correlation co-efficient which 
shows how much weight is assigned to that factor. The researcher should 
then look for the variables that are listed under each factor to define a general 
label for that factor. The question here is what these variables have in 
common. The variables that are listed under factor I are all measuring the 
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skills of the entrepreneur, therefore the researcher assigned skills labels for 
the first factor and so on. 
I 
Hence, based on the clustering of the variables as shown in Table 
7.2.13, the three factors that have influenced investors when assessing the 
quality of the entrepreneur can be identified as follows: 
1. Factor I: Skills 
2. Factor 2: Reputation 
Factor 3: Origins 
The ranking table (Table 8.20) is reproduced in Table 8.26 to give further 
insights into what factors are more important when choosing an entrepreneur. 
Table 8.26 
Rank Factors Importance 
Variables -,, -, ý,,,, ,I , 
Mean Rank Factor 
, 1 -Entrepreneur has a good track record as a founder 
of previous ventures 
9.68 Reputation 
2-Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 8.97 Reputation 
3-Entrepreneur is familiar with the market Skills 
4-Entrepreneur evaluates risk well 8.30 Skills 
5-Entrepreneur capable of sustained effort 7.49 Skills 
6-Entrepreneur was recommended to the investor by 
a trustworthy source 
6.89 Reputation 
7-Entrepreneur provided some equity 6.66 Reputation 
8-Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate when 
discussing venture 
6.02 Skills 
8-Entrepreneur has a good track record as an 
employee in other companies 
5.89 Reputation 
9-Entrepreneur has a family or friendship link with 
the investor 
3.71 Origins 
10-Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social class 
or family name I 
3.13 Origins 
I 
1-1 -Entrepreneur's father is a successful businessman 1 2.51 Origins 
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A better picture can be seen in Table 8.26. The reputation of the 
entrepreneur is ranked as the first criterion. Investors are highly motivated 
by a real previous success. This was well documented in the few interviews 
that were performed at an earlier stage of this study. According to these 
investors, the entrepreneur will find it much easier to raise funds if he/she has 
a good reputation from a previous venture. This clearly shows how serious 
informal investors are about controlling agency problems. Adverse 
selection is one of the two primary agency problems. It refers to the 
misrepresentation by the entrepreneur as to his/her abilities. The 
entrepreneur may falsify claims to have certain skills when he/she is hired. 
By ranking previous success as a founder of a previous venture first in Table 
8.26 and previous success as an employee in other companies at eight, it can 
be argued that investors are trying to reduce adverse selection risks about 
entrepreneur skills. 
The other aspect of the reputation factor is the trustworthiness/honesty 
of the entrepreneur. This also reflects the investor's fear of the second 
primary source of agency problems, moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs 
when the entrepreneur does not fulfil the effort originally agreed upon in the 
contract or the entrepreneur prevents the transfer of crucial inforniation to the 
investor. Petti and Singer (1985) claim that this problem may be more 
crucial in a smaller firm since the management team is usually dominated by 
one individual. 
The second factor that clearly ranked highly in the investor's decision 
was the skill of that the entrepreneur. Although the origins of the 
entrepreneur were ranked at the bottom on the table, this study anticipated 
that origins might be placed in a higher position, especially in a culture such 
as Saudi Arabia. Investors appear to be interested in the 
quality/trustworthiness of the entrepreneur regardless of his/her origins. 
However, ranking the references of the entrepreneur as number six may 
indicate that Saudi informal investors prefer to know the entrepreneur 
personally. Indeed, this is another mechanism to reduce asymmetric 
information but it may contribute highly to the inefficiency of the market 
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owing to the fact that investors will only know a limited number of 
entrepreneurs. 
8.2.2.3 (b) Controlling agency problems (principal-agent approach) 
As previously discussed in the analytical framework (Chapter 5), two 
approaches for controlling agency problems were reviewed. In this section, 
the first approach will be discussed because it is viewed as an ex ante 
mechanism to manage the risks associated with agency problems. 
The importance of the ex ante approach can best be explained and 
analysed after reviewing the literature about the ability of informal investors 
to control entrepreneurs in the post-investment stage. 
It is well documented that many formal venture capital firms in the UK 
and the US are not afraid to replace the entrepreneurial team if the venture is 
not performing up to expectations (Kanellos, 1996; Sweeting, 1991; 
Gorman and Sahlman, 1998; Macmillan et A, 1988). In fact, in his UK 
study, Hall (1988) found that 73 per cent of tile venture capitalists 
interviewed had replaced management where necessary, whilst in the US, 
Carter and Van Auken (1994) found that 28.86 per cent of venture capital 
investment had required a change of management. This degree of venture 
capital control over investments was further supported by another US study 
(Gorman and Sahiman, 1989), which states: 
"The venture capitalist, acting through the board of directors, 
typically gains the power to fire senior management in the 
initial negotiation. We asked venture capitalists how often 
they resorted to this final privilege. The answer is, 
'frequently'. The mean (in the statistical sense) venture 
capitalist has initiated the firing of three CEO/Presidcnts, or 
one CEO/President per 2.4 years of venture investing 
experience. " (P. 241) 
In contrast, informal investors replace management infrequently and, 
therefore, place greater emphasis on finding a competent entrepreneur in the 
initial appraisal of the investment (Mason et A, 1994). 
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Table 8.27 
Friedman Test to Rank 
Nariables MFan 
Rank 
I -Provide incentives for if certain goals achieved 3.67 
2-Investor participates in the board of directors 3.49 
3-Entrepreneur provides some of the capital 3.44 
4-No monitoring because I trust him 2.27 
5-No monitoring because we have the same 
interests 
2.13 
Table 8.27 shows that Saudi informal investors are still concerned 
about the behaviour of entrepreneurs even if they have found a trustworthy 
entrepreneur. This is clearly indicated by the high ranking of the monitoring 
methods and the low ranking of "not taking any monitoring actions". 
When dealing with the potential effects of agency problems, the 
informal investors limit divergences from their own interests by extensive 
evaluation to reduce the asymmetries of information between them and the 
entrepreneur. At this level of knowledge about the venture and the 
entrepreneur, Saudi informal investors write comprehensive contracts to 
influence the entrepreneur's behaviour. Unfortunately, this study does not 
provide a detailed analysis of the nature of contracts but it does provide 
insight into the mechanisms that are normally built into the contracts to 
control entrepreneurs' actions as presented in Table 8.27. 
These methods can either be behaviour- or outcome-bascd as applied 
by the principal agent approach (Sappington, 1991; Jensen and Mechling, 
1976). Indeed, Saudi informal investors apply this approach as follows: 
1. Outcome-based contracts 
A- Provide incentives if certain goals are achieved (Rank 1). 
B- Entrepreneur provides some of the capital (Rank 3). 
Both provide motives for entrepreneurs on outcomes (profitability). These 
methods of contracting shift some of the risks and uncertainty to the 
entrepreneur and so lead to a reduction in the cost of monitoring. 
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2. Behaviour-based contracts 
- Monitoring (Board of Directors) (Rank 2). 
One way of monitoring is to monitor/observe the behaviour of the 
entrepreneur to ensure that he/she is working to the best interest of both 
parties. 
However, Table 8.27 clearly indicates that Saudi informal investors 
prefer the outcome-based method over the behaviour-based. The cost of 
monitoring may be the main reason for this difference. Also, entrepreneurs' 
behaviour in small firms may not be easily observed. 
8.2.2.4 Product market and other attributes of the venture 
If the entrepreneur has been cited as the most important aspect, other 
aspects of the business were also ranked highly in the informal investor's 
decision. Table 8.18 showed that market issues are also a serious concern 
among the other attributes of the business. This section examines the 
ranking of criteria related to the business and its market. 
The null hypothesis reads: 
Ho: Informal investors depend on specific criteria to prevent the selection 
of low quality ventures. However, they assign the same importance to 
the different criteria related to the venture characteristics. 
Table 8.28 indicates a statistical significance for the ranking of market 
criteria. This implies that the null hypothesis must be rejected. Clearly, 
Saudi informal investors assign different weights to different criteria. Three 
out of the first four primary requirements for Saudi informal investors about 
the business are related to market considerations. The business under 
evaluation should stimulate the existing market with a good potential growth 
rate and well-established distribution channels. Secondly, investors are 
attracted by the appropriate return that the venture is promising. This is 
clearly supported by the financial rewards that investors are motivated by 
when providing risk capital as discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Table 8.28 
Friedman Test to Rank Criteria Related to 
Other Attributes of the Business 
Variables,,, - -4, 
Mean 
Ranlý 
Arith. 
Mean' 
St& 
Dev. 
Median 
I -Product stimulates existing market 9.20 4.56 0.82 5.00 
2-Market has high growth rate 8.59 4.35 0.65 4.00 
3-Appropriate return 8.40 4.35 0.65 4.00 
4-A well-established distribution channels 7.69 4.04 0.90 4.00 
5-Amount of finance sought 7.44 4.00 1.00 4.00 
6-Investor is familiar with the industry 6.73 3.83 1.00 4.00 
7-Low threat of early competition 6.25 3.71 0.97 4.00 
8-Investment could be easily made liquid 5.57 3.37 1.13 3.00 
9-Geographical Area of the project 5.14 3.31 1.14 3.00 
10- Industrial Sector of the project 5.11 3.31 1.09 3.00 
11 -Protection of product 4.96 3.17 1.21 3.00 
12-Government is a customer for the 
product I 
2.94 2.29 1.14 
I 
2.00 
On the other hand, the low ranking of the protection of the product and 
the fact that government is the main consumer of the product may be 
explained by the nature of the Saudi economy. High technology products 
which have a patent production are considered a minority among SMEs. 
The government's role as a big consumer in the economy decreased after the 
completion of the infrastructure of the country and the decrease in its 
expenditures since the late eighties. 
Most of the informal investor literature in the US and UK also supports 
these findings to a certain degree. Some studies found that infortnal 
investors prefer unique products (Osnabrugge, 1998; Mason et aL, 1996; 
Landstr6m, 1995) in a niche market (Drake, 1995), have little interest in the 
"proprietary nature of the product or service, or knowing the industry in 
which the venture will compete" (Haar et aL, 1988, p. 21), and that unlike 
formal venture capital firms, informal investors are "not interested in 
competitive insulation" (Haar et A, 1998, p-11), although the literature on 
informal investors supports the importance of the market growth potential 
(Osnabrugge, 1998; Mason et al., 199 1). 
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Summary 
This section has identified two clusters among Saudi informal 
investors according to their evaluation approaches: the informal approach, 
where investors evaluate proposals by reliance on their own evaluation but 
with support from informal networks such as friends and business associates; 
and the formal approach, where investors evaluate proposals by reliance on 
their own evaluation but with support from formal organisations such as 
consultation agencies. Few statistical differences existed between these two 
clusters on the overall evaluation criteria. 
Clearly, entrepreneur reputation was rccogniscd as the most important 
factor, followed by his/her skills. However, the origins of the entrepreneur 
seem not to affect informal decisions. On the other hand, market potential 
was ranked at the top of the other criteria which related to other attributes of 
the business. 
In addition to these results, Saudi informal investors responded to the 
risks associated with agency problems at the ex ante stage through some 
control mechanisms, first, a comprehensive evaluation of both entrepreneur 
and venture to reduce the asymmetric information that is associated with 
such a market; then, built-in contractual controls to motivate entrepreneur 
behaviour. These could be either output-based, such as incentives, which 
were preferred by Saudi informal investors, or behaviour-based to monitor 
entrepreneur actions, such as participating on the Board of Directors. 
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8.3 Post-Investment Behaviour 
In reality the problem regarding asymmetric information cannot be 
overcome, though time may help to clear up some of the unanswered 
questions about the entrepreneurs and the ventures. Investors may be unable 
to predict future events in order to write complete contracts that specify each 
party's obligations in all contingencies. So, investors are assumed to apply 
different methods in the ex-post stage to provide sufficient flexibility so that 
re-negotiation may be obtained. 
As was discussed in Chapter 5, three causes are found in the literature 
for the incompleteness of contracts. First, the transaction cost which argues 
that the costs of contracting for unlikely events may well outweigh the 
benefits. Secondly, the bounded rationality, which argues that agents either 
have only limited ability to evaluate elaborate contingencies or are not able 
to foresee unlikely contingencies. A third explanation for incomplete 
contracts is asymmetric information which argues that a person may refrain 
from including a certain clause in a contract in order to signal his/her type 
(Spier, 1992; Hart et all, 1987). 
With this theoretical background in mind, investors' behaviour is 
examined at the post-investment stage to investigate how investors control 
entrepreneur's behaviour and re-negotiate contracts when new information 
arises. In this section two methods of post-investment activities among 
Saudi informal investors will be analysed: 
1. Staging of finance. 
2. Involvement with the venture. 
8.3.1 Staging of Finance 
An important mechanism in post-investment relations between 
informal investors and are entrepreneur is staging of finance. According to 
Compers (1995): 
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1 
"the staging of capital infusions allows venture capitalists 
to gather information and monitor the progress of firms 
maintaining the option to periodically abandon projects. " 
(p. 1461). 
Sahlman (1990) notes that staged capital infusions are the most potent control 
mechanisms a venture capitalist can employ. Prospects for the firm are 
periodically re evaluated. The shorter the duration of an individual round of 
financing, the more frequently the venture capitalist monitors the 
entrepreneur's progress and the greater the need to gather information. 
Sahiman also notes in another paper that staging of finance will provide the 
strongest possible incentive for the entrepreneur to work at least as hard as 
was projected. If the project succeeds in the first round, the price of the share 
will be higher for the second round which will provide good motivation for the 
entrepreneur (Sahiman, 1988). This also may indicate that staging of finance 
will be an incentive for high quality entrepreneurs and projects to accept 
venture capital financing. This will reduce adverse selection problems that 
investors may face in the first round due to the difficulty of knowing the true 
quality of the entrepreneur and the venture. 
In this section, infonnal Saudi investors' behaviour about staging of 
finance will be discussed. 
8.3.1.1 Frequency of Staging of Finance 
Table 8.29 and Figure 8.5 present the frequency of staging of finance. 
Nearly 80 per cent are frequent users of staging. Only II per cent never 
practise staging. This clearly indicates that staging is a popular method 
among Saudi informal investors. 
In the literature in the UK, Mason et A (1995) also found that 21 per 
cent of informal investors staged initial investments whilst Coveney (1996) 
found that 55 per cent of his sample provided additional rounds of finance 
after the initial investment. This is also investigated by Osnabrugge's (1998) 
study which found that 21 per cent of informal investors staged their 
investments with more frequency in the earlier stages of a venture. 
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Unfortunately, 110 SLICII research has been condUcted on infornial investors in 
the US. 
Table 8.29 
'nie Use of Staging of Finance 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Total 
Frequency 18 12 81 45 156 
Pei-cent 11.5 7.7 51.9 2_8_. 8 100.0 
Valid Percent 11.5 7.7 51.9 28.8 100.0 
cumulative 
Percent 
11.5 19.2 71.2 100.0 
Mean 2.98 Std. Dev. . 91 Median 3 
In a scale from 1-4 and 4 bcing Often 
Figure 8.5 
The use of staging of finance 
( )t tE if I 
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8.3. L2 Motivations to Stage Finan ce 
It is important to discover why Saudi informal investors staged 
finance. Discussion with Saudi informal investors and the theoretical 
literature offer few reasons that motivate informal investors to staged 
finance. Saudi informal investors were asked to rank the importance of 
these reasons. 
The null hypothesis reads: 
Ho: Saudi informal investors apply equal importance to the different 
reasons to stage finance. 
Table 8.30 
Friedman Test to Rank the Importance of the Reasons 
that Driving Staging of Finance 
Reasons that driving staging of Importancej,,,, Arithmetic S. D 
finance Rank. T", Mean- 
Assess the quality of the 2.40 4.07 1.10 
venture 
Assess the quality of the 2.11 3.83 1.05 
entrepreneur 
Create an incentive and 1.49 3.18 1 --99 
reduce monitoring costs 
Test Statistics 
N 132 
Chi-Square 70.77 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. 
__ . 
000 
Table 8.30 indicates that Saudi informal investors stage finance mostly 
to assess the quality of the venture and then to assess the quality of the 
entrepreneur. Consequently, as the ranking of the reasons is statistically 
significant, the null hypothesis must be rejected (Sahlman, 1988): 
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"By staging the commitment of capital the venture capitalist gains the 
options to abandon and to revolve the project as new information 
arrives. These are extremely valuable options. " (p. 29) 
Uncertainty associated with venture quality criteria requires informal 
investors to look for mechanisms to reduce the risk of investing in a bad 
venture. The explanation for ranking the reason to assess the quality of the 
entrepreneur second may be due to the fact that investors are very serious 
about wanting to be sure about the quality of the entrepreneur before making 
any commitment to the deal. This view was very clear when discussing 
overall ranking of all criteria in the previous section. 
However, the results in Table 8.30 indicate some variation in the 
ranking of these reasons which may imply that different groups among 
informal investors can be identified. In the next section, the cluster analysis 
technique is used to see if more than one group could be created from the 
sample. 
8.3.1.3 Cluster Analysis 
To decide how many clusters are appropriate for the sample in hand, 
table 8.31 shows that there is a noticeable change in the percentage change in 
the co-efficient when moving from four to three clusters. This suggests that 
there are three groups in the data. 
Table 8.32 on the other hand, exhibits the essential information 
relating to the interpretation of the two-cluster solution. This table contains 
the results of an analysis of variance on the mean squares (between groups) 
and includes details of the mean values, unvariate F ratios, and the level of 
signification associated with the differences between group means. the table 
presents the three clusters that were drawn from the sample. It is noted that 
the mean values of each cluster are significantly different at the 0.001 level. 
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Table 8.31 
Cluster Analysis Proximity Values 
Number of 
Clusters 
Coefficients Change Percentage Change 
in Coefficient to Next 
Level 
9 to 8 66.664 9.573 14.4 
8 to 5 76.237 14.4 18.8 
7 to 6 90.602 27.9 23.6 
6 to 5 118.568 29.5 24.9 
5 to 4 148.052 30.7 20.7 
4 to 3 178.802 60.1 33.6 
3 to 2 238.899 72.0 30.2 
? to 1 310.909 126.75 40.7 
Table 8.32 
Mean Ratings and Significance Levels for Three-Cluster Solution 
(Using the three staging reasons variables) 
CLUSTERS 
23 
Staging Reasons MLIIti- Risk Agency Market F Sig. Group 
Variables IZcduction Risk Risk Mean 
Assess the quality of 4.21 3.00 2.43 92.53 . 
000 182 
the entrepreneur 
Assess the quality of 4.39 1.25 4.14 130.24 . 000 4.07 the venture 
Create an incentive and 3.42 3.00 2.14 22 9-. 1-6 . 000 
318 
reduce monitoring costs 
Size ofthc Chister No. 99 12 21 
Investors 75 9 16 
Response No. 132 Invcstors 
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Fý, , 
The finding that the three clusters are significantly different for all the 
variables, is very important as it confirms that three distinct clusters have 
been identified. 
Cluster 1 clearly shows that investors in this cluster are applying a multi-risk 
reduction reason. This group uses staged financing to assess the quality of 
the entrepreneur and the venture. At the same time they believe it will create 
an incentive to the entrepreneur to work harder which will reduce monitoring 
costs. This cluster dominates the sample, with 75 per cent of investors 
identified as members of this cluster. This clearly shows that most Saudi 
informal investors apply the staging finance mechanism in the post- 
investment stage because they believe that contracts in this area of finance 
are very difficult to be complete. So, staging finance will give them a better 
opportunity to re-negotiate when more information becomes available. 
Cluster 2 has medium mean rating only on reasons relating to agency risk. 
A small group of investors were identified as members of this cluster. 
However, the low rating among this group of assessing the quality of the 
venture raises an interesting question. The first explanation is that this 
group may be investing in a more established project where the quality of the 
venture is not in question. 
Cluster 3 has a high mean rating only on the assessment of the quality of the 
venture. Again, this cluster only consists of a small group of investors (16 
per cent). This group seems not to be concerned about the agency risk in the 
post-investment stage. 
Having successfully generated and interpreted a three-cluster solution, 
it is important that these clusters are validated to ensure that they are stable 
and generalisable. 
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Table 8.33 
Comparison of Group Means and Significance Levels 
for the Three-Cluster Solution from Splitting Data into Halves 
Variables 2nd, ist- 2nd, -1st 2nd, Ist-, "I 2nd '. Ist, - 2nd 
1 F,, ", ý 
Sig. -, F, ý Sig., 
quality of the 4.18 4.24 3.00 3.00 2.56 2.33 18.14 . 000 28.66 . 000 
entrepreneur 
quality of 4.35 4.44 1.25 1.25 4.22 4.08 74.62 - 000 49.68 . 000 
the 
venture 
an incentive 3.37 3.48 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.25 7.63 . 001 
12.08 . 000 
to reduce 
monitoring 
costs 
Size of the 49 50 8 4 9 12 
cluster 
No. 
Table 8.33 shows the results of the application of splitting the data into 
halves to ensure the validity of the cluster analysis.. An inspection of the data 
indicates that the variable means of the two samples for each of the two 
clusters are indeed in the same direction. Also, an ANOVA analysis was 
conducted. The results of this indicate that variable means for each half of 
the data are significantly different for each cluster. This provides further 
evidence that there are three clusters and that they are separated. 
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8.3.2 Involvement with the Venture 
The involvement of informal investors in the ventures that they funded 
are expected to provide two benefits to the contract. Firstly, informal 
investors' involvement plays an important role in devoting their management 
and technical experience to the venture. This creates the added value that is 
well known in such contracts. Secondly, informal investors' involvement 
with the venture creates a controlling and monitoring mechanism that helps 
informal investors to reduce the asymmetric information that exists in such 
relations. 
8.3.2.1 Ranking of Involvement Methods 
Table 8.34 presents the ranking of the actual use of the methods of 
Saudi informal investors' involvement in their investee firms. It clearly 
indicates that Saudi informal investors are rarely involved in daily 
operations and work on a full-time basis. Also, working on a part-time basis 
seems not to be practised regularly by informal investors. On the other hand, 
infonnal investors keep in contact with the investee finns through other 
involvement methods. They place more importance on involvement 
Table 8.34 
Friedman Test Two-Way ANOVA 
to Rank the Actual Use of Involvement Method 
Methods of involvement Frequent 
Use 
Rank 
Arithmetic 
Mean 
Consulting as needed 5.09 4.33 
Review periodic reports & general meeting 5.05 4.29 
Board of directors 4.24 3.50 
Work part time with the firm 2.54 2.06 
No Involvement 2.24 1.77 
Work full time with the firm 1.85 1.38 
bampie iou investors 
Test Statistics 
N 156 
Chi-Square 532.914 
Df 5 
Asymp. Sig. . 000 
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through consulting the venture as and when needed, monitoring periodic 
reports, and monitoring the firm from within the board of directors. While 
consultation involvement is very important to the positive role of venture 
capital financing, the data available to this study unfortunately lacked 
information on the length of time that these consultations would take, for 
example, how much time would be devoted or how many visits would be 
made to the firm. Also, investors may contact the firm to provide 
consultation but in reality this will give them more access the firm. So, 
consultation may be view as an important mechanism to gain more control 
and monitoring. 
The international informal investors' literature documents well the 
active, hands-on involvement of informal investors in their investee firms 
(Mason et al, 1992,1996,1991; Freer et al, 1990,1993,1991; Wetzel, 1983; 
Landstrom, 1993; Coveney, 1996; 0snabrugge, 1998). However, literature 
has shown informal investors to be active in the running of the business 
instead of in more strategic and passive role such as financial statements' 
monitoring and board of directors' involvement. This does not mean, 
however, that informal investors are involved in the daily operation. As 
0snabrugge (1998) stated: 
"It must be noted that although 'informal investors' are more actively in 
involved their venture capital firms, this does not imply that the 
majority are involved daily (i. e. full-time) in the running of the firm. 
Indeed, most 'internal investors' will oversee the actual operations, 
personally, on a frequent basis, rather than reviewing operations more 
from a balance sheet as the venture capital firms would. " (p. 33 1) 
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8.3.2.2 Comparisons of the Informal Investors' Background 
In order to obtain further insights into informal investors' involvement 
in their investee firms, differences in the length of involvement of investors 
and how far this was due to differences in their backgrounds, was studied. 
Table 8.37 presents comparisons between the investors' past 
experience and their degree of involvement. It indicates that investors who 
have more entrepreneurial experience (created two or more businesses) are 
more involved in the firms that they fund. The differences are statistically 
significant which clearly supports the view presented above. Only financial 
statement monitoring seems not to be different among the various groups of 
investors. 
On the other hand, other backgrounds, such as age, do not provide any 
statistically significant differences among informal investors. the results are 
presented in Appendix B. 3 
Table 8.35 
Past Experience and Involvement with the Venture 
Past experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 Group 
Size 
Never created a business 2.20 4.40 3.60 3.40 1.60 1.40 15 
Created "o'n-e 1'97, " ""1-4.23 "", ""'4.32"'-2.55 7-1 1.297- 1103 ---31 
Business,, " 
Created two or more 1.68 4.29 4.46 --3'-'8-6" ' '2"2ý'7-" 'f49 "" 166 
businesses 
Sig. . 07 . 809 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 007 - 
1- No Involvement 
2-Review periodic reports & general meeting 
3- Consulting as needed 
4- Board of directors 
5- Work part time with the firm 
6- Work full-time with the firm 
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Summary 
This section has identified two methods that are practised in the post- 
investment stage by Saudi informal investors. Staged finance and 
involvement in the investee firms are seen to provide an important 
mechanism to reduce the asymmetric information that is clearly associated 
with this kind of finance and also to support the added value that investors 
may provide to the investee firm. 
Providing capital to the venture through the staging method is 
considered by most informal investors as an important approach to reduce 
asymmetric information surrounding the entrepreneur and the venture 
quality. Also, it creates an incentive for the entrepreneur to work harder. This 
will lead to a better re-evaluation in the second stage financing which will be 
appreciated by the entrepreneur. 
Involvement of investors in the operations of the venture is also 
practised widely among Saudi informal investors. However, involvement 
does not mean that investors arc involved in the daily running of the 
business. Instead, they monitor the business through consultation and 
participation in the board of directors. 
This section concludes that Saudi informal investors are more involved 
in those monitoring activities which do not require active hands-on 
involvement. With low active involvement, the study supports that Saudi 
infort-nal investors manage agency problems by monitoring more ex ante, 
rather than ex post. However, there is a limitation to this conclusion due to 
the limited data to the variable " consultation as needed". This variable lacks 
the length that this consultation takes. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion & Implications 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters discussed data analyses intended to answer 
I 
the research questions. In this final chapter, the results and the underlying 
theory are summarized, then findings are discussed in terms of their 
implications for researchers and practitioners in the field of risk capital 
financing. The chapter concludes by identifying possible limitations and 
outlining avenues of future inquiry within this area. 
9.1 Summary and findings of the research 
With the economic importance of small firms rising, more attention is 
focused on entrepreneurial firms. However, due to their inherently uncertain 
and high risk nature, these firms often have difficulty securing financial 
backing from institutional investors and this often constrains their growth 
and economic potential. Fortunately, informal investors appear to close some 
of this gap by providing funds to these firins. Previous studies in Saudi 
Arabia confinned that infori-nal sources are the most important source of 
funds after the entrepreneur's own capital. However, with all the problems 
that are associated with reaching such investors, these studies bravely take up 
the challenge in a developing country where data in a subject such as this is 
difficult to obtain. It is believed that reaching these informal investors and 
providing a descriptive picture of their characteristics and decision-making 
should contribute pioneering work in an emerging field of research. This is 
expected to encourage other researchers in this field. 
This study seeks to increase knowledge of the investment practices of 
those investors in Saudi Arabia by answering the following two questions: 
I- What are the characteristics and investment activities of informal 
investors in Saudi Arabia? 
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2- How do infornial investors make their investment decisions during: 
- Deal origination, 
- Evaluation, 
- Post-investment. 
To investigate empirically these questions, data was collected by conducting 
a thorough literature survey, a mass mail questionnaire, and a statistical 
analysis of data. 
The main findings of this study can be reviewed in the following sections: 
9.1.1 The characteristics and investment activities of informal 
investors in Saudi Arabia 
Informal investors are a significant source of risk capital for small and 
medium-sized businesses in Saudi Arabia, and for both new and established 
firms in an economy with limited institutional financing. 
Informal investors, as explained by the sample in the current study, are 
generally well educated, wealthy, and of an average age of 44. They invest in 
finns at all stages but prefer the start-up stage. The size of their investments 
varies, with an average of nearly E300,000, which is considered to be 
relatively high when compared to the literature findings. Financial reward is 
the main motive for investing which is expected to be received in a dividend 
format. 
However, while the focus of the current study is on the decision- 
making behaviour of informal investors, the descriptive analysis of the 
profile and investment activities of the informal investors are very important 
in understanding the decision-making behaviour in its context. As mentioned 
before, the informal investors' population constitutes of a very heterogeneous 
group of investors. Following researchers will be able to compare and deduce 
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the effect of the investors' profile on their decision behaviour. The decision- 
making behaviour, if examined alongside the investors' background, will 
contribute to academics' understanding about the existence of segments in 
the market. It will also help entrepreneurs in their search for the right 
investor for their venture. 
9.1.2 Decision-Making Behaviour 
9.1.2 (a) Deal origination 
Saudi informal investors face poorly defined environments within 
which to locate investment deals. Testing the hypothesis about information 
sources indicates that investors rely on their active personal search for deals 
more than any other sources. This may introduce high search costs compared 
to network sources. Thus, informal investors are not satisfied with the 
information channels that are available to them. This results in a failure to 
utilise the funds that supply this market. 
However, while the low efficiency of infonnation transfer in the 
informal risk capital market is a very strong constraint to its growth, the low 
efficiency that characterises the market cannot be linked to the information 
problem alone. It is clear from the discussion in this section that there are 
other important constraints which jeopardise its efficiency and growth. In 
addition, co-investing, which is thought to improve the networking of 
information sources because of the new connections that are created, has 
very little effect on the informal investors' decision to co-invest. 
9.1.2 (b) Evaluation 
This section has identified two clusters among Saudi informal 
investors according to their evaluation approaches: the informal approach, 
where investors evaluate proposals by reliance on their own evaluation but 
with support from informal networks such as friends and business associates; 
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and the formal approach, where investors evaluate proposals by reliance on 
their own evaluation but with support from formal organisations such as 
consultation agencies. Few statistical differences existed between these two 
clusters on the overall evaluation criteria. 
Clearly, entrepreneur reputation was recognised as the most important 
factor, followed by his/her skills. However, the origins of the entrepreneur 
seem not to affect informal decisions. On the other hand, market potential 
was ranked at the top of the other criteria, which related to other attributes of 
the business. 
In addition to these results, Saudi informal investors responded to the 
risks associated with agency problems at the ex ante stage through some 
control mechanisms, first, a comprehensive evaluation of both entrepreneur 
and venture to reduce the asymmetric information that is associated with 
such a market; then, built-in contractual controls to motivate entrepreneur 
behaviour. These could be either output-based, such as incentives, which 
were preferred by Saudi informal investors, or behaviour-based to monitor 
entrepreneur actions, such as participating on the board of directors. 
9.1.2 (c) Post-investment 
This section has identified two methods that are practised in the post- 
investment stage by Saudi informal investors. Staged finance and 
involvement in the investee firms are seen to provide an important 
mechanism to reduce the asymmetric information that is clearly associated 
with this kind of finance and also to support the added value that investors 
may provide to the investee firm. 
Providing capital to the venture through the staging method is 
considered by most informal investors as an important approach to reduce 
asymmetric information surrounding the entrepreneur and the venture 
quality. Also, it creates an incentive for the entrepreneur to work harder. This 
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will lead to a better re-evaluation in the second stage financing which the 
entrepreneur will appreciate. 
Involvement of investors in the operations of the venture is also 
practised widely among Saudi infon-nal investors. However, involvement 
does not mean that investors are involved in the daily running of the 
business. Instead, they monitor the business through consultation and 
participation in the board of directors. 
This study concludes that Saudi informal investors are more involved 
in those monitoring activities which do not require active hands-on 
involvement. With low active involvement, the study supports the view that 
Saudi informal investors manage agency problems by monitoring more ex 
ante, rather than ex post. However, there is a limitation to this conclusion due 
to the limited data to the variable " consultation as needed". This variable 
lacks the length that this consultation takes. 
This is in contrast to the findings of previous research in the UK 
(Osnabrugge, 1998), who concluded that Venture Capital Firms are 
monitoring more ex ante but not informal investors who monitor ex post. 
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9.2 Implication of the Research 
Since this research study was guided by the need to improve our 
understanding of the procedures that informal investors utilise when 
investing in SMEs, clearly the aim was to produce empirical data which 
might have some practical relevance for the field of risk capital financing. 
This section, therefore, reviews the implications of this study: 
- Implications for Methodology 
- Implications for Academics 
- Implications for Practitioners 
- Implications for Policy 
- Implications for Islamic Financial Institutions 
- Implications for Future Research 
These will be discussed as follows: 
9.2.1 Implications for Methodology 
It is widely recognised that reaching informal investors is the most 
difficult constraint facing research in this field. However, the procedures 
employed in this study have shown its success. The snowball method, where 
one investor introduces other investors in his/her network to the study, 
proved to be quite successful in generating a high response compared to 
conventional approaches. 
9.2.2 Implication for Academics 
This study was fortunate enough to shed light on a research area that had 
been forgotten by researchers and policy makers in Saudi Arabia. This 
should be of interest not only to academics in Saudi Arabia but also in 
developed countries because, unusually, this study provided a comparative 
analysis with the literature of developed countries. Therefore, the study 
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provide the first picture of the behaviour of Saudi inforinal investors. New 
researchers may study problems in the market which are more focused. 
This study's use of asymmetric information and agency problems as a 
framework might be considered as a further step in this direction as this is 
very new to this field. 
9.2.3 Implications for Practitioners 
The study also is very important to practitioners in the market, namely 
entrepreneurs and informal investors. It may be particularly beneficial to 
entrepreneurs since it may give them a greater understanding of informal 
investors, in general; how these investors review funding proposals; and the 
criteria which are of particular importance to them. This- may make 
entrepreneurs more successful in their search for funding. On the other hand, 
it should also be beneficial to informal investors. Learning how other 
investors make investments, which criteria they find important, and methods 
to control risks associated with this kind of investment may be very 
important to examine their practices compared to other investors. This kind 
of research may be important to wealthy investors who have not yet 
invested in SMEs. This research may raise their awareness of informal 
venture capital as a viable funding option for them. 
9.2.4 Implications for Policy Makers 
All parties who are interested in the growth of SMEs and the future 
growth of the economy may benefit from this study since it is fair to assume 
that " the better we understand this market, the better we can fix it"(Wetzel, 
1993, p. 10). This research has shed light on some problems facing its 
development. Inefficiency of information channels and constraints that 
impede the growth of this market were clearly identified. Another area where 
attention should be paid is incentives that motivate informal investors. This 
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is supported by the findings of this study: that informal investors in Saudi 
Arabia are financially motivated in their involvement in SMEs. 
However, in addition, two infornial investor clusters were identified. 
As the informal approach investors seem to be local investors, this finding is 
very important when developing regional areas. Also, it was concluded that 
Saudi inforinal. investors are more involved in medium-sized firms, which is 
in contrast to the literature. It is believed that the developments of Formal 
Venture Capital Finns may improve informal investors' participation in 
small firms due to the competition that they may face from formal investors 
as is the case in developed countries. 
Saudi informal investors are not very interested in liquidation. This 
seems to be another area where policy could act to develop better liquidation 
methods, mainly in the stock market. The researcher believes that the skills 
that informal investors have in screening, monitoring and helping SMEs to 
succeed may not be fully utilised unless investors liquidate their portfolio 
when reaching a stable stage and invest in new ventures again and so on. 
9.2.5 Implications for Islamic Financial Institutions 
The two most important contracts that Islamic finance theory provides 
to channel funds from savers to investors are Mudarabah and Musharakah. 
The application of these contracts in the practices of Islamic financial 
institutions has been a small proportion in these institutions' portfolio. The 
constraints on the development of these two contracts are believed to be 
inherited from asymmetric information and agency problems 
This study about informal venture capital investors' behaviour may 
provide new insights into the development of Mudarabah and Musharakah 
applications in Islamic Finance Institutions. 
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9.2.6 Implications for Future Research 
By thoroughly addressing the subject area, this study has developed a 
good deal of knowledge about informal investors in Saudi Arabia; this will 
hopefully motivate further analysis and research in the subject. 
Future research may address the same issues to improve and support 
the generalisation of this study's findings. The shortcomings of the available 
approaches for collecting accurate samples are clear. Identifying a 
representative sample of the entire angels (informal investors) population is a 
challenge that remains unsolved. This may potentially affect the conclusions, 
but more research in the subject should decrease this problem. 
Also, later research may investigate other areas that seem to have 
important implications. More research should be directed at how contracts 
are organised; how cash, risk, and control are located; what kinds of 
incentives are used and how informal investors assign values to new venture. 
The relation between informal investors' involvement in the venture and its 
success must be examined, as well as the demand side, entrepreneurs' 
attitudes towards risk capital financing. 
However, the researcher believes that this study was courageous in 
shedding light on an invisible market in a developing country where 
information and data is extremely rare. It is hoped that this pioneer study 
will encourage the interest of other researchers in a very important aspect of 
the Saudi economy. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A. 1 
Loughborough 
University 
Informal Risk Capital Market 
In Saudi Arabia 
Investor's Characteristics and decision-making Behaviour 
Confidential 
M. Abalkhail Ph. D Student 
Business School 
Loughborough university 
Leics LE1 1 3TU UK 
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Dear investor 
Informal investors, who invest in small growing businesses exert an important and 
largely unnoticed influence on the economy development. Developing countries public 
policies have given theire investors considerable attentions and incentives to stimulate 
them to invest more and promote entrepreneurial activities which help to create a better 
future for them selves and their country. 
However, in Saudi Arabia we lack the knowledge about our high value investors 
and how public policies could help them. Currently I am conducting doctoral research 
about individual investors who invest in small unquoted firms in the Saudi Economy. As 
part of my research, this questionnaire is presented to you and if you could spare the time 
from your busy schedule to complete it and return it as soon as possible, it would be highly 
appreciated. 
Your responses to the questions will be treated as confidential and I promise to 
acknowledge your help ( if you wish)and provide you with a summary of my findings. 
Your faithfully, 
Al-Hussain 
loughborough University 
Business School 
UK 
M. Al-Hussain 
Imarn University 
Management Sciences Dept 
Saudi Arabia 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
(A) INVESTMENT HISTORY 
During the pasl five years, how many Investment Opportunities have You collie into Contact with? 
(a) number of investment opportunities .......... 
(b) Percentage of investments made O/o ......... 
(2) Many sources are considered to be providers ofinformation on investment opportunities. In the last 
five years, how important have the following sources of information been in providing you with 
investment opportunities'? 
(a) Banks 
(b) Real estate agmicies 
(c) Business associates 
(d) Friends/ relatives 
(e) Entrepreneurs 
(t) Active personal search 
(g) Chamber ofCornmerce 
(11) ('011sultation agencies 
(a) Other (please specify) 
Not --> Very 
important important 
12 3 4 5 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
(3) Are you satisfied with the effectivcness of existing channels ofcommunicatioll betwecti 
entrepreneurs seeking finance and investors like you? 
Not -> Very 
satisfied satisfied 
12345 
(4) if-there had becil sufficient opportullitics ill the last fivc ycars, would You ll', l\, C Illvest(2(i lll()IC llloljcý, 
ill a largcr number ot'companies? 
Defillitcly 110 defillitcly YC. S 
12345 
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(5) Of the investments that you have made in the past five years, how many have you made in each ofthe 
types of opportunities described in the below" 
(a) Start-Lip firms 
.. ... 
( in the idea stage ) 
(b) Infant firms .. ... 
( about one year old 
(C) Young firms 
.. ... 
( less than five year old) 
(d) Fstablished firms 
.. ... 
( more than five years old) 
(6) During the past five years, of the investments reported in Question (6), how many investments made 
by you fit into each of the following size bands? 
(a tinder 200,000 SR 
(b 200,000 - 600,000 SR ........... 
(c 600,000 - 2000,000 SR 
(d 2000,000 - 5000,000 SR ........... 
(e )5 millions and over SR 
(7) On average how much do you invest in real estate each year'. I 
(a) none 
(b) less than 1,000,000 
(b) more than 1,000,000 
8) Ofthe investments reported in question (6), please indicate the locations oftlic IMSiness oPport""Itic. " 
you have invested in: 
number aniount 
In I. and within 100 kni of home or office 
100 Kin - 200 kni oflionic or office 
more than 300 kni ofliome or office 
2) Abroad Gult, Countries .......... Arab countries 
other 
(9) Ofthe investments reported in question (6 ), how many fall into cach oftlic following iil(]Listl-ill 
catcgol-ics that YOU have madc? ( Mcasc mark cach category that you havc invcstcd in. ) 
Numbei 
(a) Retail trade/ wholesale 
(b) Agricultui c/fishing 
(C) Manufacturing - inclustrial products 
(d) Manufacturing - COIISLIIIICI' 1)1-0(11ICtS 
(e) Construction 
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services( hotels, iestuarants, financial services .... 
Other (please specify) 
10) flow many ot'these investments were in businesses developing an innovative product or lising 
innovative technological process 
.......... 
(13) Decision making 
Evaluation of an opportunity is ail important stage before investors put their moncy in a ventuic. In 
your experience, which of the following analytical methods do you use'? 
never -> often 
(a) Normally rely oil own 12345 
evaltiation and intuition 
(b) Normally rely on friends' 1234 
advice 
(c) Normally rely on associate 12345 
advice 
(d) Normally rely oil advice from 1234 
a consultation agency 
(e) Use formalised procedures 12345 
(12) When evaluating opportunitics, you Face the risk ofinvesling in a Im\ quality \, criturc. In your 
experience how important are the following critcria in your decision about the quality oftlic pro. ject'? 
( please circle your opinion in each category. ) 
(a) product stimulate existing 
market 
(h) market has high growth rate 
(C) low threat ofcarly 
competition 
(d) applopriatc rcturn 
(e) tile venture is in all industry 
which we are familiar xvith 
I-) there are a xNCII-establislied 
distilbution cliamicls 
protection Of' product 
( intelicclual patent) 
(11) IIIVCStrIICIIt COLI)d bC CýISJIY 
Inade liquid 
(f) government is a customer 
f'or the prodLICt 
Strongly 
Disaorce 
2 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5 
S 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
S 
5 
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(J) too large amount offinance sought 12345 
(K) not in my geographical area 12345 
(L) not in my industrial sector preference 12345 
(i) Othei (please specify) 12345 
(13) You also face the risk of investing in a project nin by a low quality entrepreneur. In your experience, 
how important are the following criteria in your decision about the quality ofthe entrepreneur'? 
Strongly 'Strongly 
Disag 
, ree A u, rec 
Entrepreneur: 
(a) has ail exceptionally , ood track record 
1 -as clerk in other companies 
2- in establishing previous pi-o, lccts 
(b) is familiar with the market 
(c) evaluates risk well 
(d) capable of sustain effort 
(e) has a family or friendship 
link with me 
f) has an ability to articulate , vhen 
discussing venture 
(g) was recommended to me by 
a trustworthy source 
(h) his father is a successful businessman 
(i) comes from acceptable social class 
or family name 
tj ) entrepreneur is not takin- any equity I 
(k) I do not trust tile entrepreneure 
(J) othei ................................................. 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 4 risk. 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
14) 111 YOLII- CXPCI'iClICe , 
IIOW Oftell (10 YOU Use tile l'Ollowing, procedures to control 
entrepreneur's behaviour bel'ore and alter the I'Linds are comillitte(I'? 
Never -> Ol'tell 
(a) a large percentage of' 12345 
initial financing has to 
come from entrepreneur's 
personal savings 
(b) Tying the equity oftlic 
entreprenCLIr ill the VC]ltlll'C 
to achieving specific levels 
of'performancc 
(e) I ask for a seat in the board 
(t) I do not use any procedure 
hCCaIlSC I trLlSt him 
I do not use any procedure 
because we have the same 
interest ( the firni's success) 
(C) Other (please specify) 
1 
I2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
1 
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(C) STAGING and SYNDICATION 
15) Providing finance to the entrepreneur can be given in total in the beginning or can be provided in 
stages as the venture develops. In your experience do you use staging offinance? 
(a) often ....... 
(b) sometimes ....... 
(c) rarely ....... 
(d) never ....... 
It' answer a-c please go to Q 16 it' d go to Q 17 
16) What ývas the reason in using stagino finance? 
(a) To assess the quality of 
the entrcprcncLu- 
(b) to assess the quality of the 
venture 
(c) to create an incentive for the 
entrepreneur and reduce 
Monitoring , costs. 
Never Often 
12345 
124 
234 
(17) Some investors do not invest in a firm unless there are other investors willijIL,, to ijj\, Cst, I lo\\ C\ cr, 
others do not like syndication. I low often have YOU participated with others? 
(a) Often 
(b) Sometimes 
(C) Rarely 
(d) Never 
If a-c go to Q 18 ifd go to 20 
8) What was the reason for syndicalion? 
Strongly Strongly 
I)I sa I-cc Agree 
(a) to provide deferent expertise 12345 
to the venture 
(b) to reduce the risk of'choosing 12345 
a low equality venture 
(c) I ask l7riends to syndicate with nic, 12345 
so, they will in turn offer nic their 
opportunities 
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(19) If you have participated with other investois in providing risk capital to a 
small firm. x\ cre the following acccptable partners? 
never ---> often 
(a) Government development agencies 12 3 45 
(b) Friends 12 3 45 
(C) Relatives 12 3 45 
(d) banks 12 3 45 
(d) Other companies 12 3 45 
(20) What form of financial return would you prefer on your informal risk capital investment? 
Capital gain: The profit that you make when you sell 1he venture later on. 
Dividends: The profit that you receive frorn the venture on a yearly basis. 
(a) Entirely long-term capital gains 
(b) Mostly long-term capital Pins 
(c) Part capital gains, part current dividends 
(c) Mostly current dividends 
(e) Entirely current dividends 
(21) What is the minimum cNpcctcd annual percentage rate of'rcturn that Nvotll(l encourage you to invest ill 
each ofthe following types ofinvcstnicnts? 
(a) Risk capital investment( in small unquoted Firms) ....... 
(b) Stock markct firms 
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(22) To what extent do you normally expect to become involved with a risk capital invcstment9 
Disagree Strongly 
A,, ree 
(a) No involvement at all 12345 
(b) Rcvic\v vei iodic i-eports or 12345 
attending general mecting 
only 
(C) Provide consulting help as 
needed 
(d) Representation on the 
board of directors 
(e) Work part-time with the firm 
(t) Work full-time with the firm 
(t) Other (please specify) 
(D) Attitudes 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
23 ) As an investor , 
do you feel that Satidi culturc has a bias towards cinrepreneurship rather than 
working in government or big, companies? 
Strongly disagree StIoll"k, aurce 
24 
(24) Saudi Graduates prefer to be selfemploycd than workinLý for others'? 
Sti-ongly disagree strongly agi cc 
12345 
(25) 11'public policy wants to promote the informal venture capital market, ill your opinion wbat actions 
could tile government takes '? Please list your suggestions : 
(a) ........................................................................................................................ 
(b) ......................................................................................................................... 
(c) .......................................................................................................................... 
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(26) 1 low (to you feel about the process of obtaining listing on the Saudi stock market '? 
Strongly strom, Iy 
disagree agree 
(a) listing in Saudi stock market 12 3 45 
is too complex 
(b) LýON'Cl-11111CIlt SIIOLIId case the listim, 12 3 45 
regulation 
(c) government should create another 12 3 45 
stock market with easier access 
for new established firms 
(d) other ........................................... 12 4 
: 
f(2"77ý))--or I'Liture investment which of the following, sectors are your prefer encess 
Strongly stro ngly 
disagree agree 
(a) Manul , acturing 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Services 1 2 3 4 S 
(C) Real estate 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Construction 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Agriculture 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Retail/wholesale trade 1 2 3 4 5 
(g) Other (specify) .................... 1 2 3 4 5 
(28) 1 low do you feel about the following list ofconstraints that may prevent the giowti, of i, iformal risk 
capital 
Strongly Strongly 
disagi-ce agi cc 
(a) owners of small firms do not 12345 
want outside equity financing even 
if-they have to sacrifice grox\th 
(b) communication- wlicre invcstois and 
enti-cpi-cricurs can not identify 
cach other- 
(c) the supply of good growing businesses 
in Saudi Arabia is very limited 
(d) wealthy people do not want to take the 
risk ot'growing businesses 
(d) other (specify) ........................................ 
........ I .................................................. 
1 
2 4 
2 3 4 
12 3 4 5 
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(29) If there is a fund establisbcd to invest in small growing, businesses, managed by a professional 
organisation such as indusirial development ILl"d Or investment company, do YOU think YOU NVOUld 
invest ill it '? 
Strondy disagree strongly agree 
1245 
(30) Would you bc interested in participating in a regional service that refured to you im estment 
opportunities that have been evaluated and supported by consultation agency 01" YOLII' hank? 
Strongly disagree strongly agree 
124 
(F) investors and investment background: 
(ilic next questions will licIp in the slatistical analysis) 
(31) PLI11111" YOLII' money in a small or new firm is \, cry risky, Compared to other Icss risky options, like 
banks' funds or stock market? What \Nas the motivation behind your investment in small firms 
(a) Looking for high return 
(b) Religion Ontcrcst prohibition) 
(c) I IcIping nevv critrepreneurs (self-satisfaction) 
(d) 11clping fricildfamily members 
(c) For recognition in the community 
(f) To support socially bencticial producls or services 
(32) Your educational back. ground: 
(a) No formal education 
(b) Secondary school or less 
(C) [; niversity degree 
Business and FIconomics 
Technical field 
A rt 
llo,, t-( lm(juatc (lc(-, I-cc (MSC PlID) 
hollic 
ovasees 
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V/ (33) Your occupation now: 
(a) Managing a private business 
(b) (iovernment official (ýNorker) 
(c) Free investor / self-employed 
(d) Professional (doctor, engincer, teacher 
(34) What age group are you in? 
(a) Under 30 
(b) 30-40 years old 
(C) 41-50 years old 
(d) 50-60 years old 
(e) Above 60 
(35) 1 lave you ever created a business? 
(a) never 
(b) just one 
(c) two or more 
(36) Within what range does your annual household income lie? 
(a) less than 150,000 SR 
(b) 15 1,000 ---- 300,000 SR 
(c) 301,000 ---- 500,000 SR 
(d) 501,000 ---- 1,000,000 SR 
(e) more than 1000,000 SR 
(37) Within what range does your houschOld let Nvortli lic '? excluding main residence. 
(a) less than 500,000 SR 
(h) 500'000 ---- 1,000,000 SR 
(C) 1,000,000 ---- 2,000,000 SR 
(d) 2000,000 ---- 4,000,000 SR 
(d) 4,000,000 ---- 6,000,000 SR 
(c) more than 6,000M00 SR 
285 
(38) What arc the sources of this wealth? 
(a) fi-om creating prevous projects 
(b) [Zeal estate investment 
(c) saving from prevous jonbs 
(d) I lcrila-e 
Thank you very much for co-operation 
Please Fill the enclosed card and send it separately - envelope is provided-. 
M. Al-hussain 
11.0.13OX 1775 
Alqusim BUraydah 
KSA 
Tel. 06323 - 4793 
Fax. 06324 - 5200 
Mobile: 0411-489 091 
Pager 1933 - 27 97 
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Loughborough 
University 
Business School 
United Kingdom 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B. 1 
Comparisons of Co-investing partners 
Never Rarcly Sometimes Mostly Often Total 
NO. NO. % NO. % NO. 'Yo NO, % NO. ofthe 
sample 
Friends 3 19 ý4 15.4 24 15.4 45 28. N 39 25.0 135 86. S 
Mean-3.69 
Std. Dev. -. 1.19 
Banks 57 36.5 24 15A 30 19.2 15 9.6 9 5.8 135 86.5 
N/lean=2.22 
Std. Dev. -1.29 
- Other 30 19.2 21 13.5 -- 19.2 30 39 25.0 15 9.6 135 86.5 
Companies 
Meaný2.91 
Std. Dev. - 1.34 
Government 93 59.6 9 5.8 15 9.6 12 7.7 6 3.8 135 86.5 
1 Agencies I 
Mean=1.73 
ý Std. Dev. ýý1.22 
Family Member .5 24 15.4 33 2 
-21- 13.5 36 23.1 135 86. S 
Mean=3.20 
Std. Dev.: 1.41 
In a , calc hom I -, and ý) being often 
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Appendix B. 2.1 
Education vs Criteria related to Venture and Entrepreneur 
[N-a-riables High 
schoolor 
less 
Universit 
Y 
I postgra - 
duate 
F Sig 
_ ,, _Product 
stimulate existing market _ _____ 4.83 
-- 
__ ___ 4.54 ___ 1 4.57 . 983 _377 Market has high growth rate 
Cow-threat of early competition 
Appropriate return 
4.17 
3.50 
4.67 
4.48 
3.96 
4.33 
4.24 
3.43 
4.29 
3.022 
5.813 
2.487 
0ýý 5 
. 004 
. 087 Investor is familiar with the industry 4.17 3.88 3.62 2.523 . 084 A well-established distribution channels 
r-P-rotection -of pr-oduct 
3.67 
3.83 
4.21 
3.12 
3.95 
2.95 
3.126 
3.978 . 
047 
. 021 Investment could be easily made liquid 3.67 3.04 3.57 4.920 . 009 Government is a customer for the product 2.67 2.29 2.14 1.496 . 227 Amount of Finance Sought 3.50 4.04 4.05 2.383 . 096 - Geographical Area- of the project T'- L - - ' H 3.00 3.33 3.33 . 668 . 514 - ýrojecd ýe i ector oýt 
ý71 
ný u 
ýsý 
3.17 3.67 -2.90 9.187 . 000 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as an 
employee in other companies 
3.67 3.62 3.43 . 821 . 
442 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as a 
founder of previous ventures 
4.83 4.75 1.588 . 208 
Entrepreneur is familiar with the market 
- - - 
4.37 4.33 -3.5§9 . 031 repreneur evaluate risk well ffý t -4.71 -4.37 4.10 7.79-9 . 001 Entrepreneur capable of sustain effort 4.17 4.04 4.05 . 207 . 
813 
Entrepreneur has a family or friendship link 
with the investor 
2.00 2.25 2.62 2.219 . 112 
Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate when 
discussing venture 
Entrepreneur was recommended to the 
investor by a trustworthy source 
- 
3.67 
3.33 
67 
4.00 
3.41 
3. T1 
T243 
5.39-9 
. 
291 
. 005 
ntrepreneur's father is a successful E 
businessman 
1.33 1.83 1.95 2.605 . 077 
_ Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social 
class or family name 
1.50 2.46 2.19 5.194 . 007 
-f-r-ustw6rthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 
- 
4.50 4.63 4.29 3.303 . 039 Cn trepreneur provided some Equity 41 7 E .05 5.118 . 
007 E E Eý ý 
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Appendix B. 2.2 
Age vs Criteria related to Venture and Entrepreneur 
Variables less4l - 
Years 
ý 4(ý-50 4 0--() 
Vea 
ýrs 
Years 
More5O j 
Years 
Product stimulate existing market 4.40 1 4.63 4.83 3.558 . 031 1 Market has high growth rate 4.30 
- - 
4.42 4.27 . 723 . 4871 Low threat of early competition 1 8 5 3 8-4 3.17 7.435 . 001 Appropriate return 4.30 4.42 4.33 . 519 . 596 Investor is familiar with the industry 3.65 
- 
4.06 3.75 1.905 . 152 A well-established distribution channels 3.6 0 -442 3.83 -8 8 4-7 . 
600- 
Protection of product 2.90 3.37 3.17 -- 23-0-9- ---. 103 
Investment could be easily made liquid 
- 
2.85 3.84 3.33 13384 boo 
Government is a customer for the product 2.45 2.60-- -- 2-42 --2 68-9 7071 
Amount of Finance Sought 4.20 3.89 3.75 2.652 . 074 Geographical Area of the project 3.55 3.32 2 . 83 4.623 . 011 Industrial Sector of the project 3.65 3.00 _ _ 3.17- 583-2 - -. 004 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as an 
employee in other companies 
3.60 3.42 3.67 . 825 . 440 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as a 
founder of previous ventures 
4.55 4.89 4.67 6.613 . 002 
Entrepreneur is familiar with the m 3rket 4.4 5 4.45 4.25 1 . 272 . 283 Entrepreneur evaluate risk well 4.35 427 4-25 . 
3-59 - 
. 699 Entrepreneur capable of susta6e-ffort 3.95 4.26 3.92 
- 
3.464 . 034 Entrepreneur has a family or friendship link Wi-th 
the investor 
2.60 2.11 2. A2 - -2.169 . 118 
Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate -when 
discussing venture 
3-. 5-5 -3.56 -37ý8- 
- 
- -. 013 - 
- 
----. 987 
Entrepreneur was recommended to the investor 
by a trustworthy source 
--- 4-. 00 -3.84 3 -42 
-5. K2 - - 
. 
004 
Entrepreneur's father is a successful 
businessman 
ZT5 -- -1.53 135 5.867 . 004 
Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social 
class or family name 
Y55- 2-. 16 1.83 4.644 . 011 
Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 4.40 4.47 4.58 . 622 . 538 Entrepreneur provided some Equity 3.83 ý 4.143 . 018 
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Appendix B. 2.3 
Experience vs Criteria related to Venture and Entrepreneur 
Variables No experience Experienced F Sig 
Product stimulate existing market 4.40 4.61 . 892 . 346 Market has high growth rate 4.00 4.37 4.5CO --. 036 
Low threat of early competition 3.80 3.67 . 238 . 626 Appropriate return 4.60 4.33 2.343 . 
128 
Investor is familiar with the industry 3.80 3.80 . 000 . 991 A well-established distribution channels 3.80 4.07 1.147 . 286 Protection of product 3.00 3.15 . 201 . 655 Investment could be easily made liquid 3.60 3.29 1 . 035 . 311 Government is a customer for the product 2.20 2.27 . . 051 . 822 - Amount of Finance Sought 4.20 3§8 . 6W . 405 Geographical Area of the project 4.00 3.23 6.390 . 013 Industrial Sector of the project 3.40 3.29 . 132 . 717 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as an 
employee in other companies 
3.80 3.53 1.057 . 306 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as a 
founder of previous ventures 
4.60 4.72 . 620 . 432 
Entrepreneur is familiar with the market 4.60 4.36 1.510 . 22-1 Entrepreneur evaluate risk well 4.20 4.3 1 . 388 . 5d4 Entrepreneur capable of sustain effort 
- 
3.80 4.09 
_1.965 . 
163 
ntrepreneur has a family or friendship link 
with the investor 
3.80 2.23 22.584 
. 000 
Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate 
when discussing venture 
3.46 3.58 
. 437 . 
5-10 
Entrepreneur was recommended to the 
investor by a trustworthy source 
3.60 
- - 
3.82 
- 
. 954 
-- 
. 330 
Entrepreneur's father is a successful 
businessman 
2.6 0 
- - 
ý 
1.74 
- 
9.917 
. 002 
Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social 
class or family name 
3.8 0 2. w 3-6.509 
. 000 
Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 4.20 4.51 2.212 . 139 Entrepreneur provided some Equity 3.80 3.82 --. 007 . 932 
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Appendix B. 2.4 
Income vs Criteria related to Venture and Entrepreneur 
Variables 
ýP_rol_d_uct 
stimulate existing market 
low 
Inco 
me 
_-5.00 
___ M: ---- _H_. _ 
Incorn Incom 
ee 
4.59 -4.59 
T ------- 
. 377 
si 9 
. 68T Market has high growth rate 
Low threat of early competition 
Appropriate return 
5.00 
4.06 
5.00 
. 18 3.59 
4.27 
4.46_ 
3.70 
4.41 
___ 
4.990 
. 445 2.245 
. 008 
. 642 
. 110 Investor is familiar with the industry 4.00 3.68 3.85 . 610 . 545 A well-established distribution channels 5.00 3.95 4.04 
- 
1.95-6 
. 145 
Protection of product 400 3.14 3.11 - . 786 . 457 Investment could be easily made liquid 4.00 3.27 3.33 . 609 . 545 Government is a customer for the product 5.00 2.32 2.11 10.468 . 000 Amount of Finance Sought 5.00 4.18 3.85 3.783 . 025 Geographical Area of the project 5.00 3.05 3.48 6 . 384-- 
- -. 00 2 
Industrial Sector of the project -4-. 00 -3.14 3.44 _ 2.083 __ _ . 128 
- - Entrepreneur has a good track record as an employee 
in other companies 
2 
. 
00 3.55 3.59 3.912 . 022 
Entrepreneur has a good track record as a founder of 
previous ventures 
5.00 4.59 
- - 
4.78 2.707 
. 070 
Entrepreneur is familiar with the market 5.0b 4 .2 
3 4.54 5. ý3 6- . 005 Entrepreneur evaluate risk well 400 4.2 7 4. M 10 9 . 405 Entrepreneur capable of sustain effort 4.00 4.05_ 4.07 _ . 035 . 966 Entrepreneur has a family or friendship link with the 
investor 
2.00 2.32 2.44 . 293 . 746 
Entrepreneur has an ability to articulate when 
discussing venture 
3.00 3., V 3.70 2.148 . 120 
Entrepreneur was recommended to the investor by a 
trustworthy source 
100 -3.95 3.74 2.670 . 073_' 
Entrepreneur's father is a successful businessman 3.00 1.95 1.70 3103 . 048 Entrepreneur comes from acceptable social class or 
family name 
2.00 2.23 2.26 _ . 076 . 927 
Trustworthiness/honesty of the entrepreneur 5.60 4.32 4.56 2.448 ý090 Entrepreneur provided some Equity 1.00- 3-8-2 3.81 . 867 . 422 
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Appendix B. 2.5 
Wealth vs Criteria related to Venture and Entrepreneur 
31 1 
Appendix B. 3 
Involvement with the venture 
Age 
Age No Review periodic Consulting as Board of Work part Work full- Group 
Involverne reports & general needed directors time with the time with Size 
nt meeting firm the firm 
<40 years 1.60 4.20 4.50 3.45 2.15 1.50 18 
40-50 years 2.11 4.21 4.42 3.47 2.2 1.26 72 
>50 years 1.58 4.58 4.00 3.67 1.83 1.42 63 
Sig. 
. 006 . 064 . 010 .. 
674 . 363 . 
20 - 
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Appendix BA 
Cross-tabulation Opportunities 
Received vs Opportunities Invested 
Received 
Opportunities 
Invested 
1 7 5 2 14 
2 18 - - 2 46 
3 6 7 4 - 2 19 
4 9 15 2 1 1 28 
5 3 6- 2 4 15 
6 5 3 3 12 
7 2 
8 2 2 
9 3 3 
to 3 1 2 6 
12 3 3 
14 1 1 
20 1 
24 3 3 
Total 51 60 18 11 _ 7 1 8 156 
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Appendix B. 5 
1- Consultation Agencies 
Number ol'Investment Opportunities Received 
Consultation Agencies Cross-tabulation 
Number of Investment 
Opportunities 
Received 
Not 
Important 
Cit-fle A-verage 
Important Important 
F important Very 
Important 
Total 
<5 6 11 80 18 3 6 51 
-5-15 15 9 15 5 3 57 
16-28 - 7 8 - - 15 
29-49 - 2 4 6 
50-99 2 3 3 - - 8 
>99 1 - 3 3 9 16 
Total 24 39 51 21 18 153 
2- Friends 
Number of Investment Opportunities Received 
Friends Cross-tabulation 
Number of Investment 
Opportunities 
Received 
Not 
Important 
--- Little I 
Importan 
- Avera-ge---- 
Important 
<5 3- 9 -- - 3, 
5-15 3-- -15 2-, 
16-28 
29-49 
- 
- 
9 6 
6 
50-99 5_ _3 
>99 7 3 3 
Total 3 1 18 ýý 6 ---- T-7ý 
mportant Very Tota 
Important 
3 51 
12 60 
15 
6 
8 
3 16 
314 
